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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three chapters. 
In the ﬁrst chapter (The Medium Term Eﬀects of Unemployment Beneﬁts), I 
explore the eﬀect of longer potential duration of unemployment beneﬁts on workers’ 
employment over 4 years after layoﬀ. To this purpose, I exploit rich and novel 
administrative data from Italy. The identiﬁcation is based on an age at layoﬀ rule 
which determines 4 additional months of beneﬁts for workers who are ﬁred after 
turning 50 years of age. I use this in a Regression Discontinuity Design with a 
donut correction to account for strategic delay of layoﬀ in the neighbourhood of 
the age threshold. I show that workers with longer potential beneﬁts spend more 
time on beneﬁts and in nonemployment before ﬁnding a new job than workers 
ﬁred before turning 50 years of age. However, I ﬁnd that the two groups of 
workers spend a similar amount of time in nonemployment over 4 years since layoﬀ. 
This shows that classical estimates of nonemployment eﬀects of unemployment 
beneﬁts, which do not take into account recurrent nonemployment spells, tend to 
overestimate these negative eﬀects. 
In the second chapter (Happy Birthday? Manipulation and Selection in Unem­
ployment Insurance), with Luca Citino (LSE and Bank of Italy) and Kilian Russ 
(Bonn School of Economics), we study the strategic timing of layoﬀ for workers 
to gain eligibility to longer beneﬁts. We use rich Italian administrative data and 
we focus on an age at layoﬀ rule which determined an increase in unemployment 
beneﬁt potential duration for workers ﬁred after turning 50 years of age. We ﬁnd 
that, in a neighbourhood of the threshold, a relevant share of individuals delays 
the date of layoﬀ in order to be eligible to longer beneﬁts. These workers are more 
likely to be women, white collar, part time and to be employed in small ﬁrms 
with respect to workers who do not engage in manipulation. Most importantly, 
these workers show a higher baseline risk of long-term unemployment. Although 
4 
manipulation leads to a large increase in beneﬁts, the mechanical component plays 
a central role and behavioural responses are limited. 
In third chapter (Teacher Turnover? Does it Matter for Student Achievement), 
with Shqiponja Telhaj (University of Sussex) and Steve Gibbons (LSE), we 
study the eﬀect of teacher turnover in UK secondary schools. By using a rich 
regression model and large administrative data, we ﬁnd that teacher turnover has 
a small negative, but highly statistically signiﬁcant, eﬀect on pupils’ performance. 
This eﬀect is stronger for pupils at the bottom of grade distribution and from 
disadvantaged background. 
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Chapter 1 
The Medium Term Eﬀects of Unemployment
Beneﬁts 
Vincenzo Scrutinio 
IZA, London School of Economics 
Abstract 
Although there is extensive literature on the short term eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts, 
little is known about their medium term implications. In this paper, I use rich and novel 
administrative data from Italy to study the eﬀects of potential beneﬁt duration on ag­
gregate outcomes over 4 years after layoﬀ. To obtain causal estimates, the identiﬁcation 
exploits an age at layoﬀ rule, which determines a 4 months increase in potential beneﬁt 
duration if the worker is ﬁred after turning 50 years old. Workers with longer potential 
beneﬁt duration spend more time on unemployment beneﬁts and in nonemployment 
before ﬁnding a new job. They are also slightly more likely to ﬁnd a permanent and full 
time contract. Over the 4 years following layoﬀ, however, the diﬀerence in time spent 
in nonemployment between workers with shorter and longer beneﬁts is substantially 
reduced. Frequent transitions between employment and nonemployment, and a faster 
transition of workers with longer beneﬁts towards new ﬁrms explain this discrepancy. 
These ﬁndings are important from a policy perspective as they suggest that classical 
measures of the cost of unemployment beneﬁts tend to overestimate the negative ex­
ternalities of potential beneﬁt duration. 
Keywords: Unemployment insurance; post-unemployment wages; regression discon­
tinuity design; medium term outcomes. 
J.E.L. codes: E24; H24; H55; J65. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Unemployment beneﬁts play a central role in the modern welfare state and are present 
in most developed and developing economies. Their primary role is to support workers’ 
income in periods of unemployment, thus reducing poverty and preventing sharp declines 
in consumption. However, they also generate ﬁscal costs and deadweight losses to the 
extent that workers spend more time in unemployment when covered by more generous 
beneﬁts. These two components (insurance and negative ﬁscal externalities) constitute 
the building blocks to assess the optimality of the policy (Baily, 1978 and Chetty, 2006). 
In order to assess the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts on the behaviour of workers, 
researchers usually focus on the duration of the nonemployment spell following layoﬀ, 
but this may provide only a partial picture of the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts. On 
the one hand, human capital depreciation and scarring might make it more diﬃcult 
for workers to move to a diﬀerent job or increase the time spent in nonemployment 
in future transitions between two jobs. On the other hand, workers might exploit the 
longer period in nonemployment to gain search experience and later move faster between 
jobs. In addition, workers can experience frequent transitions between employment and 
nonemployment and this could contribute to reduce the diﬀerences in employment for 
workers exposed to beneﬁts with diﬀerent generosity. The combined magnitude and 
sign of these additional eﬀects is an open empirical question which, so far, has received 
limited attention. 
In this paper, I aim to ﬁll this gap in the literature by investigating the eﬀects of 
potential beneﬁt duration over an extended period of time. More speciﬁcally, I look 
at the eﬀects of diﬀerent potential beneﬁt duration (PBD) on employment, earnings 
and transfers over a 4 years period after layoﬀ. To this purpose, I use rich and novel 
administrative data from Italy on the universe of recipients of unemployment beneﬁts 
and of private sector working histories. The identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀects of PBD 
relies on a quasi-experimental source of variation induced by an age-at-layoﬀ rule: 
workers who were ﬁred after turning 50 years of age were eligible to 12 months of PBD 
while other workers were eligible to 8 months of PBD. I exploit this variation in a sharp 
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) strategy. Consistently with previous ﬁndings 
14 CHAPTER 1. MEDIUM TERM EFFECTS OF UB 
in the literature, I ﬁnd that longer PBD increases the duration of the nonemployment 
spell following layoﬀ: workers exposed to longer PBD spend more time on beneﬁts 
and in nonemployment before ﬁnding a new job (by 8 and 6.2 weeks respectively). 
It also has a positive eﬀect on next job quality with a small, positive and signiﬁcant 
increase in the probability of ﬁnding a permanent and full time job. The eﬀects on 
other job characteristics, most notably wages and tenure, are small, positive but not 
statistically signiﬁcant. However, if we look at the full 4 years period after layoﬀ, 
workers with initially longer beneﬁts spend only 2 more weeks in nonemployment with 
respect to workers initially eligible to shorter beneﬁts. Consistently, after their ﬁrst 
spell on beneﬁts, they also spend 2 weeks less on unemployment beneﬁts. This shows 
that, over the medium run, workers with longer beneﬁts almost entirely close the gap in 
terms of nonemployment with respect to other workers. The discrepancy between these 
eﬀects is determined by two diﬀerent elements: ﬁrst, all workers tend to experience 
again job losses and, as this aﬀects more workers with shorter beneﬁts, it leads to a 
narrowing in the employment rate gap between the two groups; second, workers with 
longer beneﬁt duration ﬁnd a second job quicker than workers with shorter beneﬁt 
duration. Employment seasonality and temporary peaks in economic activity possibly 
play an important role as a relevant share of layoﬀ happens close to one year after the 
ﬁrst layoﬀ. The ﬁrst element explains about three quarters of the diﬀerence between 
the ﬁrst spell and medium run estimates while the remaining quarter is related to a 
quicker transition to a second job. Gains in terms of better match between the worker 
and the ﬁrst ﬁrm do not play a central role: longer PBD has only a small and not 
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the duration of the ﬁrst job. These results are robust to a wide 
range of robustness and identiﬁcation checks and a rich heterogeneity analysis shows 
that they apply to a large set of economic conditions and to a wide range of workers. 
Workers from small ﬁrms and permanent contracts are in general the most aﬀected 
by longer PBD but, also for them, medium term estimates are substantially smaller 
than the eﬀect on the ﬁrst nonemployment spell duration. This has implications for the 
ﬁscal externalities of unemployment beneﬁts. Indeed, by receiving beneﬁts for longer 
time and paying less taxes, workers exposed to more generous beneﬁts create costs that 
have to be ﬁnanced by general taxation. The present results show that, while the ﬁrst 
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element can be quite relevant, as workers indeed change their search as a consequence of 
more generous beneﬁts, the second channel is much less important than what a simple 
analysis of the time to the next job might suggest. Moreover, I show that workers 
initially exposed to longer beneﬁts also have a lower probability of getting beneﬁts 
in the future, which directly oﬀset part of the ﬁrst element. This, in turn, leads to 
a downward correction of the costs of longer beneﬁts and could lead to increase the 
optimal generosity of unemployment beneﬁts. As data on consumption are not available 
in my setting, I leave a more precise computations on the optimality of the beneﬁts to 
future research. 
This paper contributes to an extensive literature on the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts. 
There is a general consensus on the positive eﬀect of PBD (Card et al., 2007a, Lalive, 
2007, Caliendo et al., 2013, Le Barbanchon, 2016, Schmieder et al., 2012a, Nekoei and 
Weber, 2017) on nonemployment duration after layoﬀ, although there is substantial 
variation in the exact magnitude of the eﬀect of an additional week of beneﬁt: estimates 
range from close zero (Lalive, 2007, for small increase in potential beneﬁt duration; 
Nekoei and Weber, 2017) up to 0.6 (Lalive, 2007 for women with large increase in PBD). 
Results on the eﬀects on post unemployment job quality are in general mixed with often 
insigniﬁcant eﬀects (Card et al., 2007a and Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006) with two 
main exceptions: Schmieder et al. [2016] ﬁnd small negative eﬀects on future wages 
whereas Nekoei and Weber [2017] identify small positive eﬀects. Several works also 
estimated the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts generosity, in terms of the amount of 
the beneﬁt, on nonemployment duration. Lalive et al. [2006] exploit a policy change in 
Austria in 1989 and investigate the eﬀects of changes in generosity and PBD. They ﬁnd 
the eﬀect of higher generosity to be negligible with respect to the eﬀects of extended 
beneﬁt duration. More recent contributions, implementing regression kink design, show 
that higher generosity leads to a longer period receiving unemployment beneﬁts (Card 
et al., 2015) and to longer nonemployment spells (Britto, 2016, and Landais, 2015). 
Despite this vast literature, we only have limited evidence on the medium run eﬀects of 
unemployment beneﬁts. Degen and Lalive [2013] use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy 
to assess the eﬀect of a reduction in PBD for workers with more than 55 years of age 
at layoﬀ. Their results show that this has long lasting positive eﬀects on employment. 
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More recently, Kyyrä and Pesola [2017] use Swedish data and exploit a reform in 2005 
which postponed the age at which worker can obtain longer unemployment beneﬁts 
for workers born after 1950. They ﬁnd that a postponement in this threshold leads 
to 9% increase in months worked and labour income. Due to the direct interaction 
with early retirement schemes, their results are less informative for workers at diﬀerent 
points in the age distribution. Schmieder et al. [2012b] is the closest contribution to the 
present work as they exploit an age based discontinuity in PBD to study the eﬀects of 
unemployment beneﬁts in the medium run. They ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in time spent 
in nonemployment between the two groups is substantially reduced when they consider 
time spent in nonemployment over 5 years. However, they also ﬁnd that the discrepancy 
in time spent receiving unemployment beneﬁts increases over 5 years, which makes it 
diﬃcult to assess the overall eﬀects on negative externalities and public ﬁnances. The 
limited evidence on the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts in the medium run (Schmieder 
and Von Wachter, 2016) makes this topic particularly salient from a research perspective. 
This paper contributes to the literature in a twofold direction. First, it provides evidence 
on the medium-term eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts and shows that workers with 
longer PBD close relatively quickly the gap in employment with respect to workers 
with shorter beneﬁts. This is related to both frequent transitions between employment 
and nonemployment and to faster transitions of workers with longer beneﬁts towards a 
second job afterwards. This ﬁnding is crucial from a policy perspective as it suggests that 
standard measures of the negative externalities of unemployment beneﬁts overestimate 
the actual costs of longer potential beneﬁt duration. Second, it provides the ﬁrst 
causal estimates for the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts in the Italian context with 
large administrative data. In a previous work, Rosolia and Sestito [2012] implement 
a diﬀerence in diﬀerence strategy and exploit a policy change in 2001 to evaluate the 
eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration and generosity in Italy. However, their sample is 
limited, and their identiﬁcation might suﬀer from changes in business cycle conditions. 
Interestingly, their estimates are lower but still reasonably close to the ones of the 
present work. 
The rest of paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the Italian institutional 
setting; Section 1.3 provides a description of the data and of the sample construction; 
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Section 1.4 outlines the empirical strategy and methodological approach; Section 1.5 
reports the main results and discusses the mechanism at work; Section 1.6 looks at 
heterogeneous eﬀects; Section 1.7 implements a series of robustness checks; ﬁnally 
Section 1.8 concludes. 
1.2 Institutional setting 
In this study, I focus on the main unemployment beneﬁt which characterized the Italian 
Welfare system up to 2013: the unemployment beneﬁt for Ordinary Unemployment with 
Normal Requirement (Disoccupazione Ordinaria a Requisiti Normali, OUNR throughout 
the rest of the paper). This UB was introduced at the eve of World War II (Regio Decreto 
14th April 1939 ) and later progressively extended in both coverage and generosity. By 
the start of the new millennium, all employees in the non-agricultural sector were eligible, 
conditional on a few requirements.1 Its structure and generosity were modiﬁed several 
times over the years but in the period under study, from 2009 to 2012, its characteristics 
were similar to policies in many other European economies (Austria, Nekoei and Weber, 
2017; Germany, Caliendo et al., 2013 and Schmieder et al., 2012a). In this period, PBD 
was fully determined by the age at layoﬀ with a threshold mechanism: workers ﬁred 
before turning 50 were eligible to 8 months of unemployment beneﬁts (34.64 weeks or 
241 days)2 while workers ﬁred after turning 50 could receive up 12 months of subsidy 
(52 weeks or 365 days). The amount was proportional to average wages in the 3 months 
preceding layoﬀ with a declining schedule over the unemployment spell. Workers received 
60% of their average wage for the ﬁrst 6 months of the subsidy, 50% for the following 2 
months and 40% for the remaining 4 months, if still eligible. The transfer was capped 
by law and the threshold was yearly updated by the social security.3 
In terms of eligibility, workers needed to meet two main requirements: the worker should 
have contributed for the ﬁrst time to social security at least 2 years before the layoﬀ, 
1The parasubordinati, workers with usually exclusive contracts for speciﬁc tasks and projects 
with a ﬁrm, are categorized as self-employed and they were not eligible to the subsidy. A new 
unemployment beneﬁt was introduced for them in 2015 (DIS-COL).
2For the rest of the paper, I follow the social security convention that one month corresponds 
to 4.33 weeks. 
3Over the period considered the maximum amount increased from 1065.26 euros per month 
in 2009 up to 1119.32 in 2012. 
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and the worker should have worked for at least 52 weeks in the last 2 calendar years. 
Not all workers separating from a ﬁrm were entitled to receive the beneﬁt. Diﬀerently 
from other settings, such as the Austrian one (Jäger et al., 2018), workers who quit their 
job were generally not entitled to receive unemployment beneﬁts, while workers who 
were ﬁred for economic reasons, who had to leave the ﬁrm due to end of the contract, 
or who quit for just cause (i.e. harassment or unpaid wage) were eligible. Workers also 
needed to meet a monthly equivalent minimum wage requirement for each contribution 
which was proportional to the minimum pension amount (about 192 euro per month for 
2012). The duration and generosity of the beneﬁt were revised several times over the 
years. In this paper, I use data for the period between 2009 and 2012 as this allows for 
a uniform institutional framework. 
It should be noted that two additional beneﬁts, the beneﬁt for Ordinary Unemployment 
with Reduced Requirement (Disoccupazione Ordinaria a Requisiti Ridotti) and the 
Mobility Beneﬁt (Mobilità), were available to unemployed workers. Their presence is, 
however, unlikely to generate endogenous selection and hence bias my estimates. The 
former was a beneﬁt with lower requirements (13 weeks worked in the last year but still 
2 years since ﬁrst contribution) and generosity. In addition, it could be requested only 
the year after the period of unemployment which made it less attractive with respect 
to the one under study. The latter was substantially more generous, but it was also 
characterized by more stringent access conditions. Indeed, workers needed to have a 
permanent contract, a minimum tenure at the moment of layoﬀ, and to be ﬁred in a 
collective dismissal. In addition, the ﬁrm had to belong to speciﬁc sectors, satisfy sector 
speciﬁc size requirements and the state of economic distress, which allowed for collective 
layoﬀ, had to be certiﬁed before workers could apply to receive this beneﬁt. While the 
availability of this beneﬁt will have compositional eﬀects on the sample, the strong 
conditionality and the presence of numerous exogenous constraints for eligibility made 
it diﬃcult for workers to self-select into this measure. I provide additional details and 
discussion about these two policies in Appendix 1.A. 
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1.3 Data and sample 
The analysis is based on two main sources: the register for recipients of unemployment 
beneﬁts and the working histories in the private sector. 
The former (SIP, Sistema Informativo Percettori) collects information on unemployment 
beneﬁts administered by the social security and provides information on the start 
date, the duration and the amount of the beneﬁt. The dataset also provides several 
characteristics of the last employment such as the ﬁrm identiﬁer, the type of contract, 
etc. Due to the reorganization of the social security archives, this data source covers 
only the period after January 2009, which leaves me with a sample period from February 
2009 to December 2012 as the beneﬁt was later abolished and substituted.4 The latter 
(the Uniemens dataset) is the archive for the mandatory communications that ﬁrms 
make to Social Security for pension contributions. The dataset is collected at monthly 
frequency5 and it contains worker level data for the workforce composition of ﬁrms, 
with information on wages, type of contracts, number of days worked, broad occupation 
classiﬁcation, and job location at municipality level. 
For the analysis, I focus on individuals ﬁred between 46 and 54 years of age and who 
collect the OUNR. I exclude observations with missing end date for the unemployment 
beneﬁt and for which it was not possible to match their previous employer with 
UNIEMENS data. This is related to the presence of workers ﬁred from the public 
sector and, most notably, from schools.6 In addition, I also exclude all the observations 
concerning workers suspended for a temporary slowdown in the economic activity as, in 
their case, the subsidy has a diﬀerent structure and they still keep a close relationship 
with their previous employer.7 The ﬁnal dataset contains 452,888 spells for 328,835 
4Data on previous years would provide a relatively small contribution as the structure of 
the beneﬁt changed at the start of 2008. This leaves me with a maximum uniform legislative 
framework from January 2008 to December 2012.
5Data is available at monthly level from 2005 but it is available at a yearly frequency from 
the early 70s. I rely on the annual version for the construction of several variables such as the 
tenure of the worker. 
6The large number of teachers on temporary contracts creates regular ﬂows towards un­
employment beneﬁts in correspondence of the end of the academic year (June) About 50% 
of the unmatched workers come from the education sector. These workers are unlikely to 
reﬂect classical employment dynamics in the private sector and their exclusion should not be 
problematic.
7These are classiﬁed as suspended workers. 
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workers.8 
As the dataset on beneﬁts does not provide information on the date of ﬁrst employment 
after layoﬀ, I derive my measure of time to the next job from the social security records, 
and I deﬁne the period of nonemployment as the distance in weeks between the day of 
layoﬀ and the day of the start of the ﬁrst contract after the end of the unemployment 
beneﬁt. This choice aims to overcome possible issues related to short and low paying jobs, 
which might be compatible with unemployment beneﬁts (maximum 5 days of continuous 
duration). If there is no start of employment after the end of the unemployment beneﬁt, I 
consider the ﬁrst start date for employment after the end of the last job. This correction 
involves only a marginal number of spells (about 1,000). A limitation of the data is that 
it does not cover possible transitions towards self-employment or public employment. 
These transitions are unlikely for workers employed in the private sector in the late 
stage of their career and their exclusion should not substantially aﬀect my results. I 
report in the Appendix 1.C.3 checks using social security contributions histories to assess 
the sensitivity of my results to these transitions. Results are qualitatively robust and 
quantitatively close to the main estimates. Throughout the paper, I will rely on days of 
nonemployment in the private sector for the deﬁnition of my main dependent variable as 
information on unemployment is not available in the Social Security archives. Moreover, 
this variable could provide an imprecise measure of the work status as transitions outside 
the labour force are common after the end of the period receiving unemployment beneﬁts 
(Card et al., 2007b). Finally, if the worker does not ﬁnd any job up to the end of the 
observation period (December 2016), I report the time elapsed from the date of layoﬀ 
up to the end of our sample (this concerns 10% of the sample for temporary contracts 
and 20% for permanent contracts, or about 60,000 spells). Throughout the analysis, I 
will censor duration to 4 years in order to have a common time horizon for all workers 
in my sample. Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for my ﬁnal sample. 
Workers spend on average 26 weeks on beneﬁts after layoﬀ but spend much longer 
(85 weeks with the uncensored measure and 65 with its censored counterpart) in 
nonemployment before ﬁnding a new job. About 60% of the workers ﬁnds a new job 
within the ﬁrst year from layoﬀ, but about one third of them does not ﬁnd a job even 
8I provide additional details on the sample deﬁnition in Appendix 1.B.1. 
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after one year and half. Recalls are rather frequent and are more common for workers 
coming from temporary contracts (about 50%) rather than for workers coming from 
permanent contracts (20%). This suggests that periods of nonemployment are, at least 
in part, a normal component of the employment relationship for workers from temporary 
contracts. Most of the recipients are male, full time and blue collar, and about half 
comes from permanent contracts. Workers come from relatively small ﬁrms, which 
is consistent with the high share of small ﬁrms in the Italian economy. This is also 
consistent with the presence of alternative beneﬁts for workers coming from large ﬁrms 
under certain circumstances9 and with more rigid employment protection legislation 
for workers in these ﬁrms. Indeed, the possibility not only of monetary compensation 
but also of reintegration for workers ﬁred without just cause (economic or disciplinary) 
created high level of cost uncertainty for ﬁrms ﬁring workers with permanent contracts. 
On average workers have 1.376 spells starting between February 2009 and December 
2012, mostly due to the frequent transition towards nonemployment of workers with 
temporary contracts. 
In terms of sector composition, manufacturing makes up about 20% of the sample while 
Construction and Tourism (Restaurant and Accommodation) represent about 40% of 
the sample. Firm Services and Commerce constitute another 20% of the sample while 
the rest is divided among 15 smaller sectors. A summary for the sector composition of 
the sample is reported in Figure 1.1. 
1.4 Empirical strategy 
The identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀects of treatment is based on a quasi-experimental 
variation in the PBD. I exploit the structure of the PBD with respect to age at layoﬀ 
in a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in line with the seminal paper by Lalive 
[2007] and more recent contributions such as Nekoei and Weber [2017]. As workers 
who were ﬁred after turning 50 years of age received 4 additional months of PBD, I 
compare individuals ﬁred around the 50 years of age at layoﬀ threshold. Under the 
identifying assumption that individuals are ﬁred randomly around the cutoﬀ, the two 
9See Appendix 1.A. 
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groups should have similar characteristics and this strategy allows to identify the causal 
eﬀects of longer PBD. In practice, I estimate the following equation: 
kk kkj j 
yist = β0 + β1I(Ageit ≥ 0) + γj A it + δj Ageit:( AAge Ageit ≥ 0)+ 
j=1 j=1 
+ X  istπ + µst +  ist (1.1) 
where the outcome of interest (yist) for individual i, ﬁred in local labour market s at 
time t, is regressed on a kth order polynomial in age at layoﬀ in deviation from the 50 
years of age threshold (A ), with diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of the cutoﬀ, and Ageit
on a dummy for the individual being laid oﬀ after turning 50 (:(Ageit ≥ 50)). Our 
coeﬃcient of interest is β1, which identiﬁes the eﬀect of longer PBD. Main results are 
based on a second order polynomial but ﬁndings are robust to diﬀerent parametric 
choices and estimation as shown in Section 1.7. The model also includes a rich set 
of controls for demographics, the previous ﬁrm and occupation of the worker (Xist), 
such as dummies for female, white collar, full time and permanent contract, the log 
of daily wage and of the average monthly wage in the last three months before layoﬀ, 
market potential experience, tenure with any contract and with temporary contracts, 
the share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm together with the age and the (log) 
size of the last ﬁrm, as well as dummies for the sector of activity of the last ﬁrm at 2 
digits level (NACE 2007 classiﬁcation). I also include ﬁxed eﬀects at month and local 
labour market level (µst) to ﬂexibly control for local economic cycles and seasonality. 
In the estimation, I will then compare workers who are ﬁred before and after turning 
50 in the same month and local labour market. Standard errors are clustered at local 
labour market (LLM) level but I also experiment with other cluster levels and results 
are robust to diﬀerent choices. 
As mentioned above, this strategy allows to identify the causal eﬀects of an increase in 
the duration of unemployment beneﬁt under the assumption that workers on the two 
sides of the cutoﬀ are comparable. To check this assumption, I verify whether workers 
are able to sort around the cutoﬀ in order to obtain longer beneﬁts, and then I assess 
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whether observable characteristics show discontinuities at the cutoﬀ. 
First, I plot the density of the layoﬀ by age in months in Figure 1.2. It can be easily seen 
that workers are indeed able to inﬂuence their date at layoﬀ to self-select to the right 
side of the threshold if their original layoﬀ date was suﬃciently close to the threshold. 
The McCrary test conﬁrms the presence of a discontinuity and strongly rejects the 
null of continuity of the distribution at the threshold. I explore the determinants and 
implications of this strategic delay in a related work (Citino et al., 2018). To overcome 
this issue while keeping the comparison to individuals with similar age, I implement a 
donut regression discontinuity design in the spirit of Barreca et al. [2011]: I exclude the 
ﬁrst two bins before and the ﬁrst one after the cutoﬀ which are the ones most aﬀected 
by manipulation. This is consistent with the analysis developed in Citino et al. [2018]. 
I perform several robustness checks for this choice in Section 1.7 and results are largely 
in line with the main speciﬁcation. 
Then, I check for possible discontinuities in observables. I plot the average of character­
istics by age at layoﬀ in months in Figure 1.3. In most of the cases, observables are 
reasonably continuous at cutoﬀ despite the strategic behaviour of workers but there 
are sizeable jumps in a few instances. I replicate the above analysis in a regression 
framework to assess the magnitude of these discontinuities and to what extent my 
strategy can mitigate this problem: I regress the observables on a square polynomial in 
age, ﬂexible on the two sides of the cutoﬀ, on a dummy for being laid oﬀ after 50 years 
of age, and on the set of interacted months and LLM ﬁxed eﬀects. Table 1.2 reports 
the results of this exercise. The rich set of ﬁxed eﬀects seems unable to capture all 
the sorting and several variables show highly statistically signiﬁcant but quantitatively 
small jumps: workers on right of the cutoﬀ are more likely to be women, to have a white 
collar job, to have a permanent contract, to have lower tenure in temporary contract, 
to come from smaller ﬁrms, and from ﬁrms with a larger share of permanent workers. 
However, once the donut region is removed, all the discontinuities but one are no longer 
detectable. It is worth pointing out that this result is mostly determined by a lower 
coeﬃcient rather than lower precision of the estimates, which provides evidence in favour 
of the ability of this strategy to remove the most problematic observations. There is 
still a small diﬀerence in tenure with temporary contract, but the size of the jump is 
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limited (2 weeks with respect to an average of 1 year). These ﬁndings show that the 
donut strategy is eﬀective in solving issues concerning strategic sorting. 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Eﬀects on beneﬁts and nonemployment 
First, I look at the eﬀects of longer PBD on the nonemployment spell immediately 
following layoﬀ and I visually inspect whether the 4 additional months of coverage lead 
to a longer period collecting unemployment beneﬁts and nonemployment spell. Both 
measures are relevant from a policy perspective: the former provides a measure of the 
direct eﬀects of the potential duration on public expenditure through longer beneﬁt 
duration; the latter characterizes the unemployed behavioural response. Figure 1.4 plots 
the average number of weeks of beneﬁts by age in months at the moment of layoﬀ. The 
plot shows a clear jump at the cutoﬀ of about 8 weeks. This discontinuity points at 
an increase in costs for the government due to the longer potential duration, but it is 
less informative about the overall change in behaviour by the workers. Indeed, this 
eﬀect combines two diﬀerent components: the mechanical response, which is related to a 
better coverage of a possibly long unemployment spell; the behavioural response, which 
represents the additional time spent in nonemployment by workers as a consequence of 
changes in their search strategy. In order to identify the latter, I move to the number of 
weeks of nonemployment reported in Figure 1.5. Also in this case a clear jump can be 
detected, although smaller than the one for beneﬁts: 4 additional months of PBD lead 
to 6.5 additional weeks in nonemployment. 
I verify quantitatively these ﬁndings in the regression framework outlined in equation 
1.1.10 Results are reported in Table 1.3 and 1.4. Coeﬃcients conﬁrm that the longer PBD 
leads to longer beneﬁt and nonemployment duration.11 The eﬀects for the duration of 
10For computational ease, estimation will use a parametric speciﬁcation with individuals ﬁred 
between 46 and 54 years of age, excluding individuals in the ﬁrst two bins on the left and the 
ﬁrst bin to the right of the cutoﬀ. Estimates using local polynomials and optimal bandwidth 
are reported in the Section 1.7.1
11For the sake of comparison, I report in Appendix 1.C.1 results with diﬀerent levels of 
clustering for the eﬀect of longer PBD on nonemployment duration up to the next job. The 
LLM clustering is slightly more conservative than other common choices but results are overall 
very robust. 
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the beneﬁt is very stable across speciﬁcations and largely conﬁrms the visual inspection: 
4 additional months of PBD lead to 8 additional weeks of beneﬁts or 0.46 additional 
weeks per week of potential duration.12 The baseline model in Column (1), includes a 
quadratic polynomial in the running variables with diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of 
the threshold. Column (2) includes a wide set of controls for the worker and previous 
job characteristics, Columns (3) and (4) include month ﬁxed eﬀects and local labour 
market ﬁxed eﬀects13 and, ﬁnally, Column (5) includes local labour market interacted 
with monthly ﬁxed eﬀects. This will be the preferred speciﬁcation for the rest of the 
paper. The eﬀect represents a 36% increase over the baseline of 23 weeks.14 Column (6) 
and (7) report the eﬀect on the total amount of the beneﬁt and point at an increase in 
the expenditure per unemployed by about 1,300 euro (+18%). Results for the number of 
weeks of nonemployment are slightly less stable but the coeﬃcient in the full speciﬁcation 
is well within 2 standard deviation with respect to the baseline model.15 Workers spend 
on average 6 additional weeks in nonemployment due to the longer potential beneﬁt 
duration or 0.354 additional weeks per week of additional potential duration. The eﬀects 
are long lasting and, after 4 years since layoﬀ, workers with longer beneﬁts are still 1 
percentage point more likely not to have found any job in the private sector (about 
6.5% over a baseline of 18%). Estimates for the eﬀect on nonemployment are slightly 
larger than previous estimates (0.3) for the Italian setting by Rosolia and Sestito [2012], 
who estimate the eﬀects of beneﬁt potential duration and generosity with a smaller 
administrative sample and a policy change in 2001. 
This eﬀect is driven by three main elements as described by the hazard rates reported in 
Figure 1.6: ﬁrst, recipients with longer PBD are less likely to exit from nonemployment 
since the very beginning of the spell; second, unemployed with shorter PBD (8 months) 
have a much higher exit rate with respect to unemployed with longer PBD when they are 
12The increase in potential beneﬁt duration by 4 months corresponds to an increase of 17.32 
weeks. 
13The Italian National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) deﬁnes LLM every 10 years. For 
temporal proximity, I use the 2011 deﬁnition which identiﬁes 611 LLM.
14Throughout the paper, the baseline for the dependent variable is computed as the average 
value for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 years and 10 months of age.
15Here, I restrict my attention to spells in the private sector and I censor spell at 4 years 
after layoﬀ. I check the implications of these restrictions in Appendix 1.C.2 by trying diﬀerent 
censoring. I consider then transitions to the public sector and self-employment using full 
contribution histories and restriction to the estimation sample in Appendix 1.C.3. 
26 CHAPTER 1. MEDIUM TERM EFFECTS OF UB 
no longer eligible for beneﬁts; third, after the end of the UB (12th month), unemployed 
with longer initial duration experience an increase in their exit rate towards employment 
but this is too small to fully realign the overall reemployment probability between the 
two groups.16 Both groups of workers show a spike in exit rates once they lose eligibility 
for the subsidy. However, the hazard rate also shows a sizeable jump at 6 months 
for both groups. This coincides with the ﬁrst drop in the replacement rate from 60% 
to 50% but it seems unlikely that the spike is driven by a large response to beneﬁt 
generosity. Indeed, only a minor change (and in the wrong direction) in the hazard rate 
is observed for workers with 12 months of eligibility at 8 months of nonemployment 
(which corresponds to a similar drop from 50% to 40%).17 As I show in Appendix 1.G, 
this pattern is largely driven by recalls and it is related to two main reasons: ﬁrst, the 
economic cycle of tourism, which represents an important part of the sample, seems 
to last about 6 months as workers terminate their contract at the start of November 
and they are reemployed around April; second, the institutional framework provides 
strong incentives for workers to be employed at least 6 months per year as they require 
at least one year of work over two years to be eligible for unemployment beneﬁt. This 
spike could possibly relate to a strong entitlement eﬀect. This is particularly salient for 
temporary workers who have a reasonably high expectation of experiencing again a job 
separation. Finally, the hazard rate shows a small increase after 24 months since layoﬀ 
for both groups. This could be related to a reduction in social security contributions18 
for employers who hire workers who have been unemployed for at least 24 months with 
permanent contracts (L. 407/90). This pattern is indeed more evident for workers 
coming from permanent contracts who are more likely to be hired again with such 
contracts. As this incentive applies to both treated and controls, it should not aﬀect 
the results. 
These ﬁndings are also conﬁrmed in a regression framework with the use of a linear 
probability model for the probability of not having found a job after t months. In 
16It is worth pointing out that the generosity of the beneﬁts declines after 8 months, with the 
replacement rate falling from 50% to 40%. This does not seem to have a strong eﬀect on exit 
rates, as hazard rates have only a very small slowdown in the decline for workers still entitled to 
beneﬁts. This is consistent with previous results by Rosolia and Sestito [2012].
17The hazard rate for workers with 8 months of eligibility is not informative at 8 months since 
layoﬀ as the month coincides with the end of their eligibility period.
18By 50% of the social security contribution or about 11% of the wage for 3 years. 
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practice, I use as a dependent variable a dummy for not having found a job after t 
months (:(t > t ∗)) since layoﬀ and iterate it for all the months in the 4 years observation 
window. This corresponds to a diﬀerence of the survival in nonemployment for the two 
groups. Resulting coeﬃcients, which summarize diﬀerences in reemployment rates over 
4 years, are reported in Figure 1.7. As described above, the diﬀerence in reemployment 
emerges since the start of the spell and becomes more marked between 8 and 12 months 
of nonemployment. This corresponds to the periods when workers with longer potential 
duration are still entitled to their beneﬁts, whereas those ﬁred before turning 50 are not. 
After the end of the 12 months of beneﬁt, workers with longer beneﬁts progressively 
close the gap between them and workers with shorter duration. However, this process is 
slow and, after 4 years, they have still a 1 percentage point higher probability of not 
having found a new job, as shown in the previous regression analysis. Notice that we 
do not see any particular change in the diﬀerence between the two groups at 24 months 
since layoﬀ, which is comforting about the absence of heterogenous eﬀects of the social 
security contribution cut. 
1.5.2 Medium term outcomes 
The career of workers could be aﬀected by longer beneﬁts well beyond their ﬁrst 
nonemployment spell. On the one hand, a longer nonemployment spell could lead to 
human capital losses and stigma, and inﬂuence the future transitions towards other 
employers or nonemployment of workers with longer beneﬁts. On the other hand, 
workers with longer beneﬁts might gain search experience, and be able to transition 
faster across future employers. The sign and the magnitude of the overall eﬀect is an 
empirical question. These eﬀects might not be fully detectable in the characteristic 
of the ﬁrst job in regulated job markets. If contracts and pay are mostly set through 
sectoral and national level agreements, employers might have limited ability to oﬀer 
heterogenous contracts thus limiting diﬀerences in the new employment characteristics. 
In addition, workers might not be able to get better contracts but more frequent contract 
which will improve their overall employment probability and earnings. 
I provide a more comprehensive view of the overall eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts by 
looking at aggregate outcome within 4 years from layoﬀ in the spirit of Schmieder et al. 
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[2012b]. I analyse both employment outcomes and earnings, as the they are informative 
about the medium term welfare eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts. I limit my period of 
observation to 4 years due to data availability as the last individual in my sample is 
ﬁred in December 2012 and the last available year for the social security records is 2016. 
An advantage of this speciﬁcation is that it is not aﬀected by selection bias as it can be 
estimated with the full sample and does not require workers to ﬁnd a job. 
As a ﬁrst step, I plot the overall number of weeks in nonemployment during the 4 years 
following layoﬀ in Figure 1.8. First, workers spend a substantial amount of time in 
nonemployment: over 4 years they spend about 130 weeks in nonemployment over 208 
total weeks. This suggests that recurrent nonemployment spells are common in the data. 
Second, the jump in weeks in nonemployment at 50 years is now substantially reduced. 
A formal regression, reported in Table 1.5, conﬁrms these ﬁndings: Column (1), which 
uses my preferred speciﬁcation for the total number of weeks in nonemployment over 
4 years, shows an increase in overall time spent in nonemployment of only 2 weeks. 
Column (2) looks at the diﬀerence in total labour income and shows a decline by 800 
euro or about 2.4% of the baseline. Column (3) and Column (4) add beneﬁts related to 
the ﬁrst layoﬀ and show that beneﬁts more than compensate for labour income losses. 
These gains are partly mitigated by the inclusion of all beneﬁts received after the ﬁrst 
layoﬀ in Column (5) and (6): overall, workers with initial longer PBD have a 4.8% higher 
income than workers with shorter beneﬁts. Finally, Columns (7) to Column (9) provide 
information on future beneﬁts. Workers with longer beneﬁt duration are less likely to 
take up new beneﬁts, they get lower transfers and spend less time on unemployment 
beneﬁts. These eﬀects directly oﬀset part of the initial higher expenditure through 
lower future transfers. It should be noted that Schmieder et al. [2012b] provide mixed 
evidence on this point. If, also in their case, the eﬀect on nonemployment is lower 
over 5 years, the diﬀerence in time spent on unemployment beneﬁts further increases, 
which makes it more diﬃcult to assess in which direction these result aﬀect eﬃciency 
considerations. Workers might have a lower take up of unemployment beneﬁts due 
to higher take up of other polices such as disability beneﬁts and pensions. Previous 
literature, such as Inderbitzin et al. [2016] and Kyyrä and Pesola [2017], underlined the 
complementarity and substitutability of these beneﬁts with UB. However, they play a 
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very limited role in this setting as shown in Appendix 1.D. 
To better understand how workers with longer beneﬁts oﬀset their initial employment 
disadvantage, I look at the pattern of employment for workers with longer and shorter 
potential beneﬁt duration. I use a linear probability model at diﬀerent time horizons 
since layoﬀ with dependent variable equal to 1 if the worker is employed in the month.19 
Diﬀerently from Figure 1.7, this speciﬁcation allows to account for repeated transitions 
in and out nonemployment. Figure 1.9 reports coeﬃcients over 4 years after layoﬀ. 
As in the previous case, workers with longer potential beneﬁt duration show a higher 
probability of nonemployment since the start of the spell. However, the maximum 
diﬀerence in employment between the two groups is lower by about 25% (2 percentage 
points), and it peaks 2 months before the end of the beneﬁt eligibility for workers with 
longer potential beneﬁt duration. The period of convergence between the two groups 
is also much shorter: while in Figure 1.7 the two groups show diﬀerent reemployment 
rates up to the very end of the sample, in this case the level of employment is the same 
after only 18 months. After this period, workers with longer potential beneﬁt duration 
show slightly higher levels of employment for about 14 months. In the long run, the 
employment diﬀerence among the two groups is close to the long run reemployment 
diﬀerence (about 1%).20 Figure 1.10 provides additional evidence on the dynamic 
eﬀects of longer PBD. Workers initially eligible to longer beneﬁts suﬀer relatively small 
income losses which are concentrated in the months between 8 and 12 (Panel (a)). Even 
accounting for extensive margins responses, workers with longer PBD get at most 75 
less euros per month. Conditional on employment, there are no diﬀerences in monthly 
earnings (Panel (b)) and individuals with longer beneﬁts actually get higher monthly 
wages between 8 and 12 months after layoﬀ. This suggests that workers with shorter 
duration get worse jobs when they lose eligibility to unemployment beneﬁts, consistently 
with past evidence by Caliendo et al. [2013]. The same conclusion can be drawn by 
looking at days worked per month (conditional on employment), there does seem to be 
at most small diﬀerences in favour of workers with longer beneﬁts (Panel (c)). Finally, 
19A worker is considered employed if she works at least one day in the month. 
20This dynamic could suggest some cyclical diﬀerences across the two groups. To further 
investigate this issue, I analyse this outcome over a 7 years period using workers ﬁred in 2009 in 
Appendix 1.E. This analysis does not show any cyclical dynamic, which suggests that the two 
employment levels will likely converge in the long run also for the whole sample. 
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workers with longer potential beneﬁt duration are less likely to be on beneﬁts after 
the end of their eligibility period (Panel (d)). This is, however, not suﬃcient to make 
inference on the employment stability of workers with longer beneﬁts as workers who 
do not ﬁnd employment are not able to claim again unemployment beneﬁts. 
The discrepancy between results in the ﬁrst spell and over 4 years can be determined by 
multiple factors which inﬂuence the employment of workers with longer beneﬁt duration: 
•	 First, workers with longer beneﬁts could ﬁnd better jobs with expected longer 
duration. 
•	 Second, workers with longer beneﬁts could be better at changing employer after 
the ﬁrst employment spell. 
•	 Finally, workers with shorter duration who found a job earlier might lose their 
job at higher rate, thus closing the employment gap with workers with longer 
beneﬁt duration. 
In the following sections, I will look at these three possible channels to provide evidence 
on each of these possible explanations. 
Quality of the ﬁrst job 
The assessment of the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts on job quality is a crucial and 
classical part of studies on unemployment beneﬁts. By acting as subsidies to search, 
longer unemployment beneﬁts can allow workers to search for better jobs, thus improving 
their labour outcomes and, possibly, productivity in the economy (Acemoglu and Shimer, 
1999 and Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999). From a pure policy perspective, positive eﬀects 
on the quality of the new job could allow to recover part of the costs of the policy 
through higher taxes and lower future beneﬁts. The presence of large positive eﬀects 
could make the policy self-ﬁnancing as in Michalopoulos et al. [2005]. 
I consider several aspects of the new job and estimate the eﬀects of longer potential 
beneﬁt duration with my preferred speciﬁcation. As the model can only be estimated 
with workers who could ﬁnd a job, this regression framework is partially aﬀected by 
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selection to the extent that the two groups show diﬀerent long-term reemployment 
probability. Although previous results have shown a lower probability for individuals 
with longer PBD, it is worth stressing two points: ﬁrst, the diﬀerence in reemployment is 
overall limited and it should not lead to large biases; then, diﬀerences are still informative 
as it can allow to identify the source of the diﬀerent employment pattern for the two 
groups. 
Figure 1.11 reports the eﬀect of longer potential beneﬁt duration on several characteristics 
of the new job. For the sake of comparison coeﬃcients are standardized by the average 
in the baseline group21 and full table is reported in Appendix 1.F. Workers with longer 
PBD experience small gains in daily wage (a 0.6% increase). Previous studies provided 
mixed evidence in this regard, with small and not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects (Card 
et al., 2007a, Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2008). My estimate is also very close to results 
of Nekoei and Weber [2017] who ﬁnd that 9 additional weeks of potential beneﬁts lead 
to a 0.5% increase in daily wage.22 Workers are however more likely to ﬁnd a job with a 
permanent contract (one percentage point over an average of 26% in the baseline group) 
and more likely to move to older ﬁrms (about 1.2 months). Interestingly, this does not 
translate to longer tenure in the new ﬁrm. These workers also have higher probability 
of having a full-time contract and tend to be hired by smaller ﬁrms. Coworkers are, 
instead, remarkably similar. 
Table 1.6 further explores characteristics of the new job by looking at mobility of workers 
in both economic and geographic terms. Longer PBD slightly promotes mobility with 
a higher probability of changing ﬁrm (Column (1)), a higher probability of changing 
geographic location but within LLM and Region23 (Columns (2)-(4)), and a higher 
probability of changing sector within broad sector (Columns (5) and (6)). Hence, workers 
exploit this additional search time to look for jobs locally but over an extended area and 
in related but diﬀerent sectors. I also explore if the new economic or geographic location 
21Workers ﬁred between 49 years and 49 years and 10 months of age. 
22The eﬀect of an additional week is hence smaller in my study, given the diﬀerence in the 
change in PBD for the two groups of workers.
23Italy is divided in 20 regions which are the intermediate administrative level between 
municipalities and the central government. They hold relevant legislative powers and can 
implement local policies concerning both taxation, welfare and labour markets. In this sense, 
the regions constitute a very relevant administrative dimension in the Italian economy. 
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oﬀers better employment prospects in Table 1.7. To this purpose, I check three diﬀerent 
outcomes: ﬁrst, I look at the growth rate of the number of employees between the year 
of hiring and year before in the new location; second, I look at retention, deﬁned as 
the share of workers employed in the ﬁrm, sector or municipality in the year before the 
hiring who are still employed there in the year of hiring; ﬁnally, I look more broadly at 
persistence in employment, deﬁned as the share of workers employed in the ﬁrm, sector 
or municipality in the year before the hiring who are still employed in the private sector 
in the year of hiring. Although results on growth (Columns (1) to (3)) show that the 
ﬁrm and the new sector are growing faster, the level of retention (Columns (4) to (6)) 
and persistence (Columns (7) to (9)) in employment does not show any change in all 
the three dimensions. 
Transitions across ﬁrms 
Then, I assess whether workers who have found a new job after a longer beneﬁt show 
higher persistence in employment by transitioning more eﬃciently across ﬁrms. I 
consider the ﬁrst two years after reemployment24 and I restrict the sample to all workers 
who ﬁnd a job within 3 years since layoﬀ. This restriction causes only small sample 
losses (5% of workers who ﬁnd a job). The diﬀerence in reemployment rates between 
workers with longer and shorter PBD at this horizon is about 2 percentage points. 
I implement a regression for the probability of being employed in the months following 
the ﬁrst reemployment date by month and plot the resulting coeﬃcients in Figure 1.12, 
Panel (a). Workers who found a new job after a longer unemployment beneﬁt indeed 
show consistently higher levels of employment after reemployment. Diﬀerences are not 
signiﬁcant in the short term, but, after one year, the two groups show a signiﬁcant 
divergence in employment which persists for more than an additional year. Panel (b) 
restricts the attention to employment in the ﬁrst ﬁrm which hired the worker after 
reemployment. In this case we do not observe any diﬀerence between the two groups. 
This is consistent with previous ﬁndings about duration of the job in the new ﬁrm 
and, in addition, show that matches with short breaks do not play an important role. 
24In this section I exploit data on 2017 which have recently been made available. Results for 
the ﬁrst year is within my sample of observation for all workers. 
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Hence, mobility towards new ﬁrms contributes to explain the diﬀerence in employment 
probability previously described. 
These results show that the diﬀerence between the medium-term estimates and those 
for the ﬁrst spell are at least partially explained by later faster transitions for workers 
with longer beneﬁts. In order to quantify the contribution of this element, I assess the 
total additional employment over this time span in a regression framework in Table 
1.8. Column (1) reports the eﬀect on the total number of weeks employed in the 
two years after layoﬀ. It shows that workers initially eligible to longer PBD spend 
almost a full additional week in employment after reemployment. Column (2) and 
(3) decompose the eﬀect between the ﬁrst ﬁrm that hired them and the other ﬁrms. 
Although workers spend actually more time in the ﬁrst ﬁrms, as expected according to 
the positive tenure eﬀects in previous section, the eﬀect on time spent in other ﬁrms is 
larger and statistically signiﬁcant at 10%. This does not seem to be explained by faster 
job to job transitions, which suggests that these workers have still to undergo some 
search before moving a diﬀerent ﬁrm. One of the main concerns is that this eﬀect comes 
from an eligibility eﬀect, indeed workers who were eligible to initially longer beneﬁts 
spend more time in nonemployment before ﬁnding a new job and this might lead them 
not to be eligible for unemployment beneﬁts when they are laid oﬀ again. I explicitly 
control for this in Column (5) by adding a dummy for workers having more than 52 
weeks of work in the two years before the new layoﬀ, and then by implementing a RDD 
in weeks worked in the last two years with a discontinuity at 52 in Columns (6) and (7). 
In the last column, I restrict the sample to workers who experienced a second layoﬀ 
for whom the number of weeks can be computed. Although repeated eligibility seems 
to play a marginal role, workers with initially longer beneﬁts still show more weeks of 
employment in other ﬁrms than workers with shorter PBD. 
In order to map this eﬀect into the whole sample, I consider that the estimates use about 
80% of the sample and correct the contribution of this employment margin by this factor. 
As a result, the overall contribution of this employment pattern represents 0.74 weeks 
for the overall sample and it explains about 18% of the observed diﬀerence between 
the two set of regressions. The contribution for transitions to new ﬁrms accounts for 
0.41 weeks (10% of the overall diﬀerence) while the longer duration of ﬁrst job accounts 
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for 0.33 weeks (8% of the diﬀerence). This estimate represents a lower bound of the 
following employment gains for workers originally on more generous beneﬁts as some 
small diﬀerences persist after 2 years. 
Repeated layoﬀ and cyclicality 
A third possibility is that workers with short unemployment beneﬁts lose again their 
job, thus reducing the diﬀerence in employment with respect to workers with longer 
beneﬁts. This is supported by the faster convergence in employment levels in Figure 1.9 
which suggests that employment losses might play an important role. 
First, I explore this possibility graphically by plotting the employment rate for workers 
with shorter and longer potential beneﬁt duration over the 4 years after layoﬀ in Figure 
1.13. I focus on individuals close to threshold and obtain their employment rate by 
estimating my RDD speciﬁcation for monthly employment with only the polynomial 
in age with the jump at the cutoﬀ and a quadratic ﬂexible polynomial in age. I, then, 
estimate the share of individuals employed on the right and on the left of the cutoﬀ 
by predicting the polynomial at the age of 50 on the two sides of the threshold. As 
expected, the employment pattern mirrors the coeﬃcients in Figure 1.9 and it highlights 
how workers who found a job within 12 months experience a large employment drop 
close to one year after their initial layoﬀ. The drop is sizeable as employment rate 
for workers with short beneﬁts decline from 53% to 38% and for workers with longer 
beneﬁts, from 45% to 34%. This leads to a 4 percentage points decline in their relative 
distance. Results in Figure 1.7 suggest that, although higher job ﬁnding rate for workers 
with longer beneﬁts might play a role, the diﬀerence in job ﬁnding rate it is too small 
to account for a large part of this diﬀerence. 
Second, Table 1.9 provides more quantitative perspective on the pattern of hiring and 
ﬁring within one year from the initial layoﬀ. As expected, workers with shorter beneﬁts 
have a higher probability of ﬁnding a job in the ﬁrst 12 months after their initial layoﬀ: 
68% of them ﬁnd a job within this time horizon while only 61% ﬁnd a job among 
those with higher beneﬁts. A relevant share of workers, however, lose again their job 
and a large part of these layoﬀs is concentrated in the months between the eleventh 
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and the thirteenth after the initial layoﬀ. These shares are very similar across the two 
groups but the overall eﬀect in terms of changes in employment is slightly diﬀerent. As 
more workers among those with shorter beneﬁts found a job, the same proportional 
incidence in layoﬀ leads to a stronger percentage points decline in the number of workers 
who are employed with a 3 percentage point narrowing in the employment rate gap 
between the two groups. These results, which concern all the workers ﬁred before and 
after 50 years of age, are consistent with previous graphical evidence and suggest that 
workers are subject to a similar shock. However, as workers with less beneﬁts have 
higher employment rates, they are also more aﬀected in absolute terms, which, in turn, 
leads to decline in the diﬀerence in total employment between the two groups. This is 
consistent with the negligible eﬀect on tenure and the characteristics of the new job 
for the two groups of workers. The dynamic in employment and subsequent job loss is 
more prevalent among temporary workers but the larger contribution to the decline in 
the diﬀerence in employment comes from workers with permanent contracts. 
These results show that transitions between employment and nonemployment are fre­
quent. The pure job ﬁnding rate, hence, provides an imperfect proxy for the employment 
levels of groups subject to diﬀerent unemployment beneﬁts. Seasonality plays an im­
portant role in this sense but these patterns are common for workers with diﬀerent 
characteristics as shown in the following section. 
1.6 Heterogeneity 
Workers ‘conditions on the labour market vary considerably and this might lead them 
to react diﬀerently to policies. This is a common concern in policy evaluation and Card 
et al. [2017], for example, ﬁnd that gender and age of workers play an important role 
in the eﬀectiveness of labour market policies. In this section, I explore the eﬀects of 
longer PBD across diﬀerent groups of workers according to their last job and personal 
characteristics. More speciﬁcally, I explore geographic, gender, ﬁrm, and contract 
heterogeneity by running my preferred speciﬁcation across subgroups of workers for 
my main variables of interest: duration of nonemployment after the ﬁrst layoﬀ before 
ﬁnding a new job, and total nonemployment. 
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Table 1.10 reports the results of my estimates. Panel A reports the eﬀect of longer PBD 
on the time spent to the next job in the private sector. As usual, Column (1) reports 
the baseline eﬀect for the sake of comparison. First, I explore geographic diﬀerences 
and I look at the eﬀect of longer potential beneﬁt duration in the Centre-North and in 
the South of Italy, in Column (2) and (3). The eﬀects on nonemployment and earnings 
are larger in the South, coherently with more diﬃculties for workers in this area to ﬁnd 
jobs after layoﬀ. I, then, explore gender diﬀerences in Column (4) and Column (5): 
women show lower responses to longer PBD. Columns (6) to (8) explore the role of size 
of the ﬁrm of origin: being in a large ﬁrm generally reduces both the average time that 
workers spend to ﬁnd a new job and the additional time they take if they are eligible to 
longer beneﬁt duration. The possibility to access to a larger set of vacancies within the 
same ﬁrm could play a role in this sense.25 In relative term, the eﬀect represents about 
a 10% increase in time to next job with respect to the baseline duration. The stability of 
the previous contract also plays an important role (Columns (9) and (10)) and workers 
who lost a permanent contract show more diﬃculties in transitioning towards a new 
employer. Workers previously in temporary contracts spend about 50% less time to 
ﬁnd a job on average and the eﬀect of longer duration is accordingly rescaled. Several 
reasons might explain this sizeable diﬀerence: workers on permanent contracts might 
lose more ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital; they might have less knowledge about vacancies 
and employment opportunities due to the longer time elapsed since they looked for 
a new job; they might be more demanding in terms of the characteristics of the new 
employment. To explore all these possible channels is, however, beyond the scope of 
the present analysis and I leave it for further research. It is worth pointing out that 
results for type of contract and ﬁrm size are related to some extent as workers from 
permanent contracts are more likely to be ﬁred from smaller ﬁrms. This diﬀerence in 
composition seems reasonable in light of the Italian institutional setting as large ﬁrms 
(more than 15 employees) face more stringent regulation with regard to ﬁring workers 
with permanent contracts (Article 18 of the Labour Code). In addition, workers from 
ﬁrms undergoing economic restructuring with previous permanent contracts can access 
25Indeed the size of the ﬁrm positively aﬀects the probability of recall as discussed in Appendix 
1.G. 
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a more generous beneﬁt under certain conditions.26 However, the contract composition 
is not enough to explain lower eﬀects for workers coming from larger ﬁrms as similar 
discrepancies can also be observed within contract group. Then, I assess the eﬀect of 
longer beneﬁts according to sector cyclicality. A sector is deﬁned cyclical if it experiences 
quarterly variation in workforce larger than 10%.27 As expected, workers in cyclical 
sectors spend less time to ﬁnd a new job and their response is lower with respect to 
other workers. Finally, I explore the role of economic conditions at the moment of layoﬀ. 
I look at individuals who are ﬁred during contractions (-1.5% in the number of employed 
over the last year in the LLM; bottom quartile of the distribution in the sample) and 
expansions (+3% in the number of employed over the last year in the LLM; top quartile 
of the distribution in the sample). I deﬁne contractions and expansions based on the 
growth of employment in the year before the layoﬀ in the labour market and focus on 
workers laid oﬀ in the bottom quartile of the growth distribution and in the top quartile. 
Interestingly, the eﬀect of longer PBD is stronger during recessions. 
Panel B reports the same set of estimates for the total nonemployment over 4 years. In 
all cases, the diﬀerence in overall time spent in nonemployment is smaller with respect 
to the diﬀerence in time before ﬁnding a new job: the decline goes from 50% of the 
eﬀect in the ﬁrst spell for workers with previous permanent contracts to 93% for workers 
in temporary contracts. In absolute terms the decline goes from 3.64 weeks for workers 
in cyclical sectors to 5.27 weeks for workers in the South. These results suggest that 
the pattern highlighted in previous sections is common to workers from many diﬀerent 
backgrounds and conditions and it should be taken into account in general perspective. 
The stronger relative decline for workers in temporary contracts supports the claim that 
their employment pattern, such as cyclicality and recall, is particularly important for 
this phenomenon. It is also interesting to note that the eﬀect on nonemployment over 4 
years is remarkably similar across all the diﬀerent groups of individuals (about 2 weeks) 
but for workers from permanent contracts for whom the diﬀerence in overall time spent 
in nonemployment is 4.2 weeks. In a few cases, the overall diﬀerence in time spent in 
26These conditions concern the tenure of the worker and the size and sector of the ﬁrm. See 
Appendix 1.A for a more detailed discussion.
27This is estimated in time series regression between 2005 and 2008 with quadratic trends, 
year ﬁxed eﬀects and seasonal dummies. 
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nonemployment is very close to zero such as in the case of workers from temporary 
contracts and laid oﬀ during an expansion. 
1.7 Robustness 
Results presented so far are based on a parametric speciﬁcation of the Regression 
Discontinuity Design with a second order polynomial in the running variable. I now 
test the sensitivity of my estimates to changes in the regression speciﬁcation and donut. 
To this purpose, I run a series of speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation checks to verify the 
reliability of the estimated coeﬃcients: I ﬁrst start with several robustness tests on the 
parametrization of the RDD; then, I examine the eﬀects of the choice of the bandwidth 
and of the donut; ﬁnally, I move to placebo tests which exploit the precise local nature 
of the treatment. 
1.7.1 Polynomial order 
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of my estimates to diﬀerent strategies, I run a 
series of checks on the polynomial order and results are reported in Table 1.11. I ﬁrst 
start with diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the polynomial in age using a linear in Column 
(2) or a third order polynomial in Column (3). Although the estimates seem to be 
slightly sensitive to this choice, in both cases the point estimate of the new models 
are always well within a 2 standard deviation distance from the main estimates. My 
preferred speciﬁcation provides estimates close to the average between the two more 
extreme speciﬁcations. I then estimate my model with a 3 months ray donut in Column 
(4), but this leads only to a small downward correction in the estimates. Column (5) 
reports a non-parametric version of the RDD, and, ﬁnally, Column (6) implements a 
non-parametric local linear RDD with triangular kernel and optimal bandwidth with 
mean square error selection.28 Similarly to previous cases, results are consistent with 
28To perform these estimates, I use the robust estimation by Calonico et al. [2014] and 
Calonico et al. [2016]. Regressions are implemented using the rdrobust command developed in 
Calonico et al. [2017]. As the procedure does not explicitly allow for a donut setting, I adjust 
the data by reducing (increasing) by one (two) month the age of individuals on the right (left) 
of the cutoﬀ. This introduces only minimal measurement error. In addition, as the estimation 
becomes highly time-consuming with a large sample and the inclusion of a rich set of controls, I 
include in the equation ﬁxed eﬀects only for broad sector (NACE letter), month of layoﬀ and 
province. 
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main ﬁndings although slightly larger. Panel B replicates the same set of checks for 
the total number of weeks in nonemployment over four years since layoﬀ: estimates are 
fairly stable and their (slight) changes mirror the variation in the eﬀect for the ﬁrst 
nonemployment spell: in all cases, estimates are consistently below the ones for the ﬁrst 
nonemployment spell and the decline with respect to this eﬀect ranges from 75% of the 
eﬀect in Column (2) to about 55% in Column (6). 
Overall, results of these checks show that estimates obtained with my preferred spe­
ciﬁcation are reasonably robust and mediate across a range of results obtained with 
alternative choices. Diﬀerent parametrizations and estimations provide qualitatively 
consistent and quantitatively similar results. 
1.7.2 Bandwidth and donut 
The choice of the donut and bandwidth can be crucial for the analysis in RDD setting. In 
my main settings, I rely on an arbitrary symmetric bandwidth and I use an asymmetric 
donut region around the cutoﬀ. In this section, I provide additional evidence of the 
robustness of my results to changes in these two dimensions of my estimation. 
I start with the bandwidth choice and I run my preferred speciﬁcation with a large set 
of (symmetric) diﬀerent bandwidths. Resulting coeﬃcients are reported in Figure 1.14. 
The speciﬁcation used in the paper corresponds to the one at 48 months of bandwidth. 
The estimates appear quite robust to diﬀerent choices and in no case the coeﬃcient 
is statistically diﬀerent from the one obtained with the manual bandwidth. It should 
also be noted that the use of larger bandwidths leads to substantial improvements in 
eﬃciency as they allow for a better estimation of the polynomial. Results with optimal 
bandwidth were reported in the previous Section in Column (6) in Table 1.11. 
As a ﬁnal check, I also assess the importance of the donut hole region. I estimate my 
preferred speciﬁcation with donut hole from one-month up to twelve months and then 
plot the estimates in Figure 1.15. Coeﬃcients are stable around the main estimate and 
the increasing size of the hole leads only to small changes up to ﬁve months from the 
cutoﬀ. It is interesting to note that coeﬃcients for donuts for a four and ﬁve months 
radius around the cutoﬀ are larger than the coeﬃcient using a three months donut 
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reported in Table 1.11, Column (4). This provides further supporting evidence to the 
estimates obtained with smaller donuts, which show very similar value. In addition, 
the coeﬃcient without a donut is also very similar to the others which suggests that 
the rich set of ﬁxed eﬀects and controls is able to capture most of the determinants of 
manipulation. Estimates start to diﬀer substantially from the main result only after 
a eight months radius and coeﬃcients are not statistically diﬀerent from zero for very 
large donut as the polynomial extrapolation becomes unable to replicate the pattern of 
the data closer to the cutoﬀ. 
All balanced, the evidence in this section shows a remarkable resilience for the estimates 
to changes in bandwidth and to the exclusion of diﬀerent bins close to the cutoﬀ. 
1.7.3 Placebo 
Another possible issue is that the regression model could deliver comparable estimates 
at diﬀerent points of the age distribution due to high variance in the dependent variable 
or to the presence of other policies. This would make the results less reliable and reduce 
the conﬁdence in the causal interpretation. To check if my estimation produces jumps 
of similar size in other points of the distribution, I run a placebo test by running RDD 
models with the same speciﬁcation in other points of the age distribution in the spirit 
of Kyyrä and Pesola [2017]. In practice, I run my preferred speciﬁcation with fake 
discontinuities using a 24 months moving window sample centered at the fake cutoﬀ. For 
the sake of presentation, I report the coeﬃcient every three months together with their 
conﬁdence interval at 95% and do not report the coeﬃcient for one year before and after 
the real discontinuity. This is done to avoid that spurious eﬀects induced by the true 
policy change. Results are reported in Figure 1.16. The outcome is reassuring about 
my identiﬁcation strategy: the coeﬃcient for the real discontinuity neatly stands out 
with respect to the others and none of them is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. The main 
coeﬃcient is also reasonably close to the one estimated in the whole sample and it is 
highly statistically signiﬁcant. Results are qualitatively similar using a non-parametric 
approach (see Appendix 1.I) although in this case the several coeﬃcients are statistically 
signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcient of interest is almost four times larger than the ones for 
the fake RDD. 
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These results provide further supportive evidence for the causal interpretation of the 
main results. 
1.8 Conclusions 
In this paper, I investigate the medium term impact of longer unemployment beneﬁts 
on workers employment. This margin, mostly neglected by previous studies, is crucial 
from a policy perspective: on the one hand, longer periods in nonemployment could lead 
to human capital depreciation or scarring and negatively aﬀect workers employment 
prospects; on the other hand, workers might exploit their higher search experience 
to look for better jobs or transition faster towards new employment. In addition, a 
market with frequent transitions between employment and nonemployment might lead 
to overestimate overall employment diﬀerences between workers exposed to longer and 
shorter beneﬁts and, thus, to overestimate the costs of unemployment beneﬁts in terms 
of ﬁscal externalities. To estimates these eﬀects, I use rich and novel administrative 
data from Italy and I implement a Regression Discontinuity Design exploiting quasi-
experimental variation in PBD related to an age at layoﬀ rule. According to this rule, 
the PBD is fully determined by age at layoﬀ: workers ﬁred before turning 50 years of 
age are eligible to 8 months of unemployment beneﬁts while workers ﬁred afterwards 
are eligible to 12 months of unemployment beneﬁts. 
Consistently with previous results in the literature, I ﬁnd that longer PBD leads to 
longer periods receiving beneﬁts and to longer time in nonemployment, by 8 and 6.2 
weeks respectively. This is determined by three diﬀerent elements: workers with longer 
beneﬁt duration have lower exit rate from nonemployment since the start of the spell; 
the diﬀerence in reemployment between the two groups increases sharply between 8 and 
12 months after layoﬀ when workers with lower potential beneﬁt duration are no longer 
eligible for unemployment beneﬁts and workers with longer beneﬁts are still eligible; 
although workers with longer beneﬁts show a higher exit rate towards employment 
after 12 months since layoﬀ, they slowly converge to the reemployment probability 
of workers with shorter beneﬁts and after 4 years they are still 1% less likely have 
found a job. This longer period spent in nonemployment leads to marginal gains in the 
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quality of the new employment as workers are slightly more likely to ﬁnd a job with 
permanent and full time contract and in older ﬁrms. The eﬀect on wages, tenure and 
coworkers’ characteristics is positive but not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Over a 4 
years period after layoﬀ, however, workers with longer PBD show only 2 more weeks 
in nonemployment. Moreover, they are less likely to get unemployment beneﬁts in the 
future. Two main elements contribute to determine this discrepancy: ﬁrst, all workers 
experience rather frequent transitions between employment and nonemployment and 
this reduces the employment gap between workers exposed to beneﬁts of diﬀerent length; 
second, workers with initially longer beneﬁts experience faster transitions towards a 
second ﬁrm after a new layoﬀ. The former element explains about three weeks in the 
diﬀerence between the two set of estimates while a bit less than one week is explained 
by a faster transition towards a second ﬁrm. these eﬀects contribute to reduce the ﬁscal 
externalities generated by longer beneﬁts and could lead to an increase in the optimal 
generosity of beneﬁts. Although, the most striking diﬀerences can be observed for 
workers with temporary contracts, the discrepancy between the eﬀect on the duration of 
the ﬁrst nonemployment spell and the medium term total nonemployment are common 
to a variety of diﬀerent settings. Workers coming from smaller ﬁrms and who lost 
permanent job show the strongest responses to longer potential beneﬁt duration. Also, 
in their case, however, the overall response in terms of nonemployment over 4 years is 
substantially lower. Results are robust to a wide range of robustness checks. 
These results are of crucial importance from a policy perspective. Indeed, workers with 
longer PBD generate negative ﬁscal externalities on other workers to the extent that 
they change their search behaviour as a consequence of longer beneﬁts: they receive 
more transfers and pay less taxes. The results in the present work show that employment 
levels tend to be much similar than expected by looking on the duration of the ﬁrst 
spell. As salaries between the two groups of workers are also similar, this suggests a 
similar level of overall taxation. In addition, a lower probability of getting beneﬁts in 
the future directly oﬀset part of the initial higher expenditure. Overall, these eﬀects 
suggest that classical estimates are overestimating the costs of unemployment beneﬁts 
duration and they could be underestimating the optimal level of generosity. 
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Figures 
Figure 1.1: Sector composition for recipients of un­
employment beneﬁts 
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Note: Figure reports sector composition for workers ﬁred between 2009 
and 2012 and receiving unemployment beneﬁts. Sample restricted to 
workers ﬁred between 46 and 54 years of age at the moment of layoﬀ. 
Figure 1.2: Density of recipient of unemployment 
beneﬁts by age (month) 
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Note: Density of age at layoﬀ for the universe of recipients of unemploy­
ment beneﬁts (OUNR) between 2009 and 2012. Number of recipients of 
unemployment beneﬁts: 452,888. Result of McCrary test for discontinu­
ity at the threshold reported at the bottom of the graph. Corresponding 
t-stat is 10.45. 
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Figure 1.3: Continuity of observable characteristics at cutoﬀ
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Note: Average of observable characteristics in a 4 year radius around the cutoﬀ. Number of recipients of 
unemployment beneﬁts: 452,888; variables reported (from left to right and top to bottom): Female; Permanent 
Contract; Full time; White Collar; Potential Market Experience; Tenure; Tenure with Temporary Contract; 
Average Monthly Wage in 3 months before layoﬀ; Average daily Wage in 6 months before layoﬀ; Size of the plant 
(ﬁrm-municipality); Small Firm (less than 15 employees); Medium Firm (14-49); Large Firms (more than 49); 
Share of workers with Permanent Contracts in past ﬁrm; Age last ﬁrm; Share of workers from Southern Regions. 
Polynomial ﬁt is estimated by OLS, separately on the two sides of the cutoﬀ, with a square polynomial in age. 
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Figure 1.4: Weeks of beneﬁt
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Note: Figure reports weeks on beneﬁts in the ﬁrst spell after layoﬀ. Fig­
ure based on 438,403 layoﬀs between February 2009 and December 2012 
for workers between 46 and 54 years of age at layoﬀ excluding workers 
from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Polynomial ﬁt 
is estimated by OLS, separately on the two sides of the cutoﬀ, with a 
square polynomial in age. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
Figure 1.5: Weeks of nonemployment 
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Note: Figure reports the weeks of nonemployment in the ﬁrst spell after 
layoﬀ. Figure based on 438,403 layoﬀs between February 2009 and Decem­
ber 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years of age at layoﬀ excluding 
workers from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Period of 
nonemployment deﬁned as the number of weeks between the end of the 
last job and the start of a new job after the end of unemployment beneﬁts. 
Number of weeks of nonemployment censored at 4 years. Polynomial ﬁt 
is estimated by OLS, separately on the two sides of the cutoﬀ, with a 
square polynomial in age. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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Figure 1.6: Hazard rate for exit from nonemployment
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Note: Hazard rate for exit of workers from nonemployment towards em­
ployment in the private sector. Hazard rate computed as the share of 
workers exiting nonemployment in month t over the number of work­
ers still nonemployed after t-1 months. Figure based on 438,403 layoﬀs 
between February 2009 and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 
54 years of age at layoﬀ excluding workers from 49 years and 10 months 
of age to 50 years of age. 
Figure 1.7: Diﬀerence in reemployment probability 
since layoﬀ 
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Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on prob­
ability of being still nonemployed after t months. Linear probability 
models with dummy equal to 1 if the worker is still nonemployed after 
t months since layoﬀ. Regressions include a square polynomial in age 
with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last 
ﬁrm characteristics and local labour market interacted with month of lay­
oﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects. Figure based on 438,403 layoﬀs between February 2009 
and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years of age at layoﬀ 
excluding workers from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of 
age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Conﬁdence 
interval at 95% reported. 
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Figure 1.8: Total weeks of nonemployment (4 years)
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Note: Total weeks of nonemployment within 4 years since layoﬀ. Figure 
based on 438,403 layoﬀs between February 2009 and December 2012 for 
workers between 46 and 54 years of age at layoﬀ excluding workers from 
49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Linear ﬁt estimated 
by OLS with a square polynomial in age estimated separately on the two 
sides of the cutoﬀ. Polynomial ﬁt is estimated by OLS, separately on 
the two sides of the cutoﬀ, with a square polynomial in age. Conﬁdence 
interval at 95% reported. 
Figure 1.9: Diﬀerence in nonemployment probability 
over 4 years since layoﬀ 
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Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on prob­
ability of being nonemployed at t months after layoﬀ. The worker is con­
sidered employed if she works at least one day during the corresponding 
month in the private sector. Regressions include a square polynomial 
in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, controls for the worker 
and last ﬁrm characteristics, local labour market interacted with month 
ﬁxed eﬀects. Figure based on 438,403 layoﬀs between February 2009 
and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years of age at layoﬀ 
excluding workers from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of 
age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Conﬁdence 
interval at 95% reported. 
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Figure 1.10: Income, days worked and unemployment beneﬁts over 4 years after 
layoﬀ 
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Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on labour earnings (a), log labor earnings (b), 
days worked (c) and probability of receiving UB (d). Panel (b) and (c) conditional on employment. Regressions 
include a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last ﬁrm 
characteristics, local labour maket interacted with month ﬁxed eﬀects. Figure based on 438,403 layoﬀs between 
February 2009 and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years of age at layoﬀ excluding workers from 
49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. 
Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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Figure 1.11: Eﬀect on ﬁrst employment characteristics 
(ﬁrst spell) 
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Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on post 
unemployment job characteristics. Regressions include a square poly­
nomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, controls for the 
worker and last ﬁrm characteristics, local labour market interacted with 
month ﬁxed eﬀects. Figure based on 352,486 new jobs for subset of lay­
oﬀs between February 2009 and December 2012. Sample includes workers 
between 46 and 54 years of age at layoﬀ excluding workers from 49 years 
and 10 months of age to 50 years of age, and who ﬁnd a job within 4 
years since layoﬀ. Coeﬃcients standardized by the mean for the baseline 
group, i.e. workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 years and 10 
months of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. 
Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
Figure 1.12: Probability of nonemployment following reemployment 
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(a) Nonemployment - any ﬁrm
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(b) Nonemployment - ﬁrst reemployment 
ﬁrm 
Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on probability of being employed at t months 
after reemployment. The worker is considered employed if she works at least one day during the corresponding 
month in the private sector. Regressions include a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the 
cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics, local labour market interacted with month ﬁxed 
eﬀects. Figure based on workers who ﬁnd an employment within 3 years since layoﬀ, subset of all layoﬀs 
between February 2009 and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years of age at layoﬀ excluding 
workers from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour 
Market level. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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Figure 1.13: Employment rate for workers at the 
cutoﬀ 
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Note: Share of workers employed at 50 years of age on the two sides 
of the cutoﬀ. Estimates are based on RDD regressions with depend­
ent variable a dummy taking value one if the worker is employed at 
month t and value 0 otherwise. Regressions include second order 
polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of the cutoﬀ 
and a dummy for workers ﬁred after turning 50 years of age. 
Figure 1.14: RDD estimates with diﬀerent bandwidths. 
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Note: RDD estimates with diﬀerent bandwidths around the cutoﬀ. Sample at 48 months corresponds to main 
sample and it includes 438,403 layoﬀs between February 2009 and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 
54 years of age at layoﬀ excluding workers from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Regressions 
include a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last 
ﬁrm characteristics, local labour market interacted with month ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at Local 
Labour Market level. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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Figure 1.15: RDD estimates with diﬀerent donut holes
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(a) Nonemployment - ﬁrst spell (b) Nonemployment - 4 years 
Note: RDD estimates with diﬀerent donuts around the cutoﬀ with a 4 years bandwidth for duration of nonem­
ployment in the ﬁrst spell and over 4 years since layoﬀ. Regressions include a squared ﬂexible polynomial on the 
two sides of the fake cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics and local labor market interacted 
with month of layoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects. Coeﬃcient at 1 is the closes to the preferred speciﬁcation. Standard errors 
clustered at Local Labour Market level. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
Figure 1.16: Placebo RDD 
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Note: Placebo linear regression for duration of nonemployment in the ﬁrst spell and over 4 years since layoﬀ. 
Figure based on 438,403 layoﬀs between February 2009 and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years 
at layoﬀ excluding workers with 49 years of age and 10 months and 50 years of age. Regressions include a squared 
ﬂexible polynomial on the two sides of the fake cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics and 
local labour market interacted with month of layoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects. Coeﬃcient at 50 years of age corresponds 
to policy induced change in potential beneﬁt duration. Placebo and main RDD regressions use a one year 
bandwidth. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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Tables
 
Table 1.1: Sample characteristics
 
Variable Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Weeks of Beneﬁt 26.322 15.832 0.143 52 
Duration Nonemployment 84.903 106.700 0 413 
Duration Nonemployment (Censored) 69.627 73.784 0 208 
% with duration between 0 and 4 months 0.275 0.447 0 1 
% with duration between 4 and 8 months 0.227 0.419 0 1 
% with duration between 8 and 12 months 0.115 0.319 0 1 
% with duration between 12 and 16 months 0.070 0.255 0 1 
% with duration above 16 months 0.313 0.464 0 1 
Recall 0.337 0.473 0 1 
Female 0.375 0.484 0 1 
Permanent Contract 0.537 0.499 0 1 
Full Time 0.803 0.398 0 1 
White Collar 0.184 0.387 0 1 
Market Potential Experience 27.434 8.853 2.000 50 
Tenure 4.303 5.233 0.083 30 
Tenure Temporary 0.924 1.507 0 14 
log Avg Monthly Wage in last 3 months 7.335 0.376 -1.109 11 
log Daily Wage in last 6 months 4.139 0.439 -3.258 10 
(log) Avg Size Plant 2.543 1.546 0 10 
Small Firm (below 15 employees) 0.556 0.497 0 1 
Medium Firm (between 15 and 49 employees) 0.201 0.401 0 1 
Large Firm (above 50 employees) 0.243 0.429 0 1 
Share Permanent in Last Firm 0.665 0.369 0 1 
Age Last Firm 15.258 12.684 0 110 
South 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Workers 
Spells 
(Avg) # spells per individual 
328,835 
452,888 
1.376 
Note: Summary statistics at spell level for individuals receiving unemployment beneﬁts and ﬁred between 46 and 54 years 
of age. The sample excludes individuals coming from the public sector and individuals with seasonal contracts. Weeks of 
nonemployment deﬁned as the distance between the layoﬀ originating the unemployment beneﬁt and the ﬁrst hiring date 
after the end of unemployment beneﬁt. Tenure deﬁned as the number of years, even with breaks, spent with the same 
employer with any contract (Tenure) or with a speciﬁc type of contract (Temporary Contract). 
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Table 1.2: Identiﬁcation check: regression coeﬃcients for discontinuity of observables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Polynomial and FE Donut 
Variable Beta Standard Deviation T-stat Beta Standard Deviation T-stat Average Relative Eﬀect 
Female 0.011 0.004 2.685 0.004 0.005 0.859 0.375 1.04% 
Permanent Contract 0.025 0.005 5.196 0.008 0.005 1.488 0.529 1.43% 
Full Time 0.004 0.003 1.042 0.004 0.004 1.012 0.801 0.50% 
White Collar 0.012 0.003 3.634 0.002 0.004 0.608 0.181 1.36% 
Market Potential Experience 0.088 0.076 1.156 -0.015 0.084 -0.180 27.168 -0.06% 
Tenure 0.059 0.042 1.400 -0.061 0.054 -1.140 4.233 -1.44% 
Tenure Temporary -0.064 0.013 -4.862 -0.029 0.013 -2.192 0.938 -3.06% 
(Log) Monthly Wage Last 3 Months 0.005 0.003 1.579 0.004 0.003 1.070 7.330 0.05% 
(Log) Daily Wage Last 6 Months 0.002 0.004 0.385 0.002 0.005 0.317 4.134 0.04% 
(Log) Plant Size (Firm-Municipality) -0.035 0.014 -2.443 -0.009 0.013 -0.690 2.551 -0.36% 
Small Firm (<15) 0.011 0.005 2.406 0.001 0.005 0.130 0.552 0.11% 
Medium Firm (15-49) -0.004 0.003 -1.316 -0.002 0.004 -0.628 0.203 -1.22% 
Large Firm (>50) -0.007 0.004 -1.610 0.002 0.004 0.416 0.245 0.75% 
Share Permanent Contracts Last Firm 0.013 0.003 3.936 0.001 0.004 0.366 0.661 0.21% 
Age Last Firm -0.125 0.106 -1.178 -0.170 0.117 -1.450 15.271 -1.11% 
South Region -0.001 0.004 -0.132 0.000 0.000 0.389 0.273 0.03% 
Note: Linear regression model with second order polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes at two sides of the cutoﬀ and dummy for workers laid oﬀ after 50 years of age 
(coeﬃcient reported in table). Columns from (1) to (3) include age polynomial and ﬁxed eﬀects at Local Labour Market. Columns from (4) to (6) excludes the ﬁrst two bins to 
the left and the ﬁrst bin to the right of the cutoﬀ (from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age). Column (7) reports the average value for the variable for the 
individuals between 49 years of age and 49 years and 10 months of age. Column (8) reports the ratio between the coeﬃcient in Column (6) and the average in Column (7). 
Number of spells: 452,888. Standard errors are clustered at Local Labour Market level. 
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Table 1.3: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on beneﬁt duration and amount 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Beneﬁts (amount) Beneﬁts (log) 
Above 50 years of age 8.136*** 8.056*** 8.054*** 8.039*** 7.947*** 1,262.314*** 0.177*** 
(0.258) (0.258) (0.256) (0.254) (0.269) (48.280) (0.010) 
Observations 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 
Mean dependent 22.94 22.94 22.94 22.94 22.94 4767.21 
Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression for the duration in weeks and amount of the beneﬁt with a ﬂexible squared polynomial on the two sides of the 
cutoﬀ. Controls include past job and ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: 
female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average monthly wage in the 
last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts 
in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between 
February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Baseline computed as 
the average of the dependent variable for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors clustered at 
Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
Table 1.4: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on nonemployment duration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Nonemployed (after 4y) 
Above 50 years of age 6.879*** 6.457*** 6.394*** 6.249*** 6.123*** 0.012*** 
(0.828) (0.776) (0.774) (0.777) (0.793) (0.004) 
Observations 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 
Mean dependent 66.58 66.58 66.58 66.58 66.58 .18 
Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE NO NO NO YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Note: Linear regression for the duration of nonemployment in weeks up to the ﬁrst employment in the private sector after the 
end of UB with a ﬂexible squared polynomial on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. Controls include past job and ﬁrm characteristics 
and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation 
dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential 
experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age 
of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between February 
2009 and December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Baseline computed 
as the average for the dependent variable for workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Standard 
errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 1.5: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on medium term outcomes 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Weeks Nonemployment 
(2) 
Income (W) 
(3) 
Income (W+B) 
(4) 
log Income (W+B) 
(5) 
Income (W+AB) 
(6) 
log Income (W+AB) 
(7) 
# Other UB 
(8) 
Amount Other UB 
(9) 
Weeks Other UB 
Above 50 years of age 
Observations 
Mean dependent 
Controls 
Month FE 
LLM FE 
LLM X Month FE 
2.162*** 
(0.646) 
438,403 
128.83 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
-883.965*** 
(305.085) 
438,403 
33365.46 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
378.349 
(282.046) 
438,403 
38132.67 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.060*** 
(0.009) 
438,403 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
1.464 
(286.657) 
438,403 
43792.49 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.046*** 
(0.009) 
438,403 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
-0.035*** 
(0.012) 
438,403 
1.26 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
-418.269*** 
(53.089) 
438,403 
5423.12 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
-1.911*** 
(0.256) 
438,403 
26.09 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Note: Linear regression on nonemployment duration over 4 years since layoﬀ and on diﬀerent measures of total income. Column (2) reports the eﬀect of 4 additional months of PBD on total taxable labour 
income; Columns (3) and (4) include beneﬁts collected in the ﬁrst spell; Columns (5) and (6) include all beneﬁts received by workers after the ﬁrst layoﬀ; Columns (7)-(9) report the eﬀect for time on 
unemployment beneﬁts beyond the ﬁrst spell of beneﬁts. Controls include past job and ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, full time 
contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, 
log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. All regressions include squared age polynomial with diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of the 
cutoﬀ. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Baseline 
computed as the average for the dependent variable for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 
10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 1.6: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on sector and geographic mobility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Firm Municipality LLM Region ATECO Broad ATECO 2 
Above 50 years of age 0.008* 0.013** 0.006 -0.000 0.005 0.008* 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 352,486 352,486 352,486 352,486 352,467 352,467 
Mean dependent .58 .41 .26 .09 .25 .34 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Calendar Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression for the probability of changing ﬁrm in Column (1), of changing geographic location (Columns 
(2)-(4)) of changing sector (Columns (5)-(6)) with new employment. Controls include past job and ﬁrm characteristics 
and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occu­
pation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, 
market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent 
contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the ﬁrm and sector dummies. All regressions include squared age polynomial with 
diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. Estimates based on 356,486 new jobs, subset of layoﬀs between Feb­
ruary 2009 and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years at layoﬀ excluding workers from 49 years and 
10 months of age to 50 years of age. Baseline computed as the average for the dependent variable for workers ﬁred 
between 49 years of age and 49 years and 10 months of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. 
Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 1.7: Employment prospects in new ﬁrm and location 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Growth Employment Retention Persistence 
VARIABLES Growth Firm Growth Municipality Growth Sector Firm Municipality Sector Firm Municipality Sector 
Above 50 years of age 0.016** 0.000 0.058*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.002* -0.000 -0.000 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.017) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 317,842 356,205 356,210 318,436 356,205 356,039 318,436 356,205 356,039 
Mean dependent .14 .00 .00 .65 .78 .76 .85 .88 .87 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Calendar Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression for growth and stability of employment in new occupation. Columns (1) to (3) report growth in number of employees in the new job between the hiring 
year and the year of hiring. Columns (4) to (6) report the eﬀect on retention, deﬁned as the share of workers employed in ﬁrm/sector/municipality still employed in the same 
place between the year before the hiring and the year of hiring. Columns (7) to (9) report the eﬀect on employment persistence, deﬁned as the share of workers employed in 
ﬁrm/sector/municipality still employed between the year before the hiring and the year of hiring. Controls include past job and ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of 
layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average monthly wage 
in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last 
ﬁrm and sector dummies. All regressions include squared age polynomial with diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. Estimates based on 356,486 new jobs, subset of 
layoﬀs between February 2009 and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years at layoﬀ excluding workers with 49 years of age and 11 months and 50 years of age which 
end with employment within 4 years. Baseline computed as the average for the dependent variable for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 years and 11 months of age. 
Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 1.8: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on employment after ﬁrst reemployment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Weeks Weeks - ﬁrst ﬁrm Weeks - other ﬁrms J-t-J Weeks - other ﬁrms Weeks - other ﬁrms Weeks - other ﬁrms 
Above 50 years of age 0.925*** 0.413 0.512* -0.000 0.441* 0.612** 0.704** 
(0.348) (0.366) (0.266) (0.004) (0.268) (0.261) (0.285) 
Not Eligible again for beneﬁt 1.864*** 3.454*** 3.091*** 
(0.202) (0.228) (0.222) 
Observations 343,820 343,820 343,820 343,820 343,820 343,820 301,548 
Mean dependent 57.4 43.25 14.15 .24 14.15 14.15 15.79 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression on duration of employment over 2 years after reemployment. Columns (1) reports eﬀect of longer initial beneﬁts on total weeks after reemployment. Column (2) and 
(3) decompose the eﬀect between the ﬁrst ﬁrm and other ﬁrms. Column (4) looks at the eﬀect on job to job transitions, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the worker ﬁnds a job in 
the same month or in the month after the new layoﬀ. Columns (5) to (7) control for repeated eligibility by looking at how many individuals are still eligible to beneﬁts after the second layoﬀ 
(i.e. they cumulated at least one year of work in the two years before the new layoﬀ). Column (5) includes a dummy, Column (6) includes a second RDD in the same speciﬁcation in 
weeks worked before the second layoﬀ. Column (7) replicates Column (6) but restricts the sample to workers who actually lost their reemployment job. Controls include past job and ﬁrm 
characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 
months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the 
last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. All regressions include squared age polynomial with diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. Sample includes all recipients of 
unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. The sample excludes also all workers 
who found a job after 3 years since layoﬀ. Baseline computed as the average for the dependent variable for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors 
clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 1.9: Jobs found and lost within 13 months since the ﬁrst layoﬀ 
(1) (2) (3)	 (4) 
% Found Job	 % Lost (again) Job % Lost Job 11-13 Job Lost and Δpp [(1)*(2)] 
Below 50 years of Age 
Perment 0.57 0.41 0.55 0.23 
Temporary 0.81 0.62 0.57 0.50 
Total 0.68 0.53 0.56 0.36 
Above 50 years of Age 
Perment 0.49 0.41 0.58 0.20 
Temporary 0.76 0.64 0.59 0.49 
Total 0.61 0.54 0.59 0.33 
Note: Share of workers ﬁnding and losing job within 13 months since initial layoﬀ. Column (1) reports fraction of 
workers who found a job within 12 months. Column (2) reports the fraction of those who found a job who lost again 
their job within the same time period of Column (1). Column (3) reports the share of lost job between 11 and 13 
months since initial layoﬀ. Column (4) reports the total change in employment by group due to subsequent layoﬀ 
(Share who found a job again multiplied by the share of those who found a job who lost again their job). Sample 
includes all workers ﬁred before and after 50 years of age, but those ﬁred in the donut region: 249,162 workers laid oﬀ 
before turning 50 years of age and 189,241 workers ﬁred after turning 50 years of age. 
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneous eﬀects on nonemployment duration before the ﬁnding a new job and over 4 years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES	 Baseline Centre-North South-Island Female Male < 15 emp 15-49 emp > 49 emp Permanent Temporary Cyclical Not Cyclical Contraction Expansion 
Panel A: Nonemployment (till next job) 
Above 50 years of age 6.123*** 5.481*** 7.201*** 5.701*** 6.485*** 7.767*** 4.923*** 4.791*** 8.459*** 4.081*** 5.055*** 6.099*** 6.596*** 4.859*** 
(0.793) (1.132) (1.084) (1.271) (0.906) (1.072) (1.629) (1.410) (1.260) (0.918) (1.228) (0.855) (1.382) (1.390) 
Mean dependent 66.58 64.71 69.40 67.41 66.08 74.82 58.12 48.95 84.53 46.04 45.09 71.65 69.66 60.7 
Panel B: Nonemployment (4 years) 
Above 50 years of age 2.162*** 2.434** 1.926** 1.887* 1.855** 3.218*** 1.263 2.209 4.214*** 0.275 1.416 1.837** 2.247* 0.410 
(0.646) (0.944) (0.747) (0.997) (0.809) (0.844) (1.387) (1.580) (0.886) (0.885) (1.050) (0.736) (1.176) (1.234) 
Mean dependent 128.83 122.41 138.49 125.99 130.55 134.15 123.63 117.1 137.51 118.89 119.27 131.09 131.35 125.96 
Delta 3.961 3.047 5.275 3.814 4.63 4.549 3.66 2.582 4.245 3.806 3.639 4.262 4.349 4.449 
Delta over eﬀect ﬁrst spell 0.65 0.56 0.73 0.67 0.71 0.59 0.74 0.54 0.50 0.93 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.92 
Obs 438,403 264,324 174,079 164,441 273,962 266,055 93,251 79,097 235,421 202,982 84,065 354,011 109,507 109,586 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Calendar Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression on duration of nonemployment before ﬁnding a job after the of unemployment beneﬁts (Panel A) and on duration of nonemployment over 4 years (Panel B). Controls include past job and 
ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average 
monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector 
dummies. All regressions include squared age polynomial with diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between February 2009 and 
December 2012 excluding workers from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Sectors deﬁned cyclical if they show a seasonality in employment larger than 10% of the workforce. Contraction and 
expansion deﬁned based on employment growth in the LLM in the previous year with respect to the layoﬀ. LLM is classiﬁed as contracting if employment growth in the past year is lower than -1.5% (bottom 
quartile of distribution) while LLM is classiﬁed as expanding if employment growth in the past year is larger than 3% (top quartile of the distribution). Baseline computed as the average for the dependent 
variable for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 1.11: Regression estimates under diﬀerent parametrization and estimation strategies 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Panel A: Nonemployment (First Spell After Layoﬀ) 
Above 50 years of age 6.123*** 4.369*** 7.706*** 5.626*** 7.678*** 7.341*** 
(0.793) (0.463) (1.297) (0.859) (0.553) (1.204) 
Panel B: Nonemployment (4 years) 
Above 50 years of age 2.162*** 1.314*** 3.354*** 2.011*** 4.037*** 3.887*** 
(0.646) (0.384) (1.078) (0.704) (0.462) (1.017) 
Observations 438,403 438,403 438,403 424,188 99,007 438,403 
Polynomial Degree 2 1 3 2 0 2 
Donut (2,1) (2,1) (2,1) (3,3) (2,1) (2,1) 
Robust Estimation NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Non-Prametric band NO NO NO NO 1 NO 
Note: Linear regression for duration of ﬁrst nonemployment spell and medium term outcomes. Controls 
include past job and ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List 
of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 
6 months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with 
temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last 
ﬁrm and sector dummies. All regressions include squared age polynomial with diﬀerent slopes on the two 
sides of the cutoﬀ. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between February 
2009 and December 2012 ﬁred from the private sector excluding workers ﬁred at 50 years and one month of 
age. Sample restricted to workers with previous temporary contract. Robust estimation performed using 
the rdrobust STATA command and reducing age for workers older than 50 by one month to accommodate 
for one month donut. Optimal bandwidth for nonemployment before new spell is 216,307 observatsions. 
In order to simplify the robust estimation procedure, the equation in Column (6) contains only sector at 
letter level (ATECO classiﬁcation), province ﬁxed eﬀects and month of layoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors 
clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
Appendices 
1.A Alternative beneﬁts between 2009 and 2012 
Two main alternative beneﬁts were available to unemployed workers depending 
on their working histories and characteristics of the previous employment. 
First, individuals who were not eligible for the Beneﬁt for Ordinary Unemploy­
ment with Normal Requirement could apply to receive an alternative beneﬁt 
with reduced requirements (Beneﬁt for Ordinary Unemployment with Reduced 
Requirements). Workers were eligible for the beneﬁt if they had worked at least 
78 days (or 13 weeks) in the last year and if they had contributed for the ﬁrst 
to the social security system at least two years before the unemployment period. 
It granted a monetary transfer for each day worked in the past year up to 180 
days. Interestingly, the beneﬁt was more generous for workers who had shorter 
unemployment spells and aimed at discouraging undocumented work rather than 
insurance. As with the main policy, the amount was proportional to past wages 
and workers were granted 35% of the average daily wage in the previous year 
for the ﬁrst 120 days and 40% for the following 60 days. The beneﬁt was also 
characterized by a very peculiar payment structure as workers could request it 
in the solar year following the periods of unemployment up to up to the 31st of 
March. This measure, while still providing some income support, is considerably 
less generous than the previous one and, in addition, the delayed payments made 
it an imperfect substitute with respect to the one under study. Finally, the beneﬁt 
is not suitable for workers who have long periods of nonemployment during the 
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year, due to its connection with days worked rather than unemployment. It is 
hence not very likely that workers eligible for the OUNR would prefer the beneﬁt 
just described. 
Second, workers ﬁred during ﬁrm restructuring and mass layoﬀ could access so 
called Mobility Beneﬁt (Indennita’ di Mobilita’, law 223/1991).29 This policy 
provides a long and generous beneﬁt, coupled with active labour market policies 
such as meetings with consultants and activities to improve the occupational 
perspectives of the worker. Eligibility to the beneﬁt was based on two main 
elements with multiple requirements: 
•	 Worker characteristics: at least 12 months of tenure of which 6 of active 
work and a permanent contract. 
•	 Firm characteristics: 
–	 Sector and size: Industrial (at least 15 employees in last 6 months); 
commercial ﬁrms (at least 50 employees); cooperatives (at least 15 
employees); artisan ﬁrms who supply to eligible ﬁrms; tourism (at least 
50 employees); security (15 ﬁrms); plane transportation (from 2013; no 
restriction in size). 
–	 Cause of layoﬀ: economic restructuring closing of the activity. 
The duration of the beneﬁt was based on the age at layoﬀ and geographic location 
of the workers and changed over time. Here, I report the duration in months for 
workers dismissed for the period before 2012. 
Table 1.A.1: Duration for mobility beneﬁt 
Age North and Centre South and Island 
Up to 39 
From 40 to 49 
From 50 onwards 
12 
24 
36 
24 
36 
48 
29Here I will describe only the Mobilita’ Ordinaria and neglect other kind of related subsidies 
which involved a lower number of workers. 
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The amount of the beneﬁt followed the amount for the maximum salary integration 
computed yearly by the Social Security and it declined over time. The worker 
received 80% of the salary for the ﬁrst 12 months and 64% for the remaining 
period. As it can be seen, this subsidy is substantially more generous than the 
other and is very attractive to workers. In the age group I consider in this paper, 
about 25% of all workers from permanent contracts among recipients of UB use 
this beneﬁt. However, the important conditionalities to access this beneﬁt both 
for the ﬁrm and for the worker reduce the risk of endogenous selection of workers 
and selection bias. The exclusion of some of the individuals from the sample could 
reduce, to some extent, the external validity of the results. 
Given the sample composition and the heterogenous eﬀects by workers character­
istics, the presence of this beneﬁt has unclear eﬀects on the estimates. As better 
workers are ﬁred in collective layoﬀ due to plant closure (in this case the ﬁrm 
is forced to ﬁre also its good quality workers), the eﬀect of PBD could be lower 
for them. However, if the ﬁrm is closing or substantially restructuring, workers 
might also be losing more ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital and they have by deﬁnition 
a lower probability of recall. This would lead potential beneﬁt duration to have a 
stronger eﬀect on this group of workers. 
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1.B Additional information on data 
1.B.1 Sample deﬁnition for recipients UB 
I start with data for 4,555,104 unemployment beneﬁts administered between February 
2009 and December 2012. I then remove annulled subsidies, duplications and observations 
with obvious mistakes (e.g number of days of unemployment implied by end of beneﬁt 
less than zero). This reduces the sample to 3,811,687 observations. I also drop suspension 
beneﬁts and restrict my attention to workers ﬁred between 46 and 54 years of age. 
This restriction reduces the sample to 647,888 observations. I ﬁnally drop workers 
coming from the public sector (about 147,000 observations): these workers mostly come 
from the education sector and their hiring and ﬁring periods largely coincides with 
the Italian academic year (ﬁred in June or July and then hired again in September or 
October). Due to the speciﬁc nature of their occupation, this exclusion should make the 
results more relevant from a policy perspective. After the exclusion of few remaining 
observations with missing data for my variables of interest, I am left with 452,888 layoﬀs 
for 328,835 diﬀerent individuals. 
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1.B.2 Main variables deﬁnition 
Table 1.B.1: Main variables deﬁnition 
Variable Description 
Nonemployment 
Nonemployment over 4 years 
Number of weeks between lay­
oﬀ of the worker and ﬁrst job 
in the private sector. I consider 
valid jobs only those after the 
end of unemployment beneﬁts to 
avoid considering very short spells 
which might be compatible with 
UB. Computation is based on 
UNIEMENS archive. 
Number of weeks of nonemploy­
ment over 4 years after initial lay­
oﬀ. Number computed as 208 
weeks minus the number of days 
worked in the period considered. 
The number of days worked is 
equal to the number of paid days 
in the month, rescaled by the num­
ber of days in the month. Com­
putation is based on UNIEMENS 
archive. 
Female	 Indicator for gender of the worker. 
Variable is based on the worker 
registry. 
Full Time	 Indicator equal to 1 if the workers 
has a full time contract as repor­
ted by the SIP and validated with 
UNIEMENS data. 
White Collar
 Indicator equal to 1 if the worker 
has a white collar job. Model also 
includes dummies for apprentice, 
manager and few other categor­
ies which concern a small minor­
ity of the workers. Variable is de­
rived from SIP and validated with 
UNIEMENS data. 
Permanent Contract	 Indicator equal to 1 if the worker 
has a permanent contract. Vari­
able is derived from SIP and val­
idated with UNIEMENS data. 
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Variable	 Description 
Log Daily Labur Income	 Daily labour income for workers in 
the six months before layoﬀ in the 
ﬁrm laying oﬀ the worker. This 
computation excludes the month 
of the layoﬀ to have better in­
formation on the usual pay of 
worker without considering pos­
sible delayed payments. Variable 
is derived from the UNIEMENS 
archive. 
Log Average Monthly In-	 Monthly average income over the 
come	 three months before layoﬀ. In­
formation is derived from the SIP 
archive and it reports the average 
wage used for the computation of 
unemployment beneﬁts. 
Market Potential Experience	 Number of years from the ﬁrst con­
tribution of the worker to social 
security as a employee. Variable is 
derived from the worker registry. 
Tenure	 Number of total years spent by 
the worker in the same ﬁrm. 
This includes discontinous spells. 
Computation is based on yearly 
UNIEMENS records from 1982 up 
to the layoﬀ of the worker. 
Tenure Temporary	 Number of total years spent by 
the worker in the same ﬁrm with a 
temporary contract. This includes 
discontinous spells. Computation 
is based on yearly UNIEMENS 
records from 1997 up to the lay­
oﬀ of the worker. Information on 
the contract of the worker are not 
available in years before 1997. 
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Variable	 Description 
Log Average Size Firm	 Size of the ﬁrm in the municip­
ality (plant) in the six months 
before the layoﬀ of the worker. 
Information is derived from the 
UNIEMENS archive. 
Share Permanent Contracts	 Share of workers with perman­
in last ﬁrm	 ent contract in the last ﬁrm-
municipality (plant) of the worker. 
Information is derived from the 
UNIEMENS archive. 
Age Last Firm	 Number of years since the ﬁrst re­
gistration of the ﬁrm with the so­
cial security. Information is de­
rived from the ﬁrm registry. 
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1.C	 Extensions for eﬀects on the ﬁrst spell of nonem­
ployment 
1.C.1	 Clustering 
Table 1.C.1: Potential beneﬁt duration and time to next job: cluster 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LLM Month Age Robust 
Above 50 years of age 6.123*** 6.123*** 6.123*** 6.123*** 
(0.793) (0.629) (0.657) (0.711) 
Observations 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 
Mean dependent 66.58 66.58 66.58 66.58 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression for the duration in weeks and amount of the beneﬁt with a ﬂexible 
squared polynomial on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. Controls include past job and ﬁrm character­
istics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, full 
time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, 
average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with 
temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age 
of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts 
(OUNR) between February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 
10 months of age to 50 years of age. Baseline computed as the average for the dependent vari­
able for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors 
clustered at Local Labour Market level in Column (1), at month of layoﬀ level in Column (2), 
at running variable level in Column (3) and robust standard errors in Column (4). Level of 
signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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1.C.2 Censoring 
Data constraint prevents me from running the analysis over a longer time horizon. 
Censoring or trimming durations is, however, common in unemployment studies. Card 
et al. [2007a], for example, exclude all nonemployment spells longer than 2 years while 
Schmieder et al. [2012a] censor their spells of nonemployment at 3 years after layoﬀ. 
Depending on long term diﬃculties that workers encounter while looking for a job, these 
choices might have implications for the estimates of the behavioural responses to longer 
or more generous beneﬁts. As results in Figure 1.7 show, diﬀerences in reemployment 
rates persists after a long period of time and some workers experience intense diﬃculties 
in rejoining the workforce. In this section, I explore diﬀerent censoring choices to assess 
how they can impact estimates of the eﬀect of longer unemployment beneﬁts. To this 
purpose, I repeat my estimation for time to the next job and censor the maximum 
number of weeks at diﬀerent horizons. Results are reported in the table below. Censoring 
has an important eﬀect on estimates and each additional year of observation adds about 
one week. The marginal contribution of an additional year of data is decreasing which 
is consistent with the narrowing in the diﬀerence in reemployment for the two groups 
of workers as time proceeds. For the sake of comparison my preferred speciﬁcation 
is reported in Column (1). The eﬀect for longer beneﬁts is always highly statistically 
signiﬁcant and the decline in the coeﬃcient for shorter horizons is accompanied by lower 
standard errors. Column (4) reports the results for the full uncensored duration. This 
kind of estimation has the disadvantage of allowing for diﬀerent maximum duration for 
workers ﬁred at diﬀerent point of my reference period but it allows to exploit data more 
fully as all nonemployment spells are measured up to December 2016. As a consequence, 
workers will be observed up to 7 years after they ﬁrst receive unemployment beneﬁts 
(workers ﬁred in 2009). The eﬀect of longer beneﬁts is now close to 7 additional weeks 
in nonemployment, about 75% larger than the one in Column (3). These results suggest 
that the eﬀects identiﬁed represent, to some extent, a lower bound and the addition of 
more data could allow a more comprehensive assessment. This also shows that censoring 
is far from innocuous and this particular choice should take into account the long run 
reemployment probability of workers. 
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Table 1.C.2: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on nonemployment 
duration with diﬀerent censoring 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 4 years 3 years 2 years Uncensored 
Above 50 years of age 6.123*** 5.251*** 4.076*** 6.953*** 
(0.793) (0.593) (0.384) (1.123) 
Observations 438,403 438,403 438,403 438,403 
Baseline dependent 66.58 57.38 46.59 80.89 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression for the duration in weeks and amount of the beneﬁt with a ﬂexible squared 
polynomial on the two sides of the cutoﬀ (50 years of age). Controls include past job and ﬁrm char­
acteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, 
full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, 
average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with tem­
porary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the 
last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) 
between February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months 
of age to 50 years of age. Baseline censoring in Column (1), censoring at 3 years in Column (2), at 
2 years in Column (3) and uncensored in Column (4). Baseline computed as the average for the de­
pendent variable for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard 
errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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1.C.3 Transitions towards public sector and self employment 
Data allow to explicilty consider only spells in the private sector while spells as self-
employed or in the public sector cannot be observed. In this section, I use an alternative 
source, the Estratti Conto, which contains social security contribution histories of 
workers. To check to what extent these spells might be aﬀecting my results, I obtain 
the full contribution histories for a subset of my sample (workers laid oﬀ between 2010 
and 2012) and compute the time to next job. Although data is reported at annual level, 
it still reports the start date of each contribution. It should be noted that contribution 
histories suﬀer from some disadvantages. First, they tend to be updated and recompiled 
after the worker retires to compute the amount due: this makes them less reliable when 
used for workers who are not collecting pensions. Second, the comparison between the 
private sector employees data and contribution histories shows some inconsistencies on 
the start date of a spell or its continuity. In some cases, contribution histories tend 
to collect together spells with the same employer or postdate the beginning of the 
employment relation with respect to the other data source. Although results presented 
in this section hint at only minor diﬀerences when contributions histories are used, 
the considerations just mentioned should lead to use them with care when interested 
in durations. I compute several measures of time to the next employment with the 
original and contribution data and report them in Table 1.C.3. Results are comforting. 
Column (2) reports the measure of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration as 
in the main results (reported in Column (1) for comparison) but restricts the sample to 
workers for whom I also have contribution histories data. The two quantities are very 
similar and the exclusion of 2009 does not lead to large changes in the eﬀects of longer 
beneﬁts. Column (5) reports the same measure with the contribution histories and 
shows only minimal diﬀerences in the eﬀect of the longer subsidy. Interestingly, also the 
average number of weeks to the next employment is very similar and this conﬁrms that 
transitions towards self-employment in this age group are relatively rare. Column (3) 
and Column (6) report the eﬀect for the nonemployment duration after correcting the 
date for the end of the beneﬁt with the maximum duration of the beneﬁt.30 Estimates 
30This takes into account few cases in which the date of the beneﬁt seems misreported with 
respect to the expected theoretical duration. 
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are very consistent with the ﬁrst method. Finally, Column (4) and Column (7) report 
the eﬀects on nonemployment to the next job without any restriction on the ﬁrst spell. 
This allows us to also take into account spells which might have started when the worker 
was still receiving beneﬁts. This change leads to a small decline in the estimates, but 
the eﬀects are still much in line with the main ones in terms of both average duration 
and magnitude of the eﬀects of longer beneﬁts. Overall, results of this exercise do not 
lead to substantial changes in the estimated eﬀects and in the average duration of the 
nonemployment spell. This suggests that the use of spells only in the private sector 
does not constitute a strong limitation for the analysis. 
Another possible solution is to abstract from individuals showing any transition towards 
diﬀerent forms of self-employment. In this section, I run my main estimates on both 
nonemployment to the next job and total nonemployment over 4 years by excluding 
from the sample all workers who ever experienced a self-employment spell in the years 
following layoﬀ. First, I exclude from the sample all individuals with a parasubordinato 
contract, that is workers who are categorized as self employed but their job shares many 
characteristics with dependent employees such as stable working hours, unique employer 
and so on. Then, I exclude all workers with a self- employment spell. It should be noted 
that, as data for full contribution histories have to be used, these estimates exploit 
only data for workers ﬁred between 2010 and 2012. I report estimates in Table 1.C.4. 
Panel A reports the eﬀect of longer beneﬁts excluding workers who have at least one 
parasubordinato contract after their layoﬀ. Their exclusion leads only to very small 
sample losses (about 18,500 spells or 4.2% of the sample) and estimates are very close 
to the ones in the main sample. Panel B restricts the sample to individuals for whom I 
have data on possible self-employment spells (those ﬁred between 2010 and 2012) and 
then excludes all individuals with any spell as self-employed. Changes in the sample are 
more relevant than before but still limited (about 30,000 or 8.8%). More importantly, 
the estimated eﬀects are almost unaﬀected with respect to the main sample. These 
results reinforce the evidence of the previous analysis and show that self-employment 
plays at best a minor role in the main results. 
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Table 1.C.3: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on nonemployment duration with diﬀerent deﬁnitions of time to next employment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Baseline Same Sample After end UB - Corr After end UB - No Restr Estratti Conto Estratti Conto - Corr Estratti Conto - No Restr 
Above 50 years of age 6.123*** 6.022*** 6.025*** 5.617*** 6.094*** 6.097*** 6.010*** 
(0.793) (0.877) (0.875) (0.865) (0.868) (0.867) (0.830) 
Observations 438,403 346,421 346,421 346,421 346,421 346,421 346,421 
Mean dependent 66.58 66.76 66.73 65.38 64.19 64.16 61.26 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression for the duration in weeks and amount of the beneﬁt with a ﬂexible squared polynomial on the two sides of the cutoﬀ (50 years of age). Controls include past job and ﬁrm 
characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, 
average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm 
and sector dummies. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years 
of age. Baseline sample in Column (1), sample restricted to individuals whom we can observe in all employment in Column (2), correction for end of unemployment beneﬁts in Column (3), any start of 
employment for new job in Column (4). Columns (5) to (7) repeat the same analysis for the Estratti Conto, which report all employment spells in private sector, public sector and self employment. 
Baseline computed as the average for the dependent variable for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of 
signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 1.C.4: Potential beneﬁt duration and exclusion of self-employment 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Beneﬁts Nonemployment Nonemployment (4y) 
Panel A: Baseline Sample 
Above 50 years of age 7.947*** 
(0.269) 
6.123*** 
(0.793) 
2.162*** 
(0.646) 
Observations 438,403 438,403 438,403 
Panel B: Exclusion Parasubordinati 
Above 50 years of age 7.941*** 
(0.276) 
5.955*** 
(0.789) 
2.300*** 
(0.647) 
Observations 419,980 419,980 419,980 
Panel C: Exclusion Self-Employed 
Above 50 years of age 7.886*** 
(0.301) 
5.976*** 
(0.899) 
2.476*** 
(0.757) 
Observations 321,773 321,773 321,773 
Controls 
Month FE 
LLM FE 
LLM X Month FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Note: Linear regression for the duration in weeks and amount of the beneﬁt with a ﬂexible 
squared polynomial on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. Controls include past job and ﬁrm char­
acteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: 
female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the 
last 6 months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, ten­
ure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts 
in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample includes all recipients 
of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between February 2009 and December 2012 excluding 
workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Baseline sample is 
reported in Panel A, sample excluding all workers with at least one spell as parasubordinati 
(self employed with many similarities with employees such as unique ﬁrm a which they work) 
is reported in Panel B and sample excluding any workers with self-employment spell is re­
ported in Panel (C). Sample excluding self-employment is a subsample of all workers for 
which all spells in private, public and self-employment are observables (Column (2) of Table 
1.C.3 for baseline). Baseline computed as the average for the dependent variable for workers 
ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors clustered at 
Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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1.D Interaction with disability beneﬁts and pensions 
The interaction between unemployment beneﬁts and other labour market institutions is 
an important concern from a policy perspective and an active topic of research (Pellizzari, 
2006; Zweimüller, 2018). Even if workers spend less time in unemployment beneﬁts, 
they could have higher take-up rates for other programs. This would then imply higher 
costs for the government and additional negative externalities. In this section, I tackle 
this issue by looking at policies which are likely to interact with unemployment beneﬁts 
according to previous research, such as disability beneﬁts and pensions (Inderbitzin 
et al., 2016; Kyyrä and Pesola, 2017). 
In this setting, I will consider the extensive margin for both these policies: I look at 
the probability of retirement within 4 years since layoﬀ and at the take-up of disability 
beneﬁts. Again, I only take into account take-up within 4 years to have a common 
horizon for all the individuals in my sample Results are reported in Table 1.D.1. Column 
(1) reports the eﬀect on retirement while Column (2) the eﬀect on disability beneﬁts. 
In both these cases, I see a mildly positive eﬀect which is, however, negligible for both 
programs and mildly statistically signiﬁcant for disability beneﬁts. Further graphical 
analysis in Figure 1.D.1 further conﬁrms the small eﬀect of the longer PBD on Pensions 
and disability and the eﬀect of pension seem to be related to a poor ﬁt of the polynomial 
close to the cutoﬀ. Overall these results point at marginal increase in take-up of other 
programs, but the eﬀect is small. Hence, these elements do not play an important role 
in the present analysis. 
77 CHAPTER 1. MEDIUM TERM EFFECTS OF UB 
Table 1.D.1: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on pensions and 
disability beneﬁts 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Pensioned 4 Years 
(2) 
Disability 4 Years 
Above 50 years of age 0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Observations 
Baseline dependent 
Controls 
Month FE 
LLM FE 
LLM X Month FE 
438,403 
0.00 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
438,403 
.02 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Note: Linear regression for the take up of additional unemployment beneﬁts 
and other programs (pensions and disability) with a ﬂexible squared polyno­
mial on the two sides of the cutoﬀ (50 years of age). Controls include past 
job and ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour 
market level. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation dum­
mies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average monthly 
wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with 
temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in 
the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. All regressions include 
squared age polynomial with diﬀerent slopes on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. 
Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between 
February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers from 49 years and 10 
months of age to 50 years of age. Baseline computed as the average nonem­
ployment duration for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 
months of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level 
of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
Figure 1.D.1: Probability of pension and disability beneﬁts over 4 years
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Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt on probability of receiving pension or disability beneﬁts 
within 4 years since initial layoﬀ. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between 
February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. 
Baseline computed as the average nonemployment duration for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 
and 10 months of age. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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1.E Medium term eﬀects over 7 years 
The higher level of nonemployment at the of the 4 years after layoﬀ could suggest that 
the diﬀerences between the two groups are characterized by cycles of employment and 
nonemployment. This could increase or decrease the eﬀect on aggregate nonemployment 
depending on the time of observation and amplitude of the cycle. To check if this kind 
of dynamic aﬀects the results in a substantial way, I focus on workers ﬁred in 2009 who 
can be observed up to 7 years after layoﬀ and look at the diﬀerences between workers 
with initial longer and shorter unemployment beneﬁts. I look at outcomes in terms of 
time to the next employment and aggregate total nonemployment over 7 years. Results 
of the estimation are reported in Table 1.E.1. In this case, the diﬀerences between the 
estimation on the ﬁrst spell and overall eﬀect are even more striking. Column (1) shows 
that the eﬀect on the time to the next job is much larger than the one estimated in 
aggregate while the estimate for the total number of weeks in nonemployment over 7 
years is actually lower, as reported in Column (2). Column (3) and Column (4) report 
the same eﬀects over a 4 years horizon for the sake of comparison. Results for the eﬀect 
in the ﬁrst spell are larger but comparable to previous estimates while the eﬀect over 
4 years is smaller. This could be in part related to the role of the Great Recession 
which induced a strong contraction in the Italian economy and it might have made 
more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job and more likely to lose it afterwards. Results are anyway in 
line with previous estimates and this suggests that these results are informative about 
longer horizons for the rest of the sample.31 In addition, to check whether the diﬀerence 
in the two groups follows a cyclical pattern, I also check the pattern of employment over 
7 years. Coeﬃcients for monthly estimates are reported in Figure 1.E.1. In this case, 
convergence is even stronger and the two groups have the same employment probability 
in the long run. The diﬀerence follows a pattern similar to the one observed for the 
full sample: a small anticipation eﬀect, an increase in the divergence between the 8th 
and the 12th months, and a sharp decline after the 12th month. The two groups fully 
converge after 36 months and they remain the same for the remaining 4 years, although 
point estimates remain consistently positive but small and not statistically signiﬁcant. 
31This year is the ﬁrst year of the Great Recession and we could have expected fairly diﬀerent 
results as suggested by Schmieder et al. [2012a] and Card et al. [2015] 
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This picture provides suggestive evidence that the two groups converge in the long run. 
Additional data for the other years would allow us to better understand to what extent 
these ﬁndings can be generalized to the rest of the sample. 
Table 1.E.1: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on medium term outcomes 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES Nonemployment (7y) Nonemployment cum (7y) 
Above 50 years of age 8.406*** 1.593 6.589*** 1.333 
(2.685) (2.215) (1.566) (1.275) 
Observations 91,982 91,982 91,982 91,982 
Baseline dependent 89.42 225.15 65.89 127.82 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES 
(3) (4)
 
Nonemployment (4y) Nonemployment (4y)
 
Note: Linear regression for the duration in weeks and amount of the beneﬁt with a ﬂexible squared polynomial on the two sides of the cutoﬀ (50 
years of age). Controls include past job and ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects at month of layoﬀ-local labour market level. List of controls: 
female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average monthly wage in the last 3 
months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, 
age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts (OUNR) between February 2009 and December 
2009 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age to 50 years of age. Baseline computed as the average nonemployment duration for 
workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 
10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
Figure 1.E.1: Employment pattern for workers ﬁred in 
2009 for 7 years 
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Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on probability 
of being employed at t months after layoﬀ. The worker is considered employed 
if she works at least one day during the corresponding month. Regressions 
includes a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, 
controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics, local labor market interac­
ted with month ﬁxed eﬀects. List of controls: female, full time contract, past 
occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, av­
erage monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, 
tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent 
contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Figure 
based on 92,928 layoﬀs between February 2009 and December 2009 for work­
ers between 46 and 54 years at layoﬀ excluding workers from 49 years and 10 
months of age and 50 years of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labor 
Market level. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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1.F New job characteristics - regression 
Table 1.F.1: Eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on new job characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Coworkers Job 
VARIABLES Age New Firm % permanent % full time % male Average Age Average Monthly Income (log) size Tenure Full Time Permanent (log) Daily Wage 
Above 50 years of age 
Observations 
Mean dependent 
Se dependent 
Controls 
Month FE 
LLM FE 
LLM X Month FE 
1.262** 
(0.612) 
352,486 
194.84 
175.79 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
336,944 
.56 
.38 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.001 
(0.003) 
336,944 
.75 
.3 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
-0.001 0.016 
(0.003) (0.066) 
336,944 336,923 
.64 40.2 
.32 6.21 
YES YES 
YES YES 
YES YES 
YES YES 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
336,177 
6.96 
.62 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
350,866 
2.66 
1.61 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.279 
(0.806) 
352,486 
66.93 
77.72 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
0.007* 0.008* 
(0.004) (0.004) 
352,486 352,486 
.77 .26 
.42 .44 
YES YES 
YES YES 
YES YES 
YES YES 
0.006 
(0.004) 
348,562 
4.07 
.47 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on probability of being employed at t months after layoﬀ. The worker is considered employed if she works at least one day 
during the corresponding month. Regressions includes a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics, local labour 
market interacted with month ﬁxed eﬀects. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, average monthly wage 
in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector 
dummies. Figure based on 352,486 layoﬀs between February 2009 and December 2009 for workers between 46 and 54 years at layoﬀ excluding workers from 49 years and 10 months of age and 
50 years of age. Sample restricted to individuals who ﬁnd a job within 4 years since layoﬀ. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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1.G Recall 
Recall is an important and pervasive phenomenon in the labour market. Indeed, workers 
who have been laid oﬀ have a high likelihood of being hired by the ﬁrm which laid 
them oﬀ in the ﬁrst place. Feldstein [1976] underlined the relevance of this phenomenon 
and built a theoretical framework to conceptualize it in relation with unemployment 
beneﬁts. More recently several works started to revisit this employment pattern using 
richer and novel administrative data. Nekoei and Weber [2015] stress the role of recall 
in the observed hazard rate for exit towards employment in Austria while Fujita and 
Moscarini [2017] provide strong evidence on the relevance of this phenomenon in the US. 
In addition, they ﬁnd that the share of recalls is large also for permanently separated 
workers and rationalize it in a search and matching framework with large search frictions 
for employer to ﬁnd new workers. In my setting, recalls are a pervasive phenomenon 
and 42% of workers ﬁnding a job within 4 years are employed by the same ﬁrm. This 
share is higher for workers coming from temporary contracts with more than 50% being 
recalled in the same ﬁrm. This dynamic is important for the eﬀects of unemployment 
beneﬁts as workers who have the option to come back to the same ﬁrm will perform 
a diﬀerent search and show a diﬀerent reemployment pattern with respect to other 
workers. In addition, workers may bargain with the ﬁrm to time their hiring with the 
end of unemployment beneﬁts. So far, we do not have any evidence concerning the 
relationship between unemployment beneﬁts durations and the pattern of recalls. As a 
ﬁrst step, it is useful to characterize recalls32 and assess what are the characteristics 
that make more likely the hiring by the same employer. Table 1.G.1 reports a series of 
regression for workers in our sample with dependent variable equal to one if the worker 
is hired by the same ﬁrm and zero if she is hired by another ﬁrm. The regression shows 
that workers in larger ﬁrms, women, and worker for temporary contract have a higher 
probability of recall. Workers with longer tenure, especially in temporary contracts, 
have also a higher probability of being recalled.33 Finally, recall are more frequent for 
32Information on the expectation of recall are unfortunately not available and, as a consequence, 
I will only focus on realized recalls.
33This should not be taken for granted as there are legislative limits to the maximum number 
of years with ﬁxed term contracts with the same ﬁrm. In practice, these limits can be easily 
circumvented by changing a few elements in the contract. 
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blue collar and apprentices and in cyclical sectors.34 As shown before, being eligible to 
longer slightly reduces the probability of recall. 
As a second step, I check the role of recalls in the hazard rate towards employment 
and on the estimates of the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts. First, I plot hazard 
rates for workers recalled and not recalled (the latter includes also workers who do 
not ﬁnd a job within the time horizon). Results, reported in Figure 1.G.1, show a 
more prominent negative dependence in the hazard rate of workers not hired by the 
same ﬁrm, consistently with evidence for Austria (Nekoei and Weber [2015]). Hazard 
rates for these workers are also, in general, much smaller than those for other workers 
but this is partly mechanical as not recalled workers also include workers who do not 
ﬁnd a job after layoﬀ. It is also worth pointing out that the large spike previously 
observed at 6 months characterizes mostly recalled workers while little can be seen 
for workers not hired by the same ﬁrm. This neatly shows how the pattern observed 
for the overall sample reﬂects recurrent employment \unemployment spells which are 
particularly common in tourism and other seasonal sectors. 
Finally, I assess the role of recalls for the estimates of unemployment beneﬁts. Recalls 
could potentially play an important role: workers could bargain with the employer 
the time of their recall to match the duration of their unemployment beneﬁt. Hence, 
they could generate large behavioral responses. However, it is also possible that recalls 
have to match production needs and workers are not able to fully extract the value of 
unemployment beneﬁts. In this case, the potential beneﬁt duration would not matter 
for them. To investigate these eﬀects, I estimate my preferred speciﬁcation for workers 
who are recalled and who are not. Note that results in this estimation are not fully 
comparable to those in the main speciﬁcation as the sample is restricted only to workers 
who eventually ﬁnd a job within the 4 year time horizon. Estimates, reported in Table 
1.G.2, show that recalled workers are not responsive to potential beneﬁt duration and 
they show insigniﬁcant eﬀects for all the variables of interest. Workers who are not 
recalled show responses very similar to the ones in the main equation. This shows that 
results are largely driven for workers facing ex novo searches in the labour market. This 
34They are deﬁned as sectors which experience quarterly changes in the labor force greater 
than 10% in a panel regression between 2005 and 2008 with quadratic trends and year ﬁxed 
eﬀects. 
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is consistent with the fact that a large share of recalls takes place in the ﬁrst six months 
of the nonemployment spells: the share of workers who is recalled is close to 60% among 
those ﬁnding a job at 6 months in the spell whereas the share declines to 40% two 
months later and to 20 % at 12 months. Even after 4 years of nonemployment still 
about 10% of the workers are recalled by the same ﬁrm. 
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Table 1.G.1: Observables and probability of recall 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Overall Overall Permanent Temporary 
Female 0.052*** 0.060*** 0.034*** 0.064*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Full Time 0.015** -0.005 0.013*** -0.031*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
White Collar -0.097*** -0.066*** -0.044*** -0.065*** 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Apprentice 0.253*** 0.139** 0.175 0.112* 
(0.056) (0.060) (0.141) (0.061) 
Other -0.087*** -0.026 0.044 -0.118*** 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.044) 
Manager -0.213*** -0.102*** -0.030*** -0.151*** 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.041) 
Permanent Contract -0.037*** -0.090*** 
(0.007) (0.005) 
Log Daily Income -0.008 -0.003 -0.019*** 0.029*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Market Potential Experience -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenure Temporary 0.066*** 0.055*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log Avg. Size Firm 0.009*** 0.014*** -0.007*** 0.024*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share Permanent in Last Firm -0.123*** -0.042*** -0.083*** -0.123*** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Age Last Firm 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cyclical Sector 0.157*** 
(0.011) 
Fired after 50 -0.010** -0.008* -0.006 -0.009 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 353,493 353,493 172,166 181,327 
Baseline dependent .419 .419 .288 .543 
Month FE NO YES YES YES 
LLM FE NO YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE NO YES YES YES 
Note: Linear probability model for the probability of being recalled. Dependent variable equal to 1 
if the worker is hired by the same ﬁrm and 0 she is hired by another ﬁrm. Regressions includes 
a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and 
last ﬁrm characteristics, local labour market interacted with month ﬁxed eﬀects. List of controls: 
female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 
months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure 
with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age 
of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Figure based on 353,493 workers ﬁred between February 2009 
and December 2009 for workers between 46 and 54 years at layoﬀ excluding workers from 49 years 
and 10 months of age and 50 years of age. Sample restricted to individuals who ﬁnd a job within 4 
years since layoﬀ. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 
10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Figure 1.G.1: Hazard rate for exit towards employment: recall vs not recall
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(a) Hazard Rate for Recalled Workers (b) Hazard Rate for Not Recalled Workers 
Note: Hazard rate for exit of workers from nonemployment towards employment in the private sector. Hazard 
rate computed as the share of workers exiting nonemployment in month t over the number of workers still in 
nonemployment after t-1 months. Figure based on 438,403 layoﬀ excluding workers ﬁred between 49 years and 
10 months of age and 50 years of age. Panel (a) includes all workers who were recalled to their previous ﬁrm 
while Panel (b) includes all workers who move to a new ﬁrm or do not ﬁnd a job in the private sector. 
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Table 1.G.2: Eﬀects of longer PBD for workers recalled or changing ﬁrm 
Recall Not Recall 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Nonempl Nonemp (4 years) (log) W+AB Nonempl Nonempl (4 years) (log) W+AB 
Above 50 years of age 2.318*** -0.651 0.0150* 6.145*** 2.027** 0.0258** 
(0.413) (0.752) (0.00824) (0.758) (0.964) (0.0107) 
Observations 146,894 146,894 146,894 206,599 206,599 206,599 
Baseline dependent 25.85 106.67 46.73 117.75 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LLM X Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Linear regression for the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts on main variables of interest. Regressions includes a square polynomial in 
age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics and local labour market interacted with 
month ﬁxed eﬀects. List of controls: female, full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 
months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm 
size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample includes all recipients of unemployment 
beneﬁts between February 2009 and December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age and 50 years of age. Baseline 
computed as the average not employment duration for workers ﬁred between 49 years of age and 49 and 10 months of age. Standard errors 
clustered at Local Labour Market level. Level of signiﬁcance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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1.H Heterogenous eﬀects: by year and sector 
Figure 1.H.1: Eﬀects on nonemployment in ﬁrst spell and 
over 4 years by year of layoﬀ 
0
2
4
6
8
10
E
ffe
ct
 o
n 
N
on
em
pl
oy
m
en
t D
ur
at
io
n
2009 2010 2011 2012
Year of Layoff
(a) Eﬀect on Nonemployment
 
-2
0
2
4
6
E
ffe
ct
 o
n 
N
on
em
pl
oy
m
en
t (
4 
ye
ar
s)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Year of Layoff
(b) Eﬀect on Nonemployment (4 years) 
Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on nonemploy­
ment in the ﬁrst spell (a) and nonemployment over 4 years (b). Regressions 
includes a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, 
controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics, and local labour market 
interacted with month ﬁxed eﬀects. List of controls: female, full time contract, 
past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, 
average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, 
tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent 
contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample 
includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts between February 2009 and 
December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age 
and 50 years of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. 
Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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Figure 1.H.2: Eﬀects on nonemployment in ﬁrst spell and 
over 4 years by broad NACE sector 
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(b) Eﬀect on Nonemployment (4 years) 
Note: Eﬀect of 4 additional months of potential beneﬁt duration on nonemploy­
ment in the ﬁrst spell (a) and nonemployment over 4 years (b). Regressions 
includes a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes around the cutoﬀ, 
controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics, local labour market inter­
acted with month ﬁxed eﬀects. List of controls: female, full time contract, past 
occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage in the last 6 months, av­
erage monthly wage in the last 3 months, market potential experience, tenure, 
tenure with temporary contract, log of average ﬁrm size, share of permanent 
contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and sector dummies. Sample 
includes all recipients of unemployment beneﬁts between February 2009 and 
December 2012 excluding workers ﬁred from 49 years and 10 months of age 
and 50 years of age. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. 
Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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1.I Placebo with non parametric RDD 
Figure 1.I.1: Placebo RDD: non parametric 
-2
0
2
4
6
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
n 
N
on
em
pl
oy
m
en
t D
ur
at
io
n
47
-0
47
-3
47
-6
47
-9
48
-0
48
-3
48
-6
48
-9
49
-0
49
-3
49
-6
49
-9
50
-0
50
-3
50
-6
50
-9
51
-0
51
-3
51
-6
51
-9
52
-0
52
-3
52
-6
52
-9
53
-0
Age at Layoff
(a) Nonemployment - ﬁrst spell
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(b) Nonemployment - 4 years 
Note: Placebo linear regression for duration of nonemployment in the ﬁrst 
spell and over 4 years since layoﬀ. Figure based on workers ﬁred between 
February 2009 and December 2012 for workers between 46 and 54 years at 
layoﬀ excluding workers with 49 years and 10 months of age and 50 years 
of age. Regressions includes a square polynomial in age with diﬀerent slopes 
around the cutoﬀ, controls for the worker and last ﬁrm characteristics, local 
labour market interacted with month ﬁxed eﬀects. List of controls: female, 
full time contract, past occupation dummies, permanent contract, daily wage 
in the last 6 months, average monthly wage in the last 3 months, market 
potential experience, tenure, tenure with temporary contract, log of average 
ﬁrm size, share of permanent contracts in the last ﬁrm, age of the last ﬁrm and 
sector dummies. Coeﬃcient at 50 years of age corresponds to policy induced 
change in potential beneﬁt duration. Fake and main RDD regression use a 
1 year bandwidth. Standard errors clustered at Local Labour Market level. 
Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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Abstract 
This paper documents strategic delays in the timing of layoﬀs around an age-at-layoﬀ 
threshold entitling workers to a four months increase in potential unemployment in­
surance (UI) beneﬁt duration in Italy. Manipulation is quantitatively important with 
over 10% of layoﬀs in the two months before workers’ ﬁftieth birthday being delayed. 
While manipulation unambiguously increases public spending for UI, it may do so 
both because manipulators are individuals with high long-term nonemployment risk or 
because they respond to extra UI coverage by decreasing their job search intensity. We 
build on recently developed bunching estimators to disentangle the two. While in total 
aﬀected workers lengthen their UI beneﬁt receipt duration by 3.4 months, a survival 
analysis reveals that 79.6% of this increase is mechanical and due to higher coverage. 
Only the remaining 20.4% is explained by reductions in job search eﬀort. Consistent 
with this, we ﬁnd that even absent manipulation, manipulators face a signiﬁcantly 
higher long-term nonemployment risk of 80% after eight months, compared to 60% 
for non-manipulators. Together our results document pervasive manipulation in UI 
and identify long-term nonemployment risk as an important motivation to engage in 
manipulation. Once they qualify, manipulators are only modestly responsive to the 
additional UI coverage: this mitigates concerns about anticipated moral hazard. These 
ﬁndings highlight the importance of studying the underlying motives for manipulation 
and might inﬂuence how manipulation is perceived. Manipulation is conﬁned to the 
private sector and permanent contract work arrangements. It is most prevalent among 
female, white-collar, part-time workers at small ﬁrms suggesting that adjustment costs, 
bargaining power and proximity to superiors play a role for workers’ ability to engage in 
manipulation. Overall, our results highlight the importance to take strategic behaviour 
into account when designing targeted UI schemes. 
Keywords: unemployment beneﬁt, selection, moral hazard. 
J.E.L. codes: J65; H55. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The targeting of public policies on the basis of observable individual characteristics is 
ubiquitous in OECD countries. Governments tax individuals based on their marital 
status, provide welfare payments which depend on the number of children in the 
household, or tie disability insurance to particular medical conditions. The theoretical 
desirability for targeting based on immutable tags has long been recognized (Akerlof, 
1978). In practice however, policy makers often rely on imperfect tags, which leave 
room for strategic manipulation and selection into beneﬁt schemes. 
How should we view such manipulation? Typically, the initial inclination is to regard 
manipulation solely as opportunistic behaviour. Undeserving individuals cheat their way 
to higher beneﬁts and thrive at the expense of others. While manipulation undeniably 
increases public spending, this judgment lacks a more comprehensive understanding 
about the underlying motivation for manipulation. Perhaps, individuals who decide 
to manipulate value the additional beneﬁts tremendously or they manipulate out of 
necessity. Manipulators might also be relatively less responsive to beneﬁts once they 
qualify for them. The underlying rationale and subsequent changes in behaviour are 
important to better understand manipulation and might ultimately shape the way the 
phenomenon is perceived by policy makers and society at large. 
While quantifying additional expenditures is relatively straightforward, providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the motivation for manipulation is considerably more challen­
ging. Our paper makes progress on this important question by studying a context in 
which diﬀerentiated policies and manipulation are widespread, namely unemployment 
insurance (UI) (see Spinnewijn, 2019, for a survey, and Doornik et al., 2018, and Khoury, 
2018, for recent evidence on manipulation). We study the Italian UI scheme which until 
2015 featured a discontinuous jump in potential beneﬁt duration (PBD) depending 
upon whether the worker was laid oﬀ before or after her ﬁftieth birthday.1 
We start by providing clear graphical evidence of manipulation in the form of systematic 
delays in the exact timing of layoﬀs around the age-at-layoﬀ threshold. Using bunching 
1Similar policies have been in place in several OECD countries, e.g. Germany, Austria among 
others. 
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techniques, we estimate that 10% of all layoﬀs within two months before workers’ ﬁftieth 
birthday are strategically delayed. Over the subsequent nonemployment spell aﬀected 
workers collect an additional 2,239 Euros or 38,5% of total UI beneﬁts on average. 
While the above numbers are large, it is important to keep in mind that manipulation 
provides individuals with additional UI coverage. Even without a change in subsequent 
job search eﬀorts, manipulators would collect additional UI beneﬁts due to the extended 
coverage from month eight to twelve. More importantly the change in subsequent job 
search intensity lets us infer something about the underlying motivation for manipulation. 
To see this point, consider two extreme cases for why individuals might engage in 
manipulation. First, suppose manipulators are individuals who would have found a 
job exactly after eight months, but are now staying unemployed for four additional 
months before taking up their next job. In this case manipulation is motivated by an 
anticipated moral hazard response. The four additional months of beneﬁts are paid 
only because individuals change their job search eﬀort. Contrary, suppose manipulators 
are unemployed for at least twelve months with or without additional UI coverage. In 
this case, they would also collect four additional months of UI beneﬁts. However, in the 
latter case, it is individuals’ long-term nonemployment risk that drives selection into 
manipulation. The additional beneﬁts are paid mechanically due to higher coverage. In 
reality manipulation is likely motivated by a combination of these forces but it is clear 
that distinguishing between these diﬀerent motives is crucial for deciding how to view 
manipulation. 
Our survival analysis reveals that manipulators are individuals with signiﬁcantly higher 
long-term nonemployment risk. Even absent manipulation, manipulators would face an 
80% chance of being still unemployed after eight months, which would lead them to 
exhaust the less generous UI scheme. We further document that approximately 80% 
of the increase in UI beneﬁt receipt is mechanically due to higher coverage, while only 
20% is explained by a reduction in job search eﬀorts. To put the above numbers into 
perspective, non-manipulators – individuals who were laid oﬀ just before their ﬁftieth 
birthday – face a 20 p.p. lower eight months nonemployment survival risk of 60%. We 
also ﬁnd no evidence that manipulators are more responsive to additional UI coverage 
than non-manipulators. 
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Together our results document pervasive manipulation in unemployment insurance 
and identify long-term nonemployment risk as an important motivation to engage in 
manipulation. Manipulators are only modestly responsive to the additional UI coverage 
once they qualify for longer beneﬁts and this mitigates concerns about anticipated moral 
hazard. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of studying the underlying motives 
for manipulation and might inﬂuence how manipulation is perceived. Our analysis 
also implies that the type of manipulation we consider has only modest eﬀects on 
economic eﬃciency, a conclusion that would not hold if anticipated moral hazard were a 
prime motive for manipulation. This in turn has implications for the design of optimal 
diﬀerentiated UI policies. 
To shed light on the underlying collusion behaviour by which ﬁrms and workers agree to 
postpone the exact date of layoﬀ, we provide evidence by comparing manipulators and 
non-manipulators based on observable characteristics. Some degree of manipulation 
is pervasive among all permanent contract workers in private sector ﬁrms, with the 
exception of large ﬁrms with more than ﬁfty employees.2 Manipulation is relatively 
more prevalent among female, part-time, white-collar workers at small ﬁrms. This 
suggests that lower adjustment costs, higher bargaining power of workers and closer 
proximity between workers and their supervisors may facilitate manipulation. 
Our work relates to several strands of the literature. A large body of work studies the 
disincentives eﬀect and the eﬀect on post-reemployment outcomes, such as wages, of 
UI, exploiting similar policy variation, see e.g. Card et al. [2007a], Rosolia and Sestito 
[2012], Schmieder et al. [2012a], Landais [2015], Nekoei and Weber [2017], Johnston and 
Mas [2018] among others. Contrary to our setting, these papers rely on the absence of 
manipulation to identify the treatment eﬀects of interest, whereas we study the eﬀect of 
manipulation in a setting where it does occur. Furthermore, while most previous studies 
of UI focus on the distortion of job search eﬀorts of the unemployed, we examine strategic 
behaviour at the point of layoﬀ. Our work closely relates to two recent contributions 
by Doornik et al. [2018] and Khoury [2018] who exploit manipulation in UI systems 
around an eligibility and seniority threshold in Brazil and France, respectively. Doornik 
et al. [2018] provide evidence of strategic collusion between workers and ﬁrms who time 
2We ﬁnd no evidence of manipulation in public sector ﬁrms or among temporary contracts. 
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layoﬀs to coincide with workers’ eligibility for UI beneﬁts in Brazil. Khoury [2018] 
exploits a discontinuity in beneﬁt levels for workers laid oﬀ for economic reasons and 
estimates an elasticity of employment spell duration with respect to UI beneﬁts of 0.014. 
Due to the nature of their policy variation neither of these papers studies the selection 
patterns we analyse in our work. From a methodological perspective our work is most 
closely related to the work by Diamond and Persson [2017], who study manipulation 
in Swedish high-stakes exams. The construction of the manipulation region and of 
the counterfactual density relies on standard bunching techniques, such as Saez [2010], 
Chetty et al. [2011] and Kleven and Waseem [2013]. 
Although the contribution of the paper is empirical, we do relate to the literature on the 
theoretical desirability of tagging (Akerlof, 1978) and ordeals (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 
1982). We show that the bargaining over the exact timing of layoﬀs between workers 
and ﬁrms serves as a screening mechanism for long-term unemployment risk. In recent 
work Michelacci and Ruﬀo [2015] argue for higher UI beneﬁts for young workers by 
analysing the canonical Baily [1978]-Chetty [2006] trade-oﬀ from a life-cycle perspective. 
Age as an useful tag for redistribution has also been studied in the context of taxation 
by e.g. Weinzierl [2011] and Best and Kleven [2013]. 
The fact that we ﬁnd substantial manipulation and positive selection on long-term 
unemployment risk also speaks to a recent literature studying the role of private 
information and adverse selection in unemployment insurance, see e.g. Hendren [2017] 
and Landais et al. [2017]. This literature studies the role of private information about 
ex-ante unemployment risk in shaping the market for UI. Our results indicate that 
individuals hold information about their expected duration of unemployment at the 
point of layoﬀ. Understanding to what degree this information is held privately is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the institu­
tional setting and describes the data; Section 2.3 describes our quantities of interest 
and presents our identiﬁcation strategy; Section 2.4 goes into more detail in explaining 
how we implement the latter in practice; Sections 2.5 and 2.6 reports the results of our 
empirical analysis and robustness checks; Section 2.7 concludes. 
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2.2 Institutional Setting and Data 
2.2.1 Institutional setting 
In this paper we focus on Ordinary Unemployment Beneﬁts (OUB).3 This was the 
main UI scheme active in Italy from the eve of World War II till January 2013.4OUB 
covered all private non-farm and public sector employees who lost their job due to 
either end of their temporary contract, or an involuntary termination, or quit for just 
cause (e.g. unpaid wages or harassment). Other types of voluntary quits, together 
with self-employed and dependent self-employed were not eligible for the beneﬁts.5 
Additional eligibility criteria concerned labour market experience: workers needed to 
have started their ﬁrst job spell at least two years before the date of layoﬀ, and to have 
worked for at least 52 weeks in the previous two years. 
Crucially for our purposes, PBD was fully age-dependent and it was not related to 
other factors (e.g. work experience, gender, family composition, geographic area, etc.). 
Individuals who were laid oﬀ before their ﬁftieth birthday were entitled to 8 months of 
beneﬁts (34.7 weeks) while workers laid oﬀ after their ﬁftieth birthday were entitled 
to 12 months of beneﬁts (52 weeks). Such a notch in the PBD schedule generated 
economic incentives for workers to attempt to have their layoﬀ date delayed, in order to 
obtain more generous beneﬁts. Beneﬁt level was based on the average monthly wage 
over the three months preceding the layoﬀ, but the replacement rate was declining over 
the unemployment spell: 60% of the average wage for the ﬁrst 6 months; 50% for the 
following 2 months and 40% for any remaining period. OUB did not involve any form of 
experience rating. As a consequence, longer PBD was not linked to higher contributions 
by the separating ﬁrm, but for a severance payment which was proportional to tenure 
(around one monthly wage for every year worked). 
During the same time period two other main UI schemes were in place: the Reduced 
Unemployment Beneﬁts (RUB) and the Mobility Indemnity (MI).6 On the one hand, 
3Indennità di Disoccupazione Ordinaria a Requisiti Normali in Italian. 
4OUB was introduced through Regio Decreto 14th in April 1939. 
5For convenience, in the rest of the paper we will use the term “layoﬀ” to indicate all job 
terminations that are eligible for claiming UI.
6Respectively Indennità di Disoccupazione Ordinaria a Requisiti Ridotti and Indennità di 
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RUB was directed to the same workers targeted by the OUB but who did not manage 
to meet minimum contribution requirements. The latter scheme only required 13 weeks 
(78 days) worked in the last year, instead of 52, but still required at least 2 years from 
the ﬁrst contribution to the social security system. It involved a monetary transfer 
proportional to the days worked in the previous year (up to 180 days) and granted 35% 
of the average wage earned in the previous year for the ﬁrst 120 days and 40% for the 
following 60 days.7 This measure was substantially less generous than the one under 
study and, in addition, it was granted during the solar year following the unemployment 
period. These characteristics made it less attractive to workers, who would prefer the 
OUB if they met its requirements. On the other hand, MI was active until 2017 and was 
targeted to workers ﬁred during mass layoﬀs or business reorganizations. This measure 
combined a long and generous income support with active labour market policies, to 
improve workers’ occupational perspectives. During the period under study the potential 
duration of this scheme depended on the worker’s age at layoﬀ and the geographical 
area where she worked, with a maximum PBD of 48 months in southern regions and 
of 36 months in northern regions. The beneﬁt amounted to 80% of the salary for the 
ﬁrst 12 months (with a cap annually set by law) and 64% during the following months. 
This measure represents a particularly attractive alternative for individuals involved 
in mass layoﬀs and could lead to underrepresentation of these types of workers in our 
sample. What is more relevant for our purposes is that selection for this beneﬁt is 
mostly beyond the control of the worker: indeed, the ﬁrm needed to be undergoing 
signiﬁcant economic restructuring and have a minimum size, while workers needed to 
meet some tenure requirements. Due to these factors, the presence of this beneﬁt might 
lead to an underrepresentation of some categories of workers in our sample, but selection 
in and out from this beneﬁt is unlikely to be related to a choice of the worker. 
2.2.2 Data 
We use conﬁdential administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS) 
on the universe of UI claims in Italy between 2009 and 2012 and combine them with 
matched employer-employee records covering the universe of working careers in the 
Mobilità. 
7For additional information, please refer to Anastasia et al. [2009]. 
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private sector. Information on UI claims comes from the SIP8 database, which collects 
data on the universe of income support measures administered by INPS as a consequence 
of job separation. For every claim we observe the scheme type, its start date, duration 
and amount paid. We further observe information related to the job and the ﬁrm. This 
includes details about the type of the contract and a broad occupation category. The SIP 
database does not report the date of the ﬁrst job after receiving unemployment beneﬁts, 
which is crucial for our analysis. We retrieve this information from the matched employer-
employee database (UNIEMENS). This provides information on workers’ careers in the 
private sector together with detailed information on wages, type of contract and start 
date of the job. 
In order to construct nonemployment duration after job loss, we count the number of 
weeks elapsing between the layoﬀ date in the SIP and the ﬁrst hiring date in UNIEMENS. 
Crucially, we require the latter to be subsequent to the date of end of UI. This allows us 
to exclude from the analysis short jobs which might be compatible with UI continuation. 
Given that we observe all individuals in the sample for a minimum of four years, we 
censor all nonemployment durations at four years. This allows us to have a common 
period of observation for all workers. 
We restrict our attention to individuals who lost their job between February 2009 and 
December 2012, were between 46 and 54 years of age at the moment of layoﬀ, and 
claimed OUB. Unfortunately, our data do not cover the years prior to 2009 and the 
introduction of a new UI scheme in January 2013 prevents us from including later years. 
We further restrict our attention to individuals who separate from an employer in the 
private sector after a permanent contract. This leads to the exclusion of workers from the 
public sector, regardless of the contract type, and of workers from the private sector with 
temporary contracts. For the former, the UNIEMENS data does not have information 
on public sector jobs so it would not be possible to have prior career information on 
public sector workers. Similarly, if they were to ﬁnd a job in the same sector, it would 
not be possible to observe the beginning of their new job. For the latter, instead, we 
fail to detect manipulation and we decide to focus in the main results on the group 
most concerned by this behaviour. This is indicative of the fact that individuals holding 
8Sistema Informativo Percettori. 
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temporary contracts are not able to time the start and duration of their contracts to 
obtain more generous beneﬁts. We explicitly explore diﬀerences across diﬀerent contract 
types and sectors in Section 2.5.4. After the exclusion of a few observations, missing 
key information, we are left with 249,581 separation episodes that lead to a UI claim. 
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for our main sample. The average worker spends 
about 30 weeks (6.9 months) receiving UI, but 90 weeks in nonemployment before ﬁnding 
a new job. As a consequence, they have a quite high probability of being unemployed 
after 8 months in the nonemployment spell, with half of the workers still looking for a 
job after 8 months in the spell. Due to exhaustion of the beneﬁts, quite a few workers 
ﬁnd jobs in the following 4 months but still 39% of the worker have to ﬁnd a job after 
one year since the layoﬀ. Workers are mostly male, on full time contracts, and employed 
in blue collars jobs. They have spent about 27.5 years in the labor market since their 
ﬁrst job and almost 6 years in their last ﬁrm. In terms of geographic distribution, 46% 
of them are laid oﬀ in the South or in the Islands.9 They earn about 70 euros per 
day which is equivalent to 70 × 26 = 1820 euros per month if working full time. This 
measure, extracted from UNIEMENS data, is quite consistent with the monthly wage 
reported by the SIP database, which reports an average monthly wage of 1,735 euros in 
the three months preceding the layoﬀ. The separating ﬁrm is relatively old (14 years) 
and large (28.16 employees), but this is mostly driven by a few very large ﬁrms: indeed, 
more than 60% of workers come from ﬁrms with less than 15 employees while only 18% 
come from ﬁrms with more than 50 employees. 
One could be concerned that our sample is composed of workers in the late stage of 
their career and that some of them might use unemployment beneﬁts to transition 
towards retirement. This does not seem to be the case as only about 1,500 workers 
in our full sample claim a pension before the end of our observation window. For 
these workers, we deﬁne the nonemployment spell as the period between the end of 
the previous employment and the date in which they claim their pension. Finally, our 
data do not cover transitions towards self-employment, agricultural sector or public 
employment. This kind of transitions are unlikely for workers employed in the private 
9This area encompasses the following regions: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Molise, Puglia, 
Sardinia and Sicilia. 
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sectors at this late stage of their career and their exclusion should not substantially 
aﬀect our results. We replicated the analysis for a subsample of individuals for whom 
information on the full contribution history is available and results are qualitatively 
similar. 
2.3 Conceptual framework 
2.3.1 The moral hazard cost of extended UI coverage 
Manipulation provides individuals with additional UI coverage. As in any insurance 
context the increase in coverage might cause individuals to change their behaviour by 
reducing the incentive to avoid adverse states of the world. This change in behaviour, 
in our context a reduction in job search intensity, constitutes a classical moral hazard 
response. From an eﬃciency perspective it is crucial to understand how much of the 
increase in total insurance payments is driven by changes in behaviour and how much is 
mechanically due to higher coverage. 
Quantifying the relative importance of these eﬀects also leads to potentially diﬀerent 
positive views about manipulation and the motivation behind it, which in turn might 
shape how the phenomenon is perceived both by policy makers and society at large. 
Consider two extreme cases for why individuals might engage in manipulation in our 
context. First, suppose manipulators are individuals all of whom would have found a job 
exactly after eight months, but are now staying unemployed for four additional months 
before taking up their next job. In this case manipulation would be motivated by an 
anticipated moral hazard response. The four additional months of beneﬁts are paid 
only because individuals change their job search eﬀort. Contrary, suppose manipulators 
are unemployed for at least twelve months with or without additional UI coverage in 
which case they would also collect four additional months of UI beneﬁts. However, in 
the latter case, it is individuals’ long-term unemployment risk that drives selection into 
manipulation. The additional beneﬁts are paid mechanically due to higher coverage 
and do not distort individuals’ job search intensities. Of course, in reality manipulation 
is motivated by a combination of these two forces and we view distinguishing between 
them as one of this paper’s main contributions. 
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In the following we formalize the above line of reasoning and introduce the relevant 
quantities of interest. It is constructive to decompose the increase in insurance payments, 
i.e. UI beneﬁt receipt, under the twelve and eight months scheme as follows: 
 12  8 
ΔB =B12 − B8 S12 S8= t dt − = 
0 0 
t  12  12 
(S12= − S8)dt + S8dt (2.1)t t t
0 8        
behavioural response (ΔBMH ) mechanical eﬀect (ΔBME ) 
where B and S denote the average beneﬁt receipt and the survival rate each under 
the twelve and eight months PBD scheme, respectively. The behavioural moral hazard 
response, ΔBMH , captures the part of the beneﬁt receipt increase that is due to the 
outward shift of the survival curve, i.e. the behavioural response. The mechanical eﬀect, 
ΔBME , corresponds to the remaining increase in beneﬁt receipt that occurs even absent 
any behavioural response. Figure 2.1 illustrates decomposition (2.1) graphically by 
plotting hypothetical manipulators’ nonemployment survival under the eight and twelve 
months PBD scheme. The total increase in beneﬁt receipt corresponds to the sum of 
the behavioural/moral hazard eﬀect (dark grey area) and mechanical eﬀect (light grey 
area). As a preview of the results, Table 2.2 reports the decomposition of the total 
eﬀect on beneﬁt duration for both manipulators and non manipulators in our sample. 
While the above quantities capture how manipulators respond to extended UI coverage, 
they are diﬃcult to compare across groups of individuals, such as manipulators and non-
manipulators, or relate to empirical evidence from other studies. To facilitate such cross 
group comparisons and summarize the extent of moral hazard in one statistic we follow 
Schmieder and von Wachter [2017] who suggest normalizing the behavioural response 
by the mechanical eﬀect. Concretely, we calculate the behavioural and mechanical cost 
by multiplying both quantities with their respective unit cost to the government and 
take their ratio: 
b · ΔBMH BC = (2.2)
b · ΔBME MC 
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where b denotes the statutory beneﬁt replacement rate. The BC/MC ratio measures by 
how many additional euros beneﬁt receipt increases for each euro of mechanical increase. 
The ratio follows the standard bucket leakage interpretation: if the government wanted 
to provide one additional dollar of UI transfer, it would have to pay a cost that exceeds 
one dollar, precisely because there is a behavioural response. 
The analysis thus far focused on additional beneﬁt payments and abstracted from 
the second source of cost to the government: the loss in tax revenues due to longer 
nonemployment durations. Contrary to the analysis of beneﬁt durations, longer nonem­
ployment durations do not entail a mechanical eﬀect and are solely the result of a 
behavioural response. Formally, we have: 
∞ ∞ ∞ 
= N12 − N8 S12 (S12ΔN = dt − S8dt = − S8)dtt t t t
0 0 0 
behavioral response (ΔNMH ) 
where, as above, N and S denote the average nonemployment duration and the survival 
rate each under the twelve and eight months PBD scheme, respectively. Since all of the 
increase in nonemployment duration constitutes a moral hazard response, we add the 
resulting cost to the behavioural cost and adjust formula 2.2 as follows: 
τ b · ΔBMH + τ · ΔNMH BC = (2.3)
MC b · ME 
Because there is some disagreement in the literature about what the appropriate tax 
rate τ in this context is, Table 2.3 reports BC/MC ratios for several tax rates.10 
2.3.2 Identiﬁcation strategy 
This section provides a self-contained sketch of our estimation strategy and explains 
the sources of variation in the data that are used to pin down parameters of interest. 
The main idea is to exploit the local nature of manipulation by extrapolating outcomes 
from regions that are unaﬀected by manipulation to learn about what would have 
10Early studies used a 3% UI tax, however, recent work argues for higher tax wedges (Lawson 
[2017]). 
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happened in the manipulation region in the absence of it. We ﬁrst assess the range of 
the manipulation region with standard bunching techniques. We then ﬁt polynomials 
to the unmanipulated part of the data and interpolate to construct a counterfactual 
layoﬀ frequency and recover the number and share of manipulators. Similarly, we 
construct counterfactuals of outcomes that are not directly manipulated, such as 
nonemployment survival probabilities, to learn whether these outcomes respond to 
manipulation. Intuitively, any unusual change in these outcomes near the cutoﬀ together 
with an estimate of how many manipulators are causing it, let us recover manipulators’ 
responses. We employ similar reasoning to characterize manipulators based on observable 
characteristics. Our approach is closely related to that of Diamond and Persson [2017]. 
In the remainder of this section, we lay out our approach in more detail. 
Quantifying manipulation: Consider a hypothetical manipulated layoﬀ density as 
in Figure 2.2a. Absent any manipulation we would expect the frequency of layoﬀs to be 
smooth in the neighbourhood of the cutoﬀ. Manipulation instead causes a sharp drop 
in the number or layoﬀs right before and a spike right after age ﬁfty. As in standard 
bunching techniques, we recover the counterfactual frequency of layoﬀs by ﬁtting a 
polynomial to the unmanipulated parts of the data (on the left and right of the cutoﬀ) 
and interpolate inwards. We determine the lower bound of the missing region by visual 
inspection, and then iteratively try diﬀerent upper bounds of the excess region until we 
are able to balance the missing and excess mass. The diﬀerence between the observed 
frequency and the ﬁtted counterfactual lets us recover missing and excess shares, as well 
as the number of manipulators in each bin of the missing and excess region.11 
Eﬀects of manipulation: Equipped with a measure of how many manipulators 
there are, we then study outcomes which are not directly manipulated but potentially 
aﬀected by it. Figure 2.2b illustrates the idea for one of our outcomes of interest: 
nonemployment survival rates. Manipulation provides workers with additional UI 
coverage from month eight to twelve. Thus, it is likely that nonemployment survival 
rates respond to the increase in coverage. Consider a hypothetical statistical relationship 
11This estimation strategy assumes that manipulation takes the form of a pure re-timing 
of layoﬀs that would occur in any case. One concern is that the increase in PBD at the age 
threshold leads to extensive margin eﬀects, see Jäger et al. [2018]. We provide evidence that 
this is not the case in our setting in Section 2.6.2. 
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between nonemployment survival and age at layoﬀ, as in Figure 2.2b. In order to estimate 
how manipulators’ survival rate responds, we take the diﬀerence between two quantities: 
manipulators’ actual survival probability and manipulators’ counterfactual survival 
probability had they not been able to manipulate. As illustrated in Figure 2.2b, we 
obtain these quantities by separately studying the missing and excess region. First, 
we ﬁt a ﬂexible counterfactual on the right side of the threshold and estimate the 
diﬀerence between the observed and predicted survival rates to assess manipulators’ 
actual survival probability. Intuitively, survival rates in the excess region are higher 
than predicted by the un-manipulated region to the right only due to manipulation. The 
extent to which observed and predicted nonemployment survival rates diﬀer, together 
with an estimate of how many manipulators are causing this diﬀerence, let us recover 
manipulators’ actual nonemployment survival probability. We use analogous arguments 
to back out manipulators’ counterfactual nonemployment survival probability on the 
left side of the threshold. 
Selection into manipulation: The procedure illustrated in Figure 2.2b also lets us 
study selection into manipulation by comparing manipulators’ counterfactual outcomes 
to that of non-manipulators, individuals in the missing region who did not manip­
ulate. Figure 2.2b highlights this comparison and would suggest that even absent 
manipulation, manipulators would have had a higher nonemployment survival rate than 
non-manipulators due to the drop in the outcome variable to the left of the cutoﬀ. This 
is indeed what we show in Section 2.5. In light of the selection patterns we document, it 
is worth bearing in mind that we are estimating the eﬀect of manipulation on individuals 
who endogenously decide to engage in manipulation, akin to a local average treatment 
eﬀect. 
2.4 Regression Framework 
In this section we present the details of how we operationalize our identiﬁcation strategy 
in a regression framework. 
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2.4.1 Estimating the number of manipulators 
In order to quantify the amount of manipulation we follow standard bunching techniques 
(Saez, 2010, Chetty et al., 2011, Kleven and Waseem, 2013). At every age, we estimate 
a counterfactual layoﬀ frequency by ﬁtting a second order polynomial to the observed 
frequency, but excluding data from the manipulation region. Concretely, we group all 
layoﬀs into two week bins based on the workers’ age at layoﬀ and estimate the following 
speciﬁcation: 
P zUk k 
pcj = α + βp · aj + γk · I[aj = k] + νj (2.4) 
p=0 k=zL 
where cj denotes the absolute frequency of layoﬀs in headcounts in bin j, aj is the mid­
point age in bin j, P denotes the order of the polynomial. Coeﬃcients γs control ﬂexibly 
(bin-by-bin) for diﬀerences between the observed data and the counterfactual frequency 
in the manipulation region [zL, zU ].12 The whole counterfactual layoﬀ frequency can 
be recovered from the ﬁtted values of equation 2.4 omitting the contributions of the 
missing and excess region dummies, i.e. the counterfactual number of individuals in bin 
j is given by cˆj = 
�P
p=0 βˆp · apj . 
Crucial to our estimation procedure is a deﬁnition of the manipulation region [zL, zU ]. 
Here we follow the procedure employed in Kleven and Waseem [2013]. We ﬁrst rely on 
visual inspection to determine zL. We set this to be six weeks away from the age ﬁfty 
cutoﬀ (three bins). Subsequently, we try diﬀerent speciﬁcations that increase zU by 
little margins (one bin at the time), until the diﬀerence between the missing mass and 
the excess mass is suﬃciently small. If the counterfactual density could be recovered 
zLwithout error by a polynomial, we would stop when � γk · I[aj = k] = 0. In practice k=zU 
we stop when this quantity falls below a critical threshold. This procedure leaves us 
with a manipulation region of six weeks to the left and four weeks to the right of the 
cutoﬀ. 
The observed layoﬀ frequency and the estimated counterfactual are enough to compute 
12The inclusion of these dummies is equivalent to estimating the polynomial after excluding 
observations in the corresponding bins. 
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the headcount for four groups inside the manipulation region: (1) manipulators in 
the missing region (2) manipulators in the excess region, (3) non-manipulators in the 
missing region and (4) non-manipulators in the excess region.13 These quantities can 
be computed bin by bin or over the entire region. Expressions are as follows: 
missingN = γkmani,k 
N excess mani,k = γk 
missingN = cknon mani,k 
N excess non mani,k = ck − γk 
missing k N = γkmani 
k∈missing k 
N excess = γkmani 
k∈excess 
missing k N = cknon mani 
k∈missing k 
N excess = ck − γknon mani 
k∈excess 
missing = N excesswhere it must hold that Nmani mani , that is manipulators who move from the 
left-hand side of the manipulation region are to be found in the right-hand side of it. 
Given the headcount, we compute the relevant shares bin by bin that are useful for the 
calculation of eﬀects of manipulation in the next section. 
missingNmani,k 
smissing,k = missing missingN + Nmani,k non mani,k 
N excess mani,k=sexcess,k 
N excess + N excess mani,k non mani,k 
With all these ingredients, we are now ready to move to the core of our empirical 
13Here we slightly abuse notation as the group of non-manipulators to the right of the cutoﬀ is 
composed of individuals who would not have manipulated even under the left side of the cutoﬀ 
conditions and individuals who would have manipulated if necessary. The latter group did not 
have any need to actually manipulate as they were ﬁred after their ﬁftieth birthday at baseline. 
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analysis. 
2.4.2 Estimating the eﬀects of manipulation on manipulators 
In the previous section we constructed the number of manipulators and the share they 
represent in the frequency of layoﬀs by age bin. We now move to the estimation of 
the eﬀect of manipulation on manipulators. As outlined in Section 2.3.2, we estimate 
manipulators’ duration response as the diﬀerence between manipulators’ actual and 
counterfactual duration. In order to compute both these quantities, we relate diﬀerences 
in observed and predicted durations in the missing and excess region to the missing and 
excess share of manipulators, respectively. This procedure is readily applicable to all 
our outcomes of interest. In particular, it lets us study survival probabilities in nonem­
ployment, which allow us to separate the mechanical component of the manipulation 
cost increase from the behavioural one. 
As a ﬁrst step we run the following regression on individual-level data: 
P Pk 
β≤50 p 
k 
β>50 pyi = α + · a · I[ai ≤ 50] + · a · I[ai > 50]p i p i 
p=1 p=0 (2.5)
zLk 
+	 δk · I[ai = k] + ξi,
 
k=zU
 
where yj the outcome of interest, e.g. weeks of beneﬁt receipt duration or probability 
of still being nonemployed m months after the layoﬀ, β≤50 and β>50 are coeﬃcients of p p 
two P th degree polynomials in age, that are constructed based on information from the 
left-hand side and right-hand side respectively. This speciﬁcation allows for a treatment 
β>50eﬀect of longer PBD on duration outcomes, i.e. 0 . We refer to the latter as the 
“Donut-RD”. Under some assumptions this coeﬃcient captures the average treatment 
eﬀect of four more months of PBD for the average individual in the population, as shown 
in Barreca et al. [2011].14 We will use this to benchmark our results for manipulators.15 
Thanks to the inclusion of I[ai = k] indicator variables, the counterfactual polynomial 
14See Scrutinio [2018] for an application to Italian unemployment beneﬁts.
 
15Intuitively, this coeﬃcient recovers the diﬀerence between the two grey dots in Figure 2.2b.
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is estimated as if we were excluding observations from the manipulation region [zL, zU ] 
(similarly to equation 2.4). The coeﬃcients δk capture the diﬀerence in average duration 
between the observed data and the estimated counterfactual in manipulation region. 
The central idea of our estimation is the re-scaling of these estimated diﬀerences by the 
respective share of manipulators responsible for it. Therefore, for each k in the missing 
region, we calculate 
missing missing missing δkΔY ¯ ≡ Y ¯ − Y ¯ = k non mani,k mani,k missingsk 
which gives us the diﬀerence in durations between manipulators and non-manipulators, 
in bin k in the missing region, in a world without manipulation. Note that the average 
duration of non-manipulators in bin k is an observable quantity and given by 
¯ missing ykY = ,non mani,k ck 
which allows us to recover manipulators’ counterfactual duration as 
¯ missing ¯ missing missingY = Y − ΔY ¯ .mani,k non mani,k k 
The average duration over the entire manipulation region is 
kmissing 1 missing¯ ¯ Y = γk · Y ,mani 
Nmissing
mani,k 
mani k 
where the γk are the same ones as in Section 2.4.1. Following an analogous argument 
on the right-hand side, we ﬁrst re-scale the regression coeﬃcient for bin k to obtain 
Y excess Y excess Y excess 
δkΔ¯ k ≡ ¯ mani,k − ¯ non mani,k = excess . sk 
Now notice that the observable average duration in bin k in the excess region is given by
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Y ¯ excess Y ¯ excess 
Y excess 
yk γk · mani,k + (ck − γk) · non mani,k¯ = = observed,k ck ck 
Therefore, combining the two expressions above and rearranging terms gives us an 
estimate of manipulators’ actual duration in the form of 
Y ¯ excess Y ¯ excess excess Y excess mani,k = observed,k + (1 − sk ) · Δ¯ k , 
for bin k. As above, manipulators’ actual average duration over the entire excess region 
is given by 
1 k 
Y ¯ excess Y ¯ excess mani = N excess · γk · mani,k, mani k 
which lets us deﬁne manipulators’ response (or treatment eﬀect) as 
Y TE Y excess missing− Y ¯ .mani ≡ ¯ mani mani 
While this method is general and covers any type of outcome, it is instructive to show 
how it simpliﬁes when the left-hand-side variable is a survival probability. The survival 
probability for a given group g in a generic month m is obtained by dividing two 
headcounts: the number of individuals belonging to g who are still nonemployed in m 
and the original number of individuals in group g. The latter is already known from 
the procedure described in subsection 2.4.1. The former is obtained by applying the 
same estimating equation to the count of people still nonemployed in month m. For 
every month m = 1, 2, 3, . . . our estimating equation becomes:16 
16Notice that for m = 0 equation 2.6 is identical to 2.4. 
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P P
m 
k 
βm,≤50 p 
k 
βm,>50 pcj = α + p · aj · I[aj ≤ 50] + p · aj · I[aj > 50] 
p=1 p=0 (2.6)
zUk 
+ γm · I[aj = k] + ξm ,k j 
k=zL 
mwhere cj is the headcount of individuals still in nonemployment after month m who 
were laid oﬀ in age bin j. Similarly to section 2.4.1, the βm are the coeﬃcients of a p 
P th order polynomial in aj , where aj is the mid-point of age bins. The γm coeﬃcients 
recover the diﬀerence between the observed and counterfactual headcount and thus the 
number of manipulators who are still nonemployed after month m in the missing and 
excess region. For each month m, we compute the number of individuals of each group 
who are still nonemployed after month m. Formally, we deﬁne 
missing,m k γmN = mani s 
s∈missing kexcess,m γmN = mani s 
s∈excess 
Nmissing,m = 
k 
c m non mani s 
s∈missing kexcess,m mN = c − γm ,non mani s s 
s∈excess 
as the headcounts for the four groups in each month after layoﬀ.17 By re-scaling each N 
value by the same quantities’ value in month 0, we obtain an estimate of the probability 
for staying unemployed for at least m months after layoﬀ. We deﬁne 
17In theory, all Ns must be weakly decreasing in m. However, we do not restrict our estimation 
procedure and might thus violate this argument due to estimation error. Reassuringly, in practice 
these instances are rare. 
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missing,m missing,m missing,0P ≡ N /Nmani mani mani 
excess,m excess,m excess,0P ≡ N /Nmani mani mani 
missing,m missing,m missing,0P ≡ Nnon mani non mani /Nnon mani 
excess,m excess,m excess,0Pnon mani ≡ Nnon mani/Nnon mani, 
as the survival probability in nonemployment after month m of the respective group. 
We now turn to our estimation results. 
2.5 Results 
In this section we examine the main ﬁndings. We start by presenting graphical evidence 
of manipulation in the form of strategic delays in the timing of layoﬀs around the 
ﬁftieth birthday threshold. After quantifying the magnitude of manipulation, we show 
how manipulators decrease their subsequent job search eﬀort, which is reﬂected in 
outward shifts of their nonemployment survival curves and corresponding increases 
in their average nonemployment durations. We compare the increase in ﬁscal costs 
that originates from changes in search intensity to the mechanical increase in cost that 
would have arisen even absent behavioural changes. As outlined in Section 2.3, this 
allows us to retrieve the eﬀective moral hazard cost of providing extended UI beneﬁt 
to manipulators. As a ﬁnal step we compare non-manipulators’ survival curve to that 
of manipulators in a world where manipulation is not possible. This permits us to 
assess the degree of selection into manipulation on the basis of underlying long-term 
unemployment risk. 
2.5.1 Evidence of manipulation 
To provide graphical evidence of manipulation, Figure 2.3 plots the relative frequency 
of layoﬀs against workers’ age at layoﬀ. Figure 2.3b covers the entire age range from 26 
to 64 years of age, while Figure 2.3a zooms into a narrower, four year window around 
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the age-ﬁfty threshold.18 Both ﬁgures show a clear drop in the frequency of layoﬀs just 
before, and a pronounced spike after, the age-ﬁfty threshold. 
Following the procedure in Section 2.4.1, we ﬁnd the manipulation region to consist of all 
bins from six weeks before (missing region), up to four weeks after the threshold (excess 
region). We estimate that 13.3% of all layoﬀs in the missing region or around 10% in 
the two months prior to the ﬁftieth birthday threshold are strategically delayed.19 This 
amounts to a total of around 490 manipulated layoﬀ dates which corresponds to 17% of 
all layoﬀs in the two weeks smaller excess region.20 
We consider the graphical evidence presented until here as this papers’ ﬁrst main contri­
bution. It documents that incentives generated by the UI system can inﬂuence the timing 
dimension of layoﬀs and thereby the length of an employment spell. Complementing 
previous work on the extensive margin response of job separations, we focus on the 
timing dimension of the layoﬀ decision.21 Having established sizable manipulation, we 
now turn to the estimation of its eﬀect on manipulators’ subsequent job search eﬀorts. 
2.5.2 Survival responses of manipulators 
Successful manipulation provides workers with four months of additional potential 
UI coverage after the eighth month of nonemployment. In this section we make use 
of the methodology presented in Section 2.3 to study the eﬀects of manipulation 
on manipulators’ subsequent survival probabilities into nonemployment. As we will 
describe in more detail in section 2.5.3, this exercise is not only interesting from a 
positive but also relevant from a normative perspective. Intuitively, it’s crucial to 
18By plotting the layoﬀ frequency over the entire age range in Figure 2.3b, we already rule out 
potential concerns that our ﬁndings are caused by other mechanisms like (round-) birthday eﬀects 
or retirements spillovers. All our estimates for the counterfactual density and counterfactual 
outcomes will be based on the narrower (46-54) window. Further identiﬁcation checks are 
presented in Section 2.6
19The counterfactual relationship appears almost perfectly linear and is very robust to the 
choice of the order of the polynomial. The determination of the manipulation region closely 
follows the procedure in Kleven and Waseem [2013] and is explained in more detail in Section 
2.4. 
20While the total number of manipulated layoﬀs might appear small, it is worth bearing in 
mind that this number is uninformative about the size of the behavioural response. We are 
currently working on estimating the implied elasticity of the employment spell duration w.r.t. 
potential beneﬁt duration.
21Jäger et al. [2018] and Doornik et al. [2018] both study the extensive margin response of 
job separations to UI beneﬁts. 
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understand when manipulators respond, as to distinguish between relatively expensive 
moral hazard responses during months of beneﬁt receipt from those that happen after 
beneﬁt exhaustion. 
We begin by plotting these outcomes against workers’ age at layoﬀ in Figure 2.4. The 
observed pattern in the raw data ﬁts with the model of manipulation we laid out in 
Section 2.3 and constitutes clear non-parametric evidence that nonemployment survival 
rates respond to manipulation. We now use methods detailed in Section 2.4.2 to trace 
out manipulators’ and non-manipulators survival curves. 
Figure 2.5a shows the estimated nonemployment survival curve of manipulators under 
the eight and twelve months PBD scheme. Figure 2.5b reports the diﬀerence between 
the two curves at any point, with associated 95% conﬁdence bands.22 The diﬀerence 
between the two curves reveals the eﬀect of manipulation along manipulators’ survival 
curve. It shows virtually no diﬀerence in survival probabilities in the ﬁrst six to 
seven months, after which the two curves start diverging. The shift in manipulators’ 
survival curve is substantial with their nonemployment probability after twelve months 
increasing from 0.55 under the eight months scheme to 0.76 under the twelve months 
scheme. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the behavioural response is concentrated in the months 
eight to twelve and coincides with the time of extended UI coverage. However, as 
pointed out, there is very little evidence of moral hazard in the ﬁrst eight months of 
nonemployment. It is noteworthy that manipulation seems to have a very long-lasting 
eﬀect on individuals’ job ﬁnding probabilities. The two survival curves in Figure 2.5a 
show a substantial gap even as far out as thirty-two months after layoﬀ. These shifts 
in the survival curves for manipulators naturally translate into changes in the average 
beneﬁt and nonemployment durations. Thanks to the methodology in Section 2.4.2 we 
compute these to be respectively 14.53 weeks for beneﬁt duration and 13.30 weeks for 
nonemployment duration. We now have all the ingredients that are needed to compute 
the relative contribution of the mechanical and behavioural eﬀects in determining 
increases in beneﬁt collection, as outlined in Section 2.3.1 
22Conﬁdence intervals are obtained by stratiﬁed bootstrap, using age-bins as strata. 
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2.5.3 Selection on risk and moral hazard cost 
In this subsection we look at the degree to which manipulators are motivated by their 
long-term nonemployment risk, compared to an anticipated moral hazard response. 
The relevant methodology is presented in Section 2.3.1. Table 2.2, panel (a) provides 
a decomposition of the total increase in weeks on beneﬁts for manipulators into a 
mechanical and a behavioural eﬀect. In panel (b) we repeat the same exercise for the 
average individual in the population, using information from the “Donut RD” coeﬃcient, 
introduced in Section 2.4.2. 23 Two prominent results emerge from this table. First, 
most of the increase in beneﬁt payments for manipulators stems from a mechanical 
eﬀect. The latter amounts to 11.57 weeks, which corresponds to 79.6% of the total 
increase in beneﬁt receipt. Given that the total increase in weeks on beneﬁts equals 
14.53, it follows that the remaining behavioural eﬀect amounts to 14.53 − 11.57 = 2.96 
weeks. Second, the relative size of mechanical and behavioural eﬀects for manipulators 
is remarkably similar to that for the average individual in the population. This implies 
that manipulators are not adversely selected on their moral hazard response, compared 
to the average individual. 
In order to facilitate cross-group comparisons even further, we follow Schmieder et al. 
[2012a] and calculate BC/MC ratios, as in equation 2.3. We use the statutory replacement 
rate of 0.4 for the months eight to twelve and show sensitivity of the results to various 
values of the UI tax rate.24 Results for both manipulators and the average individual 
are reported in Table 2.3. In column 1 we see no diﬀerence in the BC/MC ratio across 
the two groups. This is in line with the result from Table 2.2, and is due to the fact 
that we are ignoring lost tax revenue in the months after the twelfth. A BC/MC ratio 
of 0.26 implies that, for one additional dollar of UI transfer (to either a manipulator or 
average individual), the government would have to spend an additional 26 cents due to 
the behavioural response that occurs in months 0-12. These numbers become bigger as 
23As highlighted in Section 2.3.1, the mechanical eﬀect is the integral from month 8 to 12 of 
the estimated survival curve, under the 8 month PBD scheme. The behavioural eﬀect is the 
integral from month 0 to 12 of the diﬀerence between the estimated survival curves, under the 
12 month and 8 month scheme. 
24There is some disagreement in the literature on what the appropriate tax rate in this context 
is. Early studies have used a 3% UI tax. However, recent work argues for higher tax wedges 
(Lawson [2017]). 
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we increase the tax rates, since we take into account the fact that the government is 
losing revenues due to longer nonemployment durations. While the two numbers start 
diverging somewhat due to longer durations after month twelve for manipulators, the 
ﬁgures are still remarkably similar across the two groups. All in all, these results provide 
evidence that manipulators are not substantially more responsive to the additional UI 
coverage than the average individual, and thus mitigates concerns about selection on 
anticipated moral hazard. 
The reason why manipulators see large increases in UI beneﬁt receipt duration, although 
they are not more responsive, is due to selection on long-term nonemployment risk. Fig­
ure 2.6a illustrates this by plotting survival rates for manipulators and non-manipulators 
under the eight month scheme. Even with shorter PBD, the probability of exhausting 
beneﬁts without ﬁnding a new job is 20 p.p. higher for manipulators. The large 
exhaustion risk makes most of the increase in beneﬁt duration mechanical and thus 
lowers the BC/MC ratio, ceteris paribus. 
2.5.4 Selection on observables 
Until now we have quantiﬁed manipulation and studied its consequences, but we have 
abstracted from understanding how it occurs. In this section we present a character­
ization of the manipulators along observable characteristics, in order to provide some 
suggestive evidence on the economic mechanisms that generate it. In Figure 2.7 we 
start by visually inspecting the age distribution of layoﬀs for diﬀerent types of contracts 
(permanent and temporary) and sectors (private and public). Workers in the public 
sector, either with permanent or temporary contracts, show little ability or interest to 
delay their layoﬀ and the density of layoﬀ does not exhibit any discontinuous pattern for 
either of these groups. The density for workers laid oﬀ from permanent contracts in the 
public sector also shows substantial variance, due to a smaller number of individuals. 
Once we move to the private sector, we can observe that workers on permanent contracts 
are able to manipulate their date of layoﬀ, while the same is not true for workers on 
temporary contracts. This is consistent with temporary workers having little ability 
choose a start date for their contracts that positions them on the right-hand-side of 
the threshold, once laid oﬀ. It is also consistent with lower bargaining power with the 
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employer, due to e.g. shorter tenure.25 
In what follows we focus on the subset of workers who claimed UI after losing a 
permanent job in the private sector, which was also our sample of interest in the main 
analysis. We plot age-at-layoﬀ densities for diﬀerent subgroups in Figure 2.8. We notice 
that manipulation happens in all subgroups, albeit the size may diﬀer. For example, 
we notice that the size of the jump at the threshold for females is twice as big as the 
one we see among males. Similarly, white collars and part-time workers have a higher 
probability of manipulating compared to blue collars and full-time workers, respectively. 
The level of the previous wage does not seem to play an important role, as workers show 
similar patterns of layoﬀ, regardless of whether they earn above or below the median 
wage. Geographical location has a negligible role at best, since there are small diﬀerences 
in the size of the excess mass in diﬀerent Italian macro regions. On the contrary, ﬁrm 
size is a key driver of manipulation. Workers in ﬁrms with less than 15 employees and 
between 15 and 50 employees show a strong ability to delay their layoﬀ. This does not 
happen in larger ﬁrms, where the density of layoﬀ does not show any discontinuity. In 
addition, workers in smaller ﬁrms seem to be able to delay their layoﬀ for more weeks, 
whereas manipulation is concentrated in the month prior to layoﬀ for workers in medium 
sized ﬁrms. We can only speculate as to the reasons behind the ﬁrm-size diﬀerential in 
manipulation: the eﬀect may work through personal relationships, workers’ (credible) 
threat to sue the ﬁrm for unjust dismissal, or direct bribes paid with part of the extra 
UI. Our data do not allow us to disentangle these possibilities and leave this question to 
future research. Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that adjustment costs, bargaining power 
and proximity to managers play a role in workers’ ability to engage in manipulation. 
Although informative, this graphical analysis does not allow us to precisely quantify to 
what extent manipulators diﬀer from other individuals who do not engage in manipula­
tion. To provide a more precise assessment, we make use of a procedure developed in 
[Diamond and Persson, 2017, Section 6.2]. The idea is similar in spirit to the rest of our 
analysis. Let us say that we want to investigate whether manipulators are more likely 
to have a given characteristic, e.g. being female. If there are disproportionately more 
25Although the McCrary test identiﬁes the presence a discontinuity also in this case, this is 
substantially smaller than the one observed for workers coming from permanent contracts. 
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(less) women in the excess (missing) region compared to what a ﬁtted counterfactual 
would predict, then manipulators are more likely to be female. Results are in Table 
2.4. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimated mean characteristic for manipulators 
and non-manipulators, respectively. The diﬀerence of the two is reported in column 
(3), together with bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals. In column (4) we report 
the estimated mean for yet another group, i.e. all individuals whose unmanipulated 
age-at-layoﬀ falls in the missing region. The results are in line with what found in 
the graphical analysis: manipulators are 18 p.p. more likely than non-manipulators 
to be female, 17 p.p. more likely to be employed in white collar jobs and 7 p.p. less 
likely to have full-time contracts. We observe that their wages are 6% lower, although 
estimates are relatively imprecise. No signiﬁcant diﬀerence emerges in terms of tenure 
and geographic location. As before, we notice that ﬁrm size is an important element: 
manipulators come from ﬁrms that are about 40% smaller with respect to ﬁrm of 
non-manipulators. We only see minor and statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerences in terms 
of age of the ﬁrm. 
2.6 Robustness 
2.6.1 Placebo tests 
One of the key identifying assumptions of our methodology is that the frequency of 
layoﬀs would have been smooth across the threshold, were it not for the sharp PBD 
increase at the threshold. In this section we present two pieces of evidence in favour of 
this assumption. We show that manipulation vanishes when there is no discontinuity in 
beneﬁt generosity at the threshold. In order to do so, we exploit information on two 
diﬀerent UI schemes that were introduced after 2012: MiniASpI and NASpI. 
The ﬁrst was introduced in January 2013, as part of a broader reform of the Italian 
UI system. The reform introduced two new beneﬁts that should have replaced both 
the OUB and RUB, i.e. ASpI and MiniASpI, respectively. ASpI was similar in many 
respects to OUB and maintained the discontinuity age ﬁfty. MiniASpI, which replaced 
the RUB, maintained eligibility requirements, but introduced a new formula for PBD 
calculations: the worker was entitled to a PBD equal to half the weeks worked in the 
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past year. Since this rule did not determine any discontinuity in PBD, it gave no 
incentive to individuals to manipulate their separation date. The second was introduced 
in May 2015,26 together with other labour market reforms. Also the NASpI was not 
characterized by any discontinuity in PBD at the age-ﬁfty threshold and its PBD formula 
was similar to the MiniASpI but it was based on the last 4 years before layoﬀ.27 
Layoﬀ densities are reported in Figure 2.9. In both cases, we focus on workers who were 
employed on permanent contracts, and are thus more likely to be able to delay their 
layoﬀ, as shown in Section 2.5.4. We fail to detect any evidence of manipulation. We 
can observe a small discontinuity in NASpI but it is considerably smaller than the one 
for the OUB and it is not signiﬁcant at 5%. This suggests that workers delaying their 
layoﬀ around 50 years of age in our sample were directly reacting to the policy induced 
PBD extension. 
2.6.2 Extensive margin responses 
Manipulation induces a re-timing of existing layoﬀs from the weeks immediately preceding 
workers’ ﬁftieth birthday to right after, generating a missing and an excess mass compared 
to the counterfactual frequency. One of the identifying assumptions of the methods used 
in this paper is that manipulation is the only reason why we observe these changes in 
the vicinity of the threshold. However, if longer PBD increases workers’ outside option 
out of employment, it is possible that the number of layoﬀs discontinuously increases 
after age ﬁfty, even absent any manipulation. We call this increase an “extensive margin 
response". This is worrisome for two reasons: ﬁrst we would be underestimating the 
upper bound of the manipulation region (zU ), and second, if the extra layoﬀs are selected, 
we would be altering the composition of jobs in the manipulation region for reasons 
other than manipulation, introducing a bias. 
The nature of the selection is not straightforward. As discussed in Jäger et al. [2018], 
in a standard Coesean bargaining framework, positive changes in workers’ outside 
options induce separations for those (marginal) jobs that have relatively low joint (ﬁrm 
26Our analysis will focus on workers ﬁred in 2016 to allow for a fuller adjustment of workers 
to the new rules and legislation.
27For additional information on these beneﬁts, see Appendix 2.A. 
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+ worker) surplus. These could be e.g. the least productive jobs employing the least 
skilled workers. In other (non-Coasean) settings, changes in outside options induce a 
higher number of separations among jobs with low workers’ surplus. These could be 
the workers who value leisure relatively more or are employed in physically strenuous 
occupations, and not necessarily the least productive ones. In both cases this extensive 
margin response on the number of separations would alter the composition of jobs in 
a way that is potentially correlated with outcomes of interest. These concerns are 
not purely theoretical: Feldstein [1976], Feldstein [1978] and Topel [1983] provided a 
theoretical framework and some preliminary evidence on how more generous beneﬁts 
may generate additional layoﬀs. Jäger et al. [2018] also ﬁnds an eﬀect of extended PBD 
on job separation rates in Austria. They also ﬁnd that the job matches of the workers 
who do not separate are not more resilient in subsequent years, casting doubts on the 
Coasean framework. Recent work by Albanese et al. [2019] documented an increase 
in the probability of separation for Italian workers who become eligible to the OUB 
scheme for the ﬁrst time. In what follows, we show these concerns ﬁnd little empirical 
support in our setting. 
In testing for the importance of extensive margin responses, we consider two diﬀerent 
scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, all jobs can be hit by random shocks that decrease their 
value, and whose distribution does not feature any point of discontinuity. Since all jobs 
to the right of the threshold are less resilient due to lower worker surplus, we would 
expect to see an upward shift in the whole density of layoﬀs. In the second scenario, 
there are no shocks, but a limited set of jobs with small and positive surplus will mature 
into negative surplus as workers’ age cross the age-ﬁfty threshold, due to increased 
outside option of the worker. In this case additional layoﬀs might be concentrated 
right after workers’ ﬁftieth birthday, with the following age bins being unaﬀected. We 
analyse the former case by checking whether the density of layoﬀ or workers’ observable 
characteristics show a jump at the threshold, even after accounting for the presence 
of manipulation. We then consider the latter case by comparing the total excess and 
missing mass on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. Finally, we discuss sample and institutional 
reasons which might make diﬃcult to apply the results of the more recent contributions 
on this topic to our setting. 
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Testing for shifts in the density 
Let us now turn to the ﬁrst check: we look at whether the density of layoﬀs exhibits 
an upward shift even after ﬂexibly controlling for the presence of manipulation. After 
excluding bins belonging to the manipulation region, we ﬁt two separate linear spe­
ciﬁcations in age to the layoﬀ density, on the left and on the right of the threshold 
respectively. We then check whether the estimated ﬁt on the left-hand side does a good 
job in predicting the estimated ﬁt on the right-hand side.28 Intuitively, if the distance 
between the two lines is small, this is indicative that extensive margin responses are 
not so important in our setting. In practice, we run the following regression model 
separately on the two sides of the cutoﬀ: 
dj = α + λaj + ξj for j outside of the manipulation region (2.7) 
where dj is the density of layoﬀs in bin j, aj is the mid-point age in the bin and ξj 
is an error term. We then take the regression line estimated with left-hand-side data 
and extrapolate towards the right-hand side of the threshold. In Figure 2.10a and 
2.10b we visually inspect whether the extrapolation from the left-hand side of the 
cutoﬀ is consistently below the right-hand side estimated ﬁt. Figure 2.10a shows results 
excluding the missing and excess region as deﬁned in the previous sections while Figure 
2.10b uses an extended deﬁnition of the manipulation region. This includes bins which 
were excluded in our main procedure but which might possibly contain a small share of 
manipulators. To identify the extended region, we ﬁrst run a regression of density of 
layoﬀ by bin on a ﬁrst-order age polynomial29 and on dummies for each age bin between 
6 months prior and 6 months after workers’ ﬁftieth birthday. Then we check the sign of 
the coeﬃcients for the age dummies. We deﬁne the extended missing (excess) region as 
the region characterized by a sequence of negative (positive) coeﬃcient starting from 
28Note that in this case, we use a linear speciﬁcation, instead of a quadratic, as higher order 
polynomial would provide too much weight on extreme observations and might lead to a poorer 
overall ﬁt outside the sample. Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion 
both suggest that the linear and quadratic speciﬁcation are roughly equivalent. Other measures 
of goodness of ﬁt such as the R2 also show substantial equivalence of the two models. 
29The use of a linear or a quadratic polynomial provides similar results. 
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the cutoﬀ.30 This involves a simple assumption of continuity and increasing cost of 
manipulation in the distance from the threshold and it implies a convex missing mass 
and excess mass region. As some bins include a very small number of manipulators, 
they are less interesting from the point of view of our main analysis but their presence 
might inﬂuence the slope of the polynomial. Even limiting to the case in which the 
usual manipulation region is removed, the two projections show remarkable similarities 
and the diﬀerence in the projected densities can account at most for 5% of the diﬀerence 
between the predicted density based on the left-hand side of the cutoﬀ and the data in 
the ﬁrst bin after the cutoﬀ. Once marginal bins are also excluded with the extended 
manipulation region, the two polynomial overlap almost perfectly. This suggests that it 
is unlikely that excess margin layoﬀs inﬂuence substantially our density. 
Testing for discontinuities in observable characteristics 
As a second check, we assess whether workers separating on either side of the cutoﬀ 
diﬀer systematically, above and beyond what can be explained by manipulation. We 
run two sets of models, a naive one that does not control for manipulation (and serves 
as a benchmark) and one that explicitly controls for it. The naive model, ran on the 
full sample reads: 
P Pk 
λ≤50 p 
k 
λ>50 pxi = α + · a · I[ai ≤ 50] + · a · I[ai > 50] + ξi (2.8)p i p i 
p=1 p=0 
which is a standard RD model where λ>50 is the jump at the threshold. The other 0 
model adds bin-by-bin indicator variables for the manipulation region and is as follows: 
30To reduce the possible inﬂuence of negligible deviations from the polynomial, we consider 
zeros very small deviations from the polynomial. This makes estimates of the region more stable 
across speciﬁcations. The threshold is set at one thousandth of the average density per bin, 
roughly equivalent to a deviation of three workers from the polynomial. 
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P Pk 
θ≤50 p 
k 
θ>50 pxi = κ + · a · I[ai ≤ 50] + · a · I[ai > 50]p i p i 
p=1 p=0 (2.9)
zLk 
+	 δk · I[ai = k] + νi,
 
k=zU
 
If manipulators are selected on observables, we would expect λ>50 to be diﬀerent from 0 
zero, a point also raised in Section 2.5.4. If however manipulation is the only reason 
why selection arises, we would expect θ>50 to be equal to zero. We reports tests on 0 
these two coeﬃcients in Table 2.5. Columns (1) to (3) report estimates from model 
2.8. Observable characteristics are indeed diﬀerent on the two sides of the threshold, 
because of manipulation, but potentially also because of extensive margin responses. 
Columns (3)-(5) rule this last channel out. The fact that the distribution of observable 
characteristics is continuous at the threshold, after accounting for manipulation, makes 
the presence of additional layoﬀ related to changes in the outside option for the workers 
less likely. This is very reassuring for the validity of our design, as it seems that changes 
in PBD do not induce extensive margin changes in the number of layoﬀs. 
Testing for the presence of extra excess mass 
So far, these analyses suggest negligible eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts on layoﬀs. We 
now move to testing the second type of extensive margin response, that is the one that 
emerges only near the threshold. The basic idea behind the test is to see if we can 
detect additional excess mass to the right of the cutoﬀ, above and beyond what would 
be predicted by the missing mass. In absence of extensive margin responses, excess and 
missing mass should be equal, so any diﬀerence in favour of the excess mass would make 
us think PBD is inducing extra layoﬀs right after the threshold. In order to implement 
our test, we estimate the following regression model on the layoﬀ density: 
50−	 Bk	 k 
cj = α + βaj + γ˜k · I[aj = k] + δ˜  k · I[aj = k] + ζj (2.10) 
k=A k=50+ 
Where γ˜k and δ˜k are coeﬃcients for dummies corresponding bins of an extended 
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manipulation region, ranging from A < zL to B > zU . We choose A and B this region 
under a mild assumption of convexity of the excess and missing mass. In practice, we 
look at an extended missing (excess) region delimited to the right (left) by the cutoﬀ 
and to the left (right) by the last bin with a negative (positive) coeﬃcient. The resulting 
missing region is substantially larger and it goes up to 4 months before the cutoﬀ (9 
bins) while the excess region is remarkably similar and it adds only a couple of bins to 
the one used in our baseline estimates. We then compute the missing and excess mass 
as the diﬀerence between the polynomial and the observed distribution and assess the 
diﬀerence in total excess mass and missing mass. Finally, we rescale it by the excess 
mass to have a relative magnitude of the share of the excess mass composed by excess 
layoﬀ. The resulting excess excess mass corresponds to only 1.3% of the whole excess 
mass in the excess region. In addition, this also allows us to quantify the share of the 
two masses covered by our baseline missing and excess region. The masses computed 
with our baseline speciﬁcation represent 67% of the missing mass and 70% of the excess 
mass. As the regions added in this exercise contain only a small number of manipulators 
per bin, we use our baseline speciﬁcation throughout the paper as additional bins would 
provide little information on manipulators given their limited presence in each extra bin. 
Overall, results are reassuring about the absence of any additional excess mass coming 
from additional destruction of marginal jobs and further corroborates our results. 
Why are extensive margin responses so small? 
In this subsection we discuss why we think it is plausible that we do not detect sizeable 
extensive margin responses in our setting. Mainly, our beneﬁt changes at the threshold 
is smaller and less salient compared to other studies and other institutional features 
limit the scope for big changes. For comparison, we take the results in Jäger et al. [2018] 
and Albanese et al. [2019] as benchmarks. 
First of all, they focus their attention on a policy change in Austria in 1988 that increased 
PBD from 30 to 209 weeks, a seven-fold increase. In our case the PBD increased by 
50%, which is fourteen times smaller. Due to diﬀerences in our estimation strategies 
and setting, it is diﬃcult to map their results in our case as they estimate the additional 
probability of separation from 49.75 to 55 years (Table A.2 in their paper). However, by 
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assuming linearity in the eﬀects of longer PBD, and applying their estimates to our case, 
we can still recover what would be the implied extensive margin response in our setting. 
Jäger et al. [2018] ﬁnd an increase of separations by 11 percentage points over a baseline 
of 36%. This would imply an increase in layoﬀ by about 2.5%.31 This would represent 
a very small change in our overall density and it unlikely to generate substantial bias. 
Secondly, it is worth stressing that two features of our institutional setting make it 
diﬃcult to extend results from Jäger et al. [2018] to our framework. A relevant aspect 
that should be taken into account is that the higher separation rate is partly driven by 
quits rather than layoﬀ. Indeed, in the Austrian system workers who quit their job are 
eligible to receive unemployment beneﬁts while this is not possible in Italian legislation, 
unless under particular circumstances. In addition, the longer unemployment beneﬁts 
under the Austrian REBP could be used by workers to bridge towards retirement after 
turning 55. This made unemployment more attractive to workers. The Italian pension 
system was, in the period considered, much less generous as normally workers could 
retire only after 64 years of age for males and 59 for females. Both these substantial 
diﬀerences make less likely that the extension of potential beneﬁt duration leads to 
excess layoﬀs. 
We now turn to comparing our work to Albanese et al. [2019], who ﬁnd a sizable increase 
in the separation rate for workers who become eligible to the OUB scheme in Italy for 
the ﬁrst time. We present four reasons why we think these responses are unlikely to be 
present in our sample, although we are studying the same beneﬁt program. First of all, 
individuals in their sample are young and relatively inexperienced, having accumulated 
at most two years of labor market experience before receiving beneﬁts. We know that 
workers at the beginning of their careers change ﬁrms quite frequently before stabilizing 
into a permanent position (Topel and Ward, 1992). This would imply that matches 
in their setting are relatively more fragile and more likely to be terminated after an 
increase in workers’ outside options. Similarly, older workers are more likely to have 
more resilient matches, which they are less likely to leave, possibly due to accumulated 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital or other mobility barriers such as family ties. In addition 
31This is obtained by deriving an elasticity from Jäger et al. [2018] estimates and then applying 
it to our change in weeks of unemployment beneﬁts (50%). 
125 CHAPTER 2. HAPPY BIRTHDAY 
to these considerations, it is also worth stressing that the workers in our sample have 
already experienced a jump their PBD in the past, precisely when they met their 
eligibility criteria. It follows that the observed matches, which end in a separation in our 
dataset, have already survived a large increase in their outside option, so they should be 
less sensitive to further increases in it. Finally, Albanese et al. [2019] exploit variation in 
UI eligibility rules, which allow workers with no UI to have access to some. We instead 
study variation at the intensive margin, since our workers obtain four extra months of 
PBD. Whether these two responses should be the same has not been explored so far and 
it can be argued that the former should be larger than the ﬁrst case, as the worker gains 
the coverage immediately after the end of the spell and not in relatively distant period 
after layoﬀ. To our knowledge there is no explicit analysis of this aspect in existing 
studies and we leave it to future research. All balanced, all these considerations might 
explain the discrepancy between our results and the higher probability of separation 
identiﬁed by Albanese et al. [2019]. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
This paper studies manipulation in the context of unemployment insurance. We 
document substantial manipulation in forms of strategic delays in the timing of layoﬀs 
around an age-at- layoﬀ threshold entitling workers to a four months increase in potential 
UI beneﬁt duration in Italy. Using bunching techniques, we study the selection pattern 
and moral hazard response of manipulators. We argue that changes in subsequent job 
search intensities are informative about the underlying motives for manipulation and 
we identify long-term nonemployment risk as an important factor for selecting into 
manipulation. Manipulators are only modestly response to the increase in UI coverage 
mitigating concerns about anticipated moral hazard. 
All in all, we illustrate how a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying 
motivation for manipulation might shape how the phenomenon is perceived. Furthermore, 
our results highlight the importance to take layoﬀ responses into account when designing 
diﬀerentiated UI schemes and point to potential limits of governments’ ability to target 
UI beneﬁts. 
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Although a full welfare assessment is beyond the scope of this paper, we deem it a 
fruitful avenue for future research. So is the more general question of the desirability of 
diﬀerentiated UI policies. 
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Figures 
Figure 2.1: Anatomy of the ﬁscal cost of manipulation 
Note: The ﬁgure displays manipulators’ survival curves in nonemployment under two altern­
ative scenarios: manipulators’ potential beneﬁt duration (PBD) is 8 months (solid line), and 
manipulators’ PBD is 12 months (dashed line). The dashed line is above the solid line under the 
assumption that higher PDB lowers the hazard rate of exit from nonemployment. The curves 
are simulated as negative exponentials with a constant hazard rate of 5% and 3%, respectively. 
The increase in the ﬁscal cost (shaded areas) is due to two components: (1) the mechanical cost 
(light-shaded area) due to extra UI outlays covering months 8-12, absent any behavioural change; 
(2) behavioural component (dark-shaded area) due to a shift in the survival curve in months 
0-12, induced by the change. The eﬀective moral hazard cost is given by the ratio of (2) and (1). 
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of identiﬁcation strategy 
(a) Quantifying manipulation 
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Note: This ﬁgure visualizes our identiﬁcation strategy. Panel (a) illustrates how we 
estimate the number and respective share of manipulators in both the missing and 
excess region. Panel (b) constructs manipulators’ survival response and illustrates the 
relevant comparison when studying selection into manipulation. Section 2.4 lays out 
how we estimate the ﬁtted counterfactuals in practice. 
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Figure 2.3: Layoﬀ frequency for permanent contract private sector 
workers 
(a) Age-at-layoﬀ between 46 and 54 years 
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(b) Age-at-layoﬀ between 26 and 64 years 
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the density of layoﬀs in the private sector, for individuals 
working on a permanent contract and eligible for regular UI (DORN). The data 
cover the period February 2009 till December 2012. Panel (a) plots the density 
for the age range from 46 to 54 years, while Panel (b) does so for the entire age 
range from 26 to 64 years of age. In both panels each dot represents a two week 
bin. The underlying data in Panel (a) consists of 249,581 layoﬀs. 
130 CHAPTER 2. HAPPY BIRTHDAY 
Figure 2.4: Nonemployment survival probabilities 
(a) Still unemployed after 4 months (b) Still unemployed after 8 months 
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(c) Still unemployed after 12 months (d) Still unemployed after 16 months 
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(e) Still unemployed after 20 months (f) Still unemployed after 24 months 
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(g) Still unemployed after 28 months (h) Still unemployed after 32 months 
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Note: The ﬁgures show the share of laid oﬀ workers, who are still unemployed after 4, 8, ..., 
32 months. In all panels each dot represents a two week bin. The underlying data consists of 
249,581 layoﬀs. 
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Figure 2.5: Manipulators with 8 and 12 months of potential beneﬁt duration 
(a) Survival in nonemployment 
(b) Diﬀerence in survival rates of manipulators with 8 and 12 months PBD
 
Note: Panel (a) plots point estimates of manipulators’ actual and counterfactual 
nonemployment survival for the ﬁrst 32 months after layoﬀ. Our estimation strategy is 
outlined in Section 2.4.2. Panel (b) shows the diﬀerence between the two survival curves 
and contains bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals testing against zero diﬀerence. 
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Figure 2.6: Manipulators and non-manipulators with 8 months of potential beneﬁt 
duration 
(a) Survival in nonemployment 
(b) Nonemployment hazard
 
Note: Panel (a) plots point estimates of manipulators’ and non-manipulators’ nonem­
ployment survival over the ﬁrst 32 months after layoﬀ under eight months of PBD. 
The estimation of the former is outlined in Section 2.4.2. The latter represents the 
observed mean survival rate in the missing region. Panel (b) shows the diﬀerence 
between the two survival curves and contains bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals 
testing against zero diﬀerence. 
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Figure 2.7: Density of layoﬀ by private and public sector and by contract type 
(a) Public Sector: Permanent (b) Public Sector: Temporary 
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(c) Private Sector: Permanent 
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(d) Private Sector: Temporary 
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Note: Density by age for recipients of OUB between 46 and 54 years of age who were ﬁred from 
February 2009 and December 2012. Workers classiﬁed from the public sector if their working 
history could not be observed in the data for universe of workers in the private sector. 
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Figure 2.8: Layoﬀ frequency for subgroups of workers 
(a) Female (b) Male (c) White-collar 
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(d) Blue-collar (e) Full-time (f) Part-time 
.002
.004
.006
.008
D
en
si
ty
46 48 50 52 54
Age at layoff
McCrary: .0873 (.0108); obs: 193540
 
.002
.004
.006
.008
D
en
si
ty
46 48 50 52 54
Age at layoff
McCrary: .1124 (.0107); obs: 201247
 
.002
.004
.006
.008
D
en
si
ty
46 48 50 52 54
Age at layoff
McCrary: .1272 (.0247); obs: 48334
 
(g) Sector: Manufacturing (h) Sector: Services (i) Daily wage above median 
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(j) Daily wage below median (k) Geographic area: North (l) Geographic area: Center 
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(m) (m) Geographic area: South (n) (n) Firm size: 1-14 employees (o) (o) Firm size: 15-49 employees 
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(p) (p) Firm size: 50+ employees 
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Note: Density by age for recipients of OUB between 46 and 54 years of age who were ﬁred from 
February 2009 and December 2012. Sample restricted to workers from permanent contracts in 
the private sector. 
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Figure 2.9: Placebo checks: MiniASpI and NASpI and density of recipients at 50 
years of age 
(a) MiniASpI 
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(b) NASpI 
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Note: Density of layoﬀ for workers laid oﬀ in the private sector and receiving 
MiniASpI (2013-April 2015) or NASpI (2016). Sample restricted to workers 
coming from permanent contracts. McCrary test statistics and standard errors 
are reported below each graph. 
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Figure 2.10: Linear projection for density of layoﬀ 
(a) Baseline 
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(b) Extended 
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Note: Density by age for recipients of OUB between 46 and 54 years of age who were ﬁred from 
February 2009 and December 2012. Sample restricted to workers from permanent contracts in 
the private sector. Projections derived from OLS estimated separately on the left-hand and 
right-hand side of the cutoﬀ with a linear polynomial in age and then predicted for the whole 
age distribution. Dashed line corresponds to prediction based on data on the left -hand side of 
the cutoﬀ while solid line corresponds to predicted values based on the right-hand side of the 
cutoﬀ. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Outcomes 
Duration Beneﬁts (Weeks) 29.853 15.923 
Nonemployment Duration (Weeks) 89.995 79.092 
Survival 8 0.502 0.500 
Survival 12 0.388 0.487 
Previous job characteristics 
Full Time 0.807 0.395 
White Collar 0.208 0.406 
Time since ﬁrst employment (years) 27.656 8.552 
Tenure (years) 5.931 6.113 
South and Islands 0.459 0.498 
Center 0.174 0.379 
North 0.367 0.482 
Daily Income 69.900 70.300 
Female 0.311 0.463 
Firm age (years) 14.367 12.115 
Firm size 28.158 259.01 
Firm size below 15 0.606 0.489 
Firm size between 15 and 49 0.213 0.409 
Firm size above 49 0.181 0.385 
Min. 
0.14 
0.00 
0 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
2.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.038 
0.00 
0.00 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Max. 
52.00 
208.00 
1 
1 
1.00 
1.00 
40.00 
30.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
13,981.01 
1.00 
109.83 
14,103 
1 
1 
1 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics on all OUB claims occurring between 2009 and 
2012 for individuals aged 46-54 who held a permanent contract in the private sector. The 
number of spells is 249,581 while the number of workers is 210,041. Weeks of nonemployment is 
censored at 4 years and is computed as the distance between the layoﬀ and the date of the ﬁrst 
hiring that leads to UI termination. Tenure is deﬁned as the number of years, even with breaks, 
spent with the same employer. South and islands is a dummy indicating that the worker was 
employed in one of the following regions: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Molise, Puglia, Sardinia 
and Sicilia. 
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Table 2.2: Decomposition of beneﬁt duration response
 
(1) 
Beneﬁt receipt 
duration response 
ΔB 
in weeks 
(2) 
Behavioral 
response 
ΔBMH 
in weeks 
(3) 
Mechanical 
eﬀect 
ΔBME 
in weeks 
(a) Manipulators 14.53 
(100%) 
2.96 
(20.4%) 
11.57 
(79.6%) 
(b) Average population 11.39 
(100%) 
2.34 
(20.5%) 
9.05 
(79.5%) 
Note: Panel (a) reports the decomposition of manipulators’ beneﬁt duration response 
(in weeks) into a mechanical and a behavioral eﬀect, following the methodology de­
tailed in Section 2.3.1. Panel (b) reports the same decomposition for the average 
individual in the population, and is based on β>50 coeﬃcients from speciﬁcation 2.5. 0 
Table 2.3: BC/MC Ratios 
(1) (2) (3)
 
BC/MC BC/MC BC/MC
 
(τ = 0) (τ = 3%) (τ = 20%)
 
(a) Manipulators 0.26 0.34 0.83
 
(b) Average population 0.26 0.32 0.70
 
Note: Panel (a) reports BC/MC ratios for manipulators, as deﬁned 
in equation 2.3 in Section 2.3.1, for diﬀerent values of the UI tax rate. 
Panel (b) does the same for the average individual in the population,and 
is based on β>50 coeﬃcients from speciﬁcation 2.5. 0 
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Table 2.4: Diﬀerence in observables between manipulators and other groups 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Manipulators Non Manipulators Diﬀerence (1)-(2) Baseline Group Diﬀerence (1)-(4) 
Female 0.450 0.270 0.180 0.306 0.144 
[0.100; 0.281] [0.078; 0.206] 
White Collar 0.351 0.180 0.170 0.199 0.152 
[0.101;0.239] [0.094; 0.208] 
Full Time 0.754 0.822 -0.067 0.806 -0.052 
[-0.134; -0.000] [-0.106; 0.004] 
Tenure 6.577 5.718 0.859 5.933 0.644 
[-0.142; 1.853] [-0.166; 1.449] 
Log Daily Wage 4.115 4.176 -0.0610 4.168 -0.053 
[-0.142; 0.023] [-0.120; 0.015] 
South 0.483 0.471 0.012 0.469 0.014 
[-0.072; 0.098] [-0.056; 0.083] 
(Log) Size 1.862 2.258 -0.395 2.207 -0.345 
[-0.640; -0.155] [-0.546; -0.148] 
Age ﬁrm (years) 14.546 14.335 0.211 14.482 0.064 
[-1.945; 2.320] [-1.647; 1.780] 
Note: This table reports diﬀerences in observable characteristics between manipulators and non-manipulators. The 
analysis is based on 249,581 spells of individuals laid oﬀ from a permanent contract between 2009 and 2012. Column 
(1) reports estimated means of manipulators’ characteristics; column (2) does the same for non-manipulators; 
Column (4) reports estimated means for baseline group, deﬁned as the set of individuals we would have observed 
in the missing region, in absence of manipulation. Columns (3) and (5) report the diﬀerence between these groups. 
Bootstrapped conﬁdence interval at 95% are reported in parenthesis. Bootstrap is stratiﬁed at the level of age bins. 
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Table 2.5: Test for discontinuity of observables at cutoﬀ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Simple RD model “Donut” model 
Variable λ>50 0 s.e. T-stat (1)/(2) θ>50 0 s.e. T-stat (4)/(5) Baseline 
Female 
Full Time 
White Collar 
Market Potential Experience 
Tenure 
(Log) Daily Wage 
South 
(Log) Size 
Age Last Firm (Years) 
0.011 0.005 2.43 
0.001 0.005 0.26 
0.017 0.005 3.71 
0.177 0.095 1.85 
-0.040 0.063 -0.63 
0.000 0.006 0.03 
-0.003 0.006 -0.56 
-0.038 0.014 -2.72 
-.116 .130 -0.89 
0.000 0.005 -0.03 
0.005 0.005 1.09 
0.005 0.005 0.86 
0.093 0.107 0.87 
-0.095 0.078 -1.22 
0.005 0.007 0.69 
-0.005 0.007 -0.74 
-0.015 0.016 -0.94 
-.122 .137 -0.89 
0.31 
0.81 
0.20 
27.34 
5.85 
4.17 
0.47 
2.02 
14.269 
Note: This table reports results for the robustness tests described in Section 2.6.2. The analysis based on 249,581 spells of indi­
viduals laid oﬀ from a permanent contract between 2009 and 2012. λ>50 and θ>50 are OLS coeﬃcients from speciﬁcations 2.8 0 0 
and 2.9, respectively. Columns from (1) to (3) report RDD coeﬃcient for dicontinuity of observables at cutoﬀ for whole sample 
together with standard error and associated t-stat. Columns from (4) to (6) replicates same exercise for sample excluding 
manipulation region. In both cases, the speciﬁcation includes a dummy equal to 1 if the worker is ﬁred after turning 50 years 
of age, a squared polynomial in age in diﬀerence from the cutoﬀ and ﬂexible on the two sides. T-stats are bold if coeﬃcients 
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. Baseline reports average for the individuals ﬁred between 49 and 50 years 
of age. Standard Errors clustered at local labour market level. 
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Appendices 
2.A Unemployment beneﬁts in Italy after 2012 
The Italian welfare system underwent several reforms after 2012 aimed at rationalizing 
the improve its homogeneity. In January 2013, both the OUB and the RUB were 
replaced respectively by the ASPI and MiniASpI. On the one hand, the ASpI mimicked 
many aspects of the OUB both in terms of requirements and in terms of structure of 
the beneﬁt. In order to be eligible for the beneﬁt, the worker had to have contributed 
for the ﬁrst time to social security at least 2 years before the start of the unemployment 
spell and needed to have cumulated at least 1 year of work in the last 2 years. Similarly 
to the OUB, the worker was eligible to 8 months of beneﬁt if she was ﬁred before turning 
50 while she was eligible to 12 months if the worker was ﬁred after turning 50 years of 
age. The duration of the beneﬁt was later modiﬁed on several occasions in 2014 and 
2015, which makes it more diﬃcult to use it for our analysis. The amount of the beneﬁt 
was proportional to wages in the last 2 years and the worker received 75% of the average 
reference wage for the ﬁrst 6 months and the amount was reduced by 15 percentage 
points every 6 months (up to 45% after 1 year). On the other hand, the MiniASpI was 
aimed at workers who did not meet the requirement for the ASpI (which kept most of 
the structure and requirement of the OUB) but had cumulated at least 13 weeks of 
work in the last year. The duration of the beneﬁt was equal to half of the weeks worked 
in the last year and the amount was proportional to past wages: workers received 75% 
of the average wage in the last 2 years for the whole duration of the beneﬁt. 
Following April 2015, both measures were replaced by a unique beneﬁt which provided 
a homogeneous coverage to workers in case of layoﬀ. The new beneﬁt, the NASpI, was 
mostly based on the structure of the MiniASpI. Workers were eligible to the beneﬁt 
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if they had worked for at least 78 days in the year before the layoﬀ originating the 
unemployment spell and the duration of the beneﬁt was equal to half of the weeks worked 
in the last 4 years. The amount of the beneﬁt was proportional to past average wages 
and its schedule decreasing. More speciﬁcally, the worker was eligible to receive 75% of 
the average wage in the past 4 years and the amount was reduced by 3 percentage points 
for every month after the ﬁrst 4 months of the beneﬁt. This new beneﬁt harmonized 
the Italian Welfare state and provided uniform coverage to workers previously eligible 
to diﬀerent programs. In addition, it removed any discontinuity in the duration of the 
beneﬁt, thus removing incentives for workers to delay their layoﬀ. 
Chapter 3 
Teacher Turnover: Does It Matter For Student 
Achievement? 
Stephen Gibbons 
London School of Economics 
Vincenzo Scrutinio 
IZA, London School of Economics 
Shqiponja Thelaj 
University of Sussex, CEP, London School of Economics 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature examining whether teacher turnover aﬀects 
academic achievement. We focus on age-16, state secondary school students and use a 
unique dataset of linked students and teachers in England. We advance previous work 
by: a) looking at entry rates and student achievement in subject groups across which 
there is unlikely to be non-random selective assignment; b) by looking at a context where 
students study a curriculum for two years during which they will generally be taught 
by the same teachers. This allows us to estimate the eﬀects of getting a new teacher 
mid-way through the teaching period. Our identiﬁcation is based either on a school 
ﬁxed eﬀects design which exploits year on year variation in turnover in diﬀerent subject 
groups, within schools, or a student ﬁxed eﬀect design where identiﬁcation is based on 
cross-section variation in turnover in diﬀerent subjects experienced by the student. Both 
methods give the same results: a higher teacher entry rate has a small but signiﬁcant 
negative eﬀect on students’ ﬁnal qualiﬁcations from compulsory-age schooling, despite 
organisational responses which assign new teachers to less risky grades. This result is 
robust to wide range of identiﬁcation and robustness tests. Our ﬁndings point to the 
general disruption and lack of continuity in teaching as the main mechanism through 
which turnover harms student attainment. 
Keywords: teachers, turnover, student attainment, schools. 
J.E.L. codes: H4; I2; J24. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Recent research has established that teachers matter for student achievements, albeit 
because of dimensions of ‘teacher quality’ that are largely unexplained. On the basis of 
this evidence, recent policy in the US has, sometimes controversially, moved towards 
hiring and ﬁring teachers on the basis of measurable impacts on student test scores 
(see for example, Thomsen, 2014, and discussion in Hanushek, 2009, Adnot et al., 2017, 
Rothstein, 2015). These kinds of hiring/ﬁring policies, self-evidently, have limited 
aggregate implications if the supply of teachers is constrained (Rothstein, 2015). On 
the one hand, however, turnover could have potential beneﬁts, on aggregate, because 
it is the mechanism by which: teachers gain a variety of experience; new ideas are 
brought into schools; and productive teacher-school matches are formed. On the other 
hand, there are also potential costs for individual students, schools, and on aggregate, 
from the disruptive eﬀects of turnover. New arrivals take time to assimilate, leavers 
take school-speciﬁc experience with them, diﬀerent teachers have diﬀerent teaching 
styles causing a lack of continuity and turnover absorbs ﬁnancial and administrative 
resources. These disruptive eﬀects from teacher turnover could potentially oﬀset any of 
its advantages, at least in the short run. In the US, England, and elsewhere, there is a 
presumption amongst policy makers and practitioners that turnover has, on average, 
adverse impacts. Turnover of teachers is also perennial concern for parents, particularly 
when it occurs during the period when students are studying for important exams.1 
Despite the popular importance of this issue, there are relatively few quality studies 
that investigate it empirically, such as Ronfeldt et al. [2013], Hanushek et al. [2016], 
Atteberry et al. [2017]. Our paper adds to this existing evidence on the causal impacts 
of teacher turnover. By causal impacts, we mean the average gap in achievements 
between students experiencing a high turnover of teachers and students experiencing a 
low turnover of teachers, in a hypothetical experiment in which teachers, their entry 
probabilities, their exit probabilities, and their students are all randomly assigned. The 
analysis is based on a large administrative dataset of teacher workforce records linked, 
by school and subject categories, to students’ achievement records in England over ﬁve 
1A browse of the mumsnet.com website conﬁrms this. 
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cohorts between 2009 and 2013. For most of the analysis we focus on entry rates as an 
indicator of turnover – for reasons elaborated later on – though we also look at exit 
rates. 
Our key ﬁnding is that students experiencing high teacher turnover do less well in their 
end-of-school exams. The eﬀects are quite small, though non-negligible relative to other 
factors that have been found to aﬀect student achievement. A 10 percentage point 
increase in teacher annual entry rates2 reduces student point scores (a kind of GPA) by 
just under 0.5% of one standard deviation. Interestingly, this eﬀect is of a comparable 
order of magnitude with respect to the eﬀect of other dimensions of turnover that have 
been investigated by previous research: similar to the externalities from the turnover 
of students in schools (Gibbons and Telhaj, 2011; Hanushek et al., 2004) and slightly 
larger than the eﬀects of turnover of students in neighbourhoods (Gibbons et al., 2017). 
Evidently, teachers entering and leaving matters, but this is no more disruptive to 
education than turnover amongst a student’s peers. 
Although our analysis of administrative records is necessarily unable to precisely ar­
ticulate the behavioural channels through which turnover aﬀects achievement, we say 
something about the potential mechanisms by looking at heterogeneity across the quali­
ﬁcations, age and experience of teacher who are entering and leaving, and across types 
of student. The impact is quite general. We also show that the eﬀects are insensitive 
to a wide range of controls for teacher age, salary and experience, implying that the 
eﬀects are not due to changes in workforce composition. The results suggest, instead, 
that the adverse impacts on achievement are due to new teachers disrupting continuity 
in teaching for students and having no experience speciﬁc to the institution they join. 
We advance the existing literature in a number of ways. Firstly, in line with arguments 
in Hanushek et al. [2016], we worry about potential reassignment of new teachers to 
student groups that are lower or higher performing. Therefore, we focus on the ‘intent 
to treat’ impact of teacher entry into subject groups, across all grades in a school in a 
given year, on the ﬁnal school qualiﬁcations of students taking their exams in that year. 
These subject-school groups are akin to school departments. There is an advantage of 
2The corresponding average for entry in the period considered is 14% or about 0.76 new 
teachers per year. 
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this approach, over, say comparing the performance of students in a year when they are 
allocated a new teacher with those who are not (Atteberry et al., 2017), or comparing 
the performance of students experiencing diﬀerent rates of teacher entry in speciﬁc 
grades (Ronfeldt et al., 2013). The advantage is that it is hard to reallocate specialised 
secondary school teachers across subjects. This mitigates concerns about selective 
allocation of new teachers to lower or higher performing students or student groups 
within a school. The improvement over using whole school-by-year entry rates without 
splitting by subject (Hanushek et al., 2016), is that we can control more eﬀectively for 
school-by-year shocks using ﬁxed eﬀects’ estimation. Our research design, therefore, 
identiﬁes the eﬀects of turnover on achievement from school-subject-year speciﬁc shocks 
in the ﬁnal year of secondary school. We exploit over time variation in turnover within 
school-subject groups, controlling for school-year and subject-year shocks. We also 
present estimates based on within student variation in exposure to turnover across 
subjects in the same academic year. The similarity of results from this strategy with 
results for our preferred speciﬁcation suggests that negative eﬀects of turnover are not 
driven by unobserved student heterogeneity. 
Another disadvantage of studies that analyse the eﬀects of grade-speciﬁc variation in 
turnover is that students are themselves moving between grades and will typically 
experience a change in teachers regardless of levels of turnover. Therefore, any estimates 
of turnover based on this type of design will omit eﬀects due to disruption in the 
continuity of teaching experienced by students – which is one of the main potential 
channels. Our analysis, in contrast, looks at turnover in subject groups in the middle of 
a two-year period where students are preparing for their crucial end of school exams, 
and where disruption is often thought to be particularly important. Typically, students 
will be taught by the same teachers over this period, and even if they are not, turnover 
in a department over this period will cause disruption to the organisation of the teaching 
for students approaching their ﬁnal exams. We are, therefore, more likely to capture 
these eﬀects from lack of continuity, alongside any eﬀects related to incoming teachers 
having no teaching experience speciﬁc to that school. Note, this ﬁnding is relevant to 
other contexts in which students experience mid-year disruption due to a change of 
teacher. 
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A further reﬁnement of previous work is to demonstrate, through a range of placebo, 
balancing and robustness tests that we can treat school-subject-year turnover as random, 
conditional on the various sets of ﬁxed eﬀects. We provide a number of tests to show that 
our results appear to be causal in that teacher turnover is uncorrelated with student 
demographics, conditional on our ﬁxed eﬀects design (‘balancing’); that we do not 
observe eﬀects on groups of students who we would not expect to be aﬀected (‘placebo’); 
and that the observed impacts of turnover relate quite precisely to achievement in the 
years in which we observe the turnover (‘event study’). 
One concern over our ‘intent to treat’ estimates based on school-subject-year turnover 
is that they may understate the impacts of teacher entry, if new teachers are assigned 
to students in grades other than that for which we measure student outcomes (i.e. 
there is non-compliance with the treatment). We investigate these issue by examining 
the extent to which schools assign new teachers to grades other than the high-stakes, 
ﬁnal exam-taking grade for which we measure student outcomes. Indeed, we ﬁnd that 
new teachers, particularly if they are new to the profession, are less likely to teach 
this grade. Our main estimates are thus potentially a lower bound on the causal 
impacts of randomly assigning new teachers to students, although further analysis using 
information on the grade in which a teacher teaches suggests the downward bias is 
not large. This result is in itself important because it sheds some light on the extent 
to which school re-organisation may lead to underestimation of the impacts of many 
types of school intervention or shock. This is a pervasive concern throughout education 
policy evaluation because it implies that estimates of policy interventions on student 
outcomes might be lower than what policy makers and researchers might have hoped 
or expected unless researchers allow for this kind of organisational readjustment. We 
further show that school organisational quality is an important dimension here, with 
schools rated ‘Outstanding’ by the school inspection authorities being less likely to 
assign new teachers to the grade taking their ﬁnal qualiﬁcations, and experiencing less 
of an eﬀect from teacher turnover. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 brieﬂy summarises previous 
ﬁndings on the topic; Section 3.3 reports our empirical strategy; Section 3.4 describes 
the education institutional setting in the UK and the data set; Section 3.5 presents our 
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main regression results, with Section 3.6 investigating the robustness of the analysis and 
Section 3.7 taking a more nuanced look at the variation in the eﬀects across diﬀerent 
types of teacher, student and subject; Section 3.8 provides concluding remarks. 
3.2 Related literature 
Although recently there has been a growing body of research examining patterns 
of teacher turnover (e.g. Ost and Schiman, 2015, Atteberry et al., 2017), studies 
investigating the direct link between turnover and student attainment are still thin on 
the ground. One of the reasons is lack of data, which makes it diﬃcult for researchers 
to causally identify the direct impact of turnover on student attainment. The ﬁrst large 
scale study, directly comparable to ours, is Ronfeldt et al. [2013], which looks at teacher 
turnover on 4th and 5th grade student performance in New York elementary schools. 
Their study ﬁnds that teacher turnover reduces achievement in both Mathematics and 
English, particularly for students in schools with a high proportion of low performing 
and black students. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimation strategy is similar to ours, but exploits 
within-school variation in turnover between grades and years. Hanushek et al. [2016] 
highlight the importance of controlling for within-school grade re-assignment of teachers 
and estimate model speciﬁcations that aggregate turnover and grade reassignments at 
the school-by-year level to address problems introduced by the non-random sorting of 
teachers among grades. Using data from a Texas district for teachers and students 
in grades 4 through 8 between 1996/97 and 2000/01, they ﬁnd that teacher turnover 
has adverse eﬀects on student academic achievement only in disadvantaged schools. 
Atteberry et al. [2017] examine how diﬀerent types of switches (new to profession, 
district, school, and/or grade re-assignment) aﬀects the attainment of New York City 
students in grades 3 through to grade 8 in a ﬁxed eﬀects’ approach. They ﬁnd that 
achievement is the lowest for students of teachers new to profession, followed by teachers 
who are new to district or school. 
Adnot et al. [2017] also study the eﬀects of turnover on achievement, but are interested 
in the eﬀects of exits in context of a policy environment which encouraged exits of low 
performing teachers (the IMPACT programme). They ﬁnd, unsurprisingly, that exits of 
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underperforming teachers raise student achievement, but their study is silent on the 
impact of disruption caused by new entrants. Similar ﬁndings appear in Chetty et al. 
[2014] who document that: entry of good teachers raises achievement; entry of bad 
teachers lowers achievement; exit of good teachers lowers achievement; and exit of bad 
teachers raised achievement (where quality is based on teachers’ previous history of 
generating high test scores). 
Our research also relates to a broader literature on teacher turnover which looks into the 
factors that cause teachers to enter and leave schools and investigating the consequences 
of sorting for the composition of the teaching workforce (e.g. Ingersoll, 2001; Dolton 
and Newson, 2003; Allen et al., 2018). The typical ﬁnding is that schools serving 
disadvantaged young people have higher turnover than other schools. From amongst 
this literature, Hanushek and Rivkin [2010] argue that turnover is potentially beneﬁcial 
because bad teachers leave and good teachers tend to stay in their sample of schools in 
Texas, though the aggregate implications are not very clear if teachers are just moving to 
and from schools elsewhere. They also focus only on the eﬀects attributable to changes 
in composition, rather than any disruptive impacts. 
3.3 Empirical setting 
Our aim is to estimate the average causal impact that turnover of teachers in schools has 
on the academic achievement of their students. Conceptually, the idea is to understand 
the impact of randomly increasing the rate at which teachers enter and/or leave a school, 
holding other characteristics of the workforce, school and student body constant. 
There are several basic empirical issues. Firstly, there are various ways to deﬁne and 
measure turnover. In line with previous work on student and teacher mobility (Hanushek 
et al., 2004, Gibbons and Telhaj, 2011, Ronfeldt et al., 2013, Hanushek et al., 2016), 
we focus the entry rate in a given year to represent turnover. Our design, based on 
year-to-year shocks to turnover, necessitates short term turnover indicators, rather 
than long term measures of turnover, churn and instability discussed in Holme et al. 
[2018]. The reasons for focussing on entry are elaborated at the end of this section, 
though we also look at exit rates. Secondly, there are obvious potential endogeneity 
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problems. Entry rates (and other measures of turnover) will be, in part, determined by 
the characteristics of the school, its students and the characteristics of stock of teachers, 
since these factors will aﬀect the exit rate (and hence the number of vacancies) and how 
attractive a school is to potential applicants. Moreover, sorting implies that teachers 
entering a school, the teachers in the stock and the teachers leaving are not likely to be 
identical, so entry and exit rates can change the composition of the school workforce. All 
of these factors may have direct eﬀects on achievement and are only partially observed. 
We address these endogeneity issues using a ﬁxed eﬀects regression design, in which 
we regress student exam outcomes in the ﬁnal year of compulsory schooling (Year 11, 
age 16) on a rich set of controls for both students and teachers and on teacher entry 
rates at school-by-subject-by-year level – which measures the entry rate for teachers 
in a school teaching a particular subject, in a given year for all grades. In our main 
regression speciﬁcation, identiﬁcation comes from year-to-year changes in entry rates 
within school-subject categories, conditional on school-by-year and subject-by-year ﬁxed 
eﬀects. In other words, identiﬁcation comes from year-to-year changes in subject-speciﬁc 
turnover shocks, partialling out year-to-year shocks to turnover across all subjects within 
the school, and year-to-year shocks to turnover in each subject across all schools. Our 
preferred speciﬁcation is thus: 
Qisqt = βEntrysqt + xiδ + zsqtγ + aqt + bst + cqs + εisqt (3.1) 
Where Qisqt is an index with mean 0 and unitary standard deviation of student 
i achievement in age-16 qualiﬁcations (in school s, subject q and year t), and 
Entrysqt is the entry rate (or other turnover measure) in each school-subject-year 
group. Coeﬃcient β is the expected change in student test scores associated with 
an exogenous increase in turnover in the year in which a student takes their age-16 
exams. The vector of optional student-speciﬁc control variables, xi, includes: prior 
age-11 primary school test scores; Free School Meal (FSM) eligibility; gender; 
and ethnicity (white/others). Unobservable factors aqt, bst, cqs, are treated as 
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ﬁxed eﬀects and partialled out during estimation.3 The vector of control variables 
at school-subject-year or school-year level, zsqt, includes: the pupil-teacher ratio; 
proportion of female students; proportion FSM eligible students; proportion of 
white British students; number of teachers in current and past academic year; 
average age and experience of teachers; share of female teachers and average log 
annual salary for teachers. This rich set of control variables allows us to net 
out time-varying confounders correlated with turnover and, most importantly, 
the compositional eﬀect of turnover on average characteristics of the school 
workforce. We cluster standard errors at school level to allow for serial correlation 
in unobservables over time and heteroscedasticity at school level. 
In an extension to this design, we control for student ﬁxed eﬀects and subject-by­
year ﬁxed eﬀects, so identiﬁcation comes purely from variation in entry rates across 
subjects experienced by a student in a given school and year. The associated 
equation is: 
Qisqt = βEntrysqt + zsqtγ + aqt + bst + cqs + di + εisqt (3.2) 
In other words, we examine whether students who face higher teacher mobility in, 
say, Mathematics than in English have lower academic performance in the former 
rather than in latter. This between-subject, within-student design has featured in 
several previous papers, such as Dee [2005], Clotfelter et al. [2010], Slater et al. 
[2012], Altinok and Kingdon [2012], Lavy et al. [2012], Nicoletti and Rabe [2018]. 
The key diﬀerence between the strategies in 3.1 and 3.2 is that the latter does not 
exploit the time series variation within school-subject groups, and identiﬁcation 
is based purely on cross sectional variation across subjects within students (and 
schools) in a given year. 
3We use within-groups estimation, or the numerical procedure of Correia [2014] as implemen­
ted in the command reghdfe in Stata. 
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The identifying assumption underlying these strategies is that teacher entry into 
a school-subject-year group is determined by the choices of teachers outside the 
school with only limited information about the characteristics of the speciﬁc 
student cohort. This is especially true because teachers almost always join at 
the beginning of the school year when they would have no information about 
the future KS4 performance of the speciﬁc student-subject group they will be 
teaching. Teachers’ decisions about entry are, therefore, largely dependent on 
persistent or time-varying school level and subject level factors. School-subject-year 
speciﬁc entry rates can, therefore, be rendered plausibly exogenous by appropriate 
conditioning on ﬁxed eﬀects and observable school characteristics. We assess the 
credibility of this identifying assumption by showing that these subject-school-year 
speciﬁc shocks to turnover rates are largely uncorrelated with observable school, 
teacher and student characteristics, and by various ‘placebo’ tests. 
The above considerations suggest that entry rates are better than exit rates as 
measures of turnover. End-of-year exit rates from a school-subject-year group are 
determined by the choices of teachers inside the school, with good information 
about the cohort of students they have been teaching. General school cohort 
quality shocks are taken care of by our school-year ﬁxed eﬀects. However, it is likely 
that subject-year exit rates, either during year t or t-1 are related to unobserved 
(to us) student-teacher match quality and, hence, to student attainment in year 
t. A teacher exit in a speciﬁc subject within a school-year group could signal 
adverse teacher-student match quality that is unobserved to us but observed 
by the incumbent teacher. The exit of a poorly matched teacher will, in turn, 
induce the entry of another teacher, but there is no reason to believe that this 
incoming teacher will share the same characteristics which make the outgoing 
teacher a poor match for the current student cohort. The entry rate is therefore 
plausibly exogenous, even if the exit rate isn’t. One related situation which might 
raise concerns is if a shock to a department in year t-1 leads to exits in year t-1, 
consequent entry in year t, and poor performance in year t. In this case, entry 
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rates in year t are negatively correlated with performance in year t, through the 
exit rates in t-1. Given a shock to a department in year t-1 would likely cause 
a fall in performance in year t-1, we would therefore also expect entry rates in 
year t correlated with performance in year t-1, but we will show through an event 
study framework that this is not the case. 
It is also worth noting at the outset that there is one identiﬁcation issue which 
we cannot address when focussing on entry rates: an increase in the entry rate is 
equivalent to an increase in the share of teachers with zero years of school tenure, 
so necessarily implies a reduction in average teacher tenure and experience in the 
school. The eﬀects of entry and the reduction in average school-speciﬁc tenure 
it induces are therefore conceptually equivalent and not separately identiﬁed. 
However, we show that entry eﬀects extend across the range of general teacher 
experience, so are not primarily a result of entrants being overly represented by 
new teachers with a lack of teaching experience. In addition, we also control 
for teacher experience, and the results are insensitive to various parametric and 
non-parametric speciﬁcations of this control, suggesting that the eﬀects of entry 
are not due to changes in the general teaching experience of the school workforce. 
3.4 Institutional setting and data 
Our study focuses on the population of secondary school students and teachers in 
state-maintained secondary schools in England between 2008/09 and 2012/13.4 
Compulsory education in state schools5 in England is organised into ﬁve “Key 
Stages”. The Primary phase, from ages 4-11 spans from the Foundation Stage to 
Key Stage 2 (Years 1-6, where Years are the English terminology for Grades). At 
the end of Key Stage 2, when pupils are aged 10/11, children leave the Primary 
4We base our analysis on 2008/09-2012/13 period. We have exact information on the subjects 
taught for the period between 2011 and 2013. We extend the analysis to the years 2009 and 
2010 by imputing subject taught according to future teaching and qualiﬁcation, to improve our 
sample size and to be able to run additional identiﬁcation checks that require a longer time 
span. Results are similar if we restrict the analysis to the 2011/2013 period.
5State schools in England account for around 93 percent of the population of students. 
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phase and go on to Secondary school from ages 11-16, where they progress to Key 
Stage 3 (Years 7-9) and to Key Stage 4 (Year 10-11). At the end of each Key 
Stage, prior to age-16, pupils are assessed on the basis of standard national tests 
(though the Key Stage 3 tests stopped in 2008). Our study focuses on students 
in Year 11, which is their last year of compulsory schooling. During Key Stage 4 
(Years 10 and 11), students study for and take assessments in a range of subjects, 
leading to their ﬁnal qualiﬁcations at age 16. The most common qualiﬁcation is 
the General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education (GCSE), and we focus on these 
GCSE educational outcomes of students by subject. Assessment for GCSEs during 
our study period was generally carried out by a mixture of coursework during Year 
10 and Year 11 and ﬁnal summer exams in Year 11, with greater weight generally 
placed on the ﬁnal exams. However, the structure of assessment varied between 
subjects, with some subjects such as Art being assessed purely on coursework. 
The analysis described in Section 3.3 requires data on student performance and 
on teachers’ career histories. Our main sources are student-level data from the 
Department for Education’s National Pupil Database (NPD) and teacher records 
from the Schools Workforce Census (SWC), supplemented with the Database of 
Teacher Records (DTR). 
The NPD data contains information on students’ socioeconomic characteristics 
and attainment scores in the Key Stage tests, and Key Stage 4 qualiﬁcations. 
These data come from school returns made in January each year. Student point 
scores (a form of GPA) at Key Stage 4 – our main outcome measure – are taken 
from the NPD, along with scores for the Key Stage 2 primary school exam as 
a measure of general student quality. The national pupil database also reports 
information on other student characteristics such as age, gender, FSM eligibility 
and ethnicity. 
The School Workforce Census (SWC) has run from 2010/11, and is also based 
on returns from schools, providing information on teachers, their qualiﬁcations, 
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salaries, contract type, number of hours taught, subjects they teach, and other 
characteristics. We use SWC data up to 2012/13 and supplement it with informa­
tion from the DTR to extend the data back to 2008/9. The DTR is used in the 
administration of the national teachers’ pension system and also provides a range 
of information on teachers, such as salaries and their qualiﬁcations.6 
Schools are identiﬁed as individual entities that are consistent over time from the 
“Edubase” dataset, which holds information on basic school characteristics like 
school phase, type, location in each year. Starting from the universe of secondary 
schools in UK, we exclude Independent (private) and Special Schools (for children 
with special needs). We construct unique school identiﬁers with information 
available on the Edubase database concerning school conversions. Schools formed 
from the merger of two or more schools, or schools resulting from the division 
of a school are treated as new schools. Our data does not permit us to know 
exactly which teachers teach each student. However, we are able to link students 
to teachers by the subjects the student takes in a school at Key Stage 4 (Years 
10/11) and the subjects a teacher is teaching in that school. The SWC data 
provides information on the hours a teacher teaches in each subject, from which we 
derive the main subject taught. In the DTR, this information is unavailable, but 
we infer their main subject from subjects taught in the later years, and teachers’ 
degree qualiﬁcation.7 We form 18 subject groups: Mathematics; English; Science; 
History; Modern Foreign Languages; Sports; Biology; Chemistry; Physics; Art; 
IT; Social Science; Design; Business and Economics; Home Economics; Media and 
Humanities and Engineering. These are aggregated from the 114 original subject 
codes, in a way that makes it feasible to assign mean teacher characteristics in 
these subject groups to students, based on which teachers the students are likely 
to encounter given the subjects they are studying. These subject groups are, in 
6Our data stops in 2012/13 because after that point there were signiﬁcant reforms to the 
GCSE qualiﬁcations and their assessment format, which makes comparisons with earlier years 
potentially problematic.
7A comparison of the subject taught and teacher qualiﬁcation, when both are available, show 
a high level of concordance (more than 90%), which suggests that this imputation should induce 
minor measurement error. 
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eﬀect, approximately equivalent to school teaching departments. The number 
of teachers by department is reported in Table 3.A.1 of the Appendix. Note 
that this aggregation does not imply we are introducing measurement error in 
terms of the entry rates and other measures of mobility: we are over-aggregating 
our explanatory variable, not introducing noise. We also estimated regressions 
where we aggregate all the data to form a school-subject-year group panel, but 
the ﬁndings are broadly similar to those reported in the empirical section below 
and we do not report them. 
As discussed in Section 3.3, we use teacher entry rates as the main measure of 
turnover, but we also look at exit rates. Entry rates are constructed on school­
by-subject-by-year groups, and also broken down by teacher characteristics (e.g. 
gender and salary quintiles). We also determine whether a teacher is moving from 
one school to another, or appears as a new entrant into the system, or whether 
they are leaving the system (based on whether we observed them in previous or 
subsequent years).8 
The entry rate in a school-subject-year group is computed as the share of teachers 
present in the school-subject group during the current academic year (t) who 
were not present in that school-subject group in the previous year (t-1). The exit 
rate for the current year (t) is the share of stock teachers who are present in the 
year (t), but are no longer present in the school in next year (t+1). Data from 
the DTR/SWC for 2007/9 and 2013/14 is used to compute these variables at the 
beginning and end of our 2008/9 to 2012/13 study period. Entry is necessarily 
missing for the ﬁrst year after the school opening.9 A limitation of this approach 
to deﬁning entry is that it does not distinguish the year group (i.e. grade) in 
which teachers are teaching. In practice, most teachers teach in their subject 
across all grades in England’s secondary schools. For example, according to our 
8To simplify our methodology and decrease the eﬀect of possible misreporting, we do not 
consider exit from the profession if the teacher is not observed in the data for a few years but 
eventually is reported again. This concerns 5.6% of the total number of teachers.
9We ignore the small proportion (4.5%) of teachers recorded as moving within school across 
departments. 
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data, around 90% of teachers teach in both Key Stage 4 (Years 10 and 11) and 
Key Stage 3 (Years 7-9). In part of our analysis, we use a reﬁned measure of 
teacher entry based on the share of total hours taught by incoming teachers in 
Year 11 -the year of students’ ﬁnal qualiﬁcation exams, and Year 10 - the ﬁrst 
year of the Key Stage 4 curriculum phase. In this way, we can say more about 
the importance of timing of teacher entry relative to the timing of assessments. 
However, missing data on subject teaching hours reduces the estimation sample 
size, and, as noted in Section 3.3 and in Hanushek et al. [2016], it could lead to 
biases if new teachers are selectively assigned to high or low performing grades. 
Ultimately, we end up with data on teachers, their characteristics and the turnover 
variables aggregated to school by subject group by year cells. These school-
subject-year variables are then merged with student-level data from the NPD. 
After cleaning and matching, the ﬁnal sample spans 5 years, has 18 subject groups, 
approximately 2,750 schools, 2,305,500 distinct students, 202,500 school-subject­
year groups and a dataset with a total of around 12,700,000 student-subject 
observations. 
Descriptive statistics related to this sample are presented in Table 3.A.2 of the 
Appendix. Annual turnover of teachers is around 12% with entry rates (14%) 
slightly higher than exit rates (10%). Around 32% of the entry is due to teachers 
new to the profession (or entering from outside the English state school system), 
and the rest due to mobility of teachers across schools. 
3.5 Main regression results 
To begin the empirical analysis of the eﬀect of teacher turnover on students’ KS4 
(Year 11) attainment, Table 3.1 reports the coeﬃcients and standard errors from 
baseline regression estimates of equations 3.1 and 3.2, with overall entry rates10 
as turnover measure. As we move left to right across the table, the speciﬁcations 
10Overall entry rate is computed as the share of new teachers over the total number of teachers 
in the department-school cell. 
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control for ﬁxed eﬀects at ﬁner levels of granularity, with Columns (1) and (2) 
controlling only for year dummies, and Columns (7) and (8) controlling for subject-
group by year ﬁxed eﬀects and student ﬁxed eﬀects. In order to test and control for 
other possible confounding factors, each ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation is reported with 
and without additional time-varying control variables. Odd-numbered columns 
have no additional control variables; even-numbered columns include a rich set of 
control variables for student and teacher characteristics plus average characteristics 
for students in school-subject-year group cells (see notes of Table 3.1 notes for 
details). Standard errors are clustered at school level. Entry rates are deﬁned 
at subject-school-year cells, and, therefore, they represent a Year 11 students’ 
potential exposure to teacher mobility in a school department as a whole in a given 
academic year, rather than actual exposure to mobility of teachers speciﬁcally 
assigned to teaching in their year group. The coeﬃcients are then best interpreted 
as an ‘intention to treat’ eﬀect, which avoids selection issues that could arise 
through strategic assignment of new teachers into diﬀerent year groups. We 
consider alternative deﬁnitions of treatment that more closely capture students’ 
actual exposure to teacher entry in Section 3.6.2. 
In all speciﬁcations in Table 3.1, higher entry rates are associated with lower KS4 
scores. With no control variables or ﬁxed eﬀects in Column (1), the coeﬃcient of 
0.10 implies that a 10 percentage-point increase in entry (about 60% of a standard 
deviation) is associated with a 1% standard deviation reduction in KS4 scores. 
When we add in controls for observable student, teacher and school attributes in 
Column (2), the coeﬃcient becomes larger in absolute value. It is the inclusion of 
variables describing the existing teacher stock that leads to this change. However, 
when we more fully control for unobserved confounders with ﬁxed eﬀects at 
school-by-year and subject-by-year level in Column (3), the coeﬃcient is reduced 
again to -0.050 and is now less sensitive to the inclusion of control variables in 
Column (4) (given the standard errors). The magnitude remains relatively stable 
with the inclusion of additional ﬁxed eﬀects. In Columns (5) and (6) we control, 
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in addition, for school-by-subject ﬁxed eﬀects, implying that identiﬁcation is 
based purely on variation in entry rates over time within these school-by-subject 
groups, conditional on time-varying factors aﬀecting entry rates at school level 
and at subject level. In Columns (7) and (8) we introduce student ﬁxed eﬀects. 
Here identiﬁcation comes from variation across subjects taken by each student. 
Note that school-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects are not identiﬁed within pupil, and so are 
omitted. The estimates from this speciﬁcation are broadly similar to those in 
Columns (3)-(6) and are again fairly insensitive to the inclusion of time varying 
control variables. The stability of the estimates to observable characteristics in the 
speciﬁcations that control for school-subject speciﬁc unobservables, time-varying 
school and subject speciﬁc shocks, or student speciﬁc unobservables, suggests that 
entry rate variation in these speciﬁcations is eﬀectively random with respect to 
these dimensions. ‘Balancing’ regressions in which we regress the entry rate on 
mean student characteristics in school-subject-year cells also demonstrate that 
the entry rates are uncorrelated with them (see Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix). 
In the remainder of the empirical analysis, we focus on the more conservative 
estimates based on year-to-year shocks in mobility in the speciﬁcation of Column 
(6). Compositional changes in teacher workforce are a crucial component of 
the eﬀect of turnover and past research has shown that they can account for a 
large part of these estimated eﬀects. Hanushek et al. [2016] show that turnover 
has a negligible eﬀect after controlling ﬂexibly for changes in the experience of 
teachers and this leads us to consider this aspect more explicitly. In our baseline 
speciﬁcation we control linearly for years in teaching profession but non linearities 
might make this approach insuﬃcient to capture the full eﬀect of experience. To 
overcome this issue, we assess the reliability of our model by trying several other 
possible speciﬁcations for this crucial control: polynomials (up to third order); 
share of teachers by experience classes; inclusion of tenure which might capture 
more fully the loss of school speciﬁc human capital. Results of this exercise, 
reported in Table 3.A.4 of the Appendix, show that the estimates are very robust 
161 CHAPTER 3. TEACHER TURNOVER 
to all these diﬀerent choices and experience does not seem to play a very important 
role once our rich set of ﬁxed eﬀects is included. 
Taken together, the estimates in Table 3.1, Columns (5)-(8), suggest that an 
increase in the entry rate of 10 percentage points reduces attainment by around 
0.3-0.5 percent of one standard deviation, with our preferred estimate in Column 
(6) at just under 0.5 percent of one standard deviation. This implies that a 
one standard deviation increase in entry rates (16.7 percentage points) in the 
year of preparation for end of school qualiﬁcations reduces attainment by around 
0.8 percent of one standard deviation. This is not a huge eﬀect, but it is non-
negligible compared to many school interventions and the magnitude is similar 
to the eﬀects of other turnover-related externalities in schools. The magnitude is 
close to that from the turnover of students in schools (Gibbons and Telhaj, 2011; 
Hanushek et al., 2004) and slightly larger than the eﬀects of turnover of students 
in neighbourhoods (Gibbons et al., 2017). These eﬀects are also comparable in 
magnitude to estimates for the US such as Hanushek et al. [2016], although in 
their case the eﬀect of turnover is fully absorbed by compositional changes in the 
experience of teachers. 
3.6 Robustness checks 
To assess the robustness of our results, we run a series of checks: ‘placebo’ 
treatments; controlling for additional confounding factors; checking the robustness 
of our deﬁnition of exposure to teacher entry; showing the timing of eﬀects in an 
event study. 
3.6.1 Confounding trends and shocks 
The estimates of our eﬀect of interest in Table 3.1 appeared robust to the inclusion 
of a wide range of controls and ﬁxed eﬀects. However, it is still possible that 
some unobserved pre-existing trends or time varying contemporaneous (to entry) 
shocks are driving our results. Table 3.2 presents the results of a number of checks 
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related to these threats. 
Column (1) reports the coeﬃcient for our preferred baseline speciﬁcation with 
school-by-subject, school-by-year, and subject-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects from Table 3.1, 
Column (6). Column (2) includes two years’ lead of the measure of entry (t+2): if 
entry reﬂects a general trend of the school/department, then a higher turnover in 
the future might be associated with lower grades in the current year. As Column 
(2) shows, the inclusion of this measure of future entry, however, does not have 
any eﬀect on students’ attainment in the current year and our main coeﬃcient of 
interest is largely unaﬀected by the inclusion of this measure of future turnover. 
This suggests that our estimates do not reﬂect general trends in the school-subject 
performance. A similar reasoning is applied in Column (3), where we include a 
measure of turnover in other subject groups within the school in the same year. 
We exclude other subjects taken by the student in order to avoid any possible 
spillover across subjects. Again, in this case, the eﬀect of entry is robust and the 
entry in other subject groups does not have an independent eﬀect on students’ 
scores. Column (4) includes exit rates alongside entry rates. As discussed in 
Section 3.3, exit rates are more likely to be endogenous than entry rates, due to 
teacher-student match quality. However, there is no indication of any association 
here and the eﬀect of entry rates on student performance is almost unchanged. 
Column (5) includes lagged school-by-subject KS4 achievement, as a proxy for 
unobservables that are correlated with past performance. Doing so again makes 
little diﬀerence to the magnitude or statistical signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of teacher 
entry. Column (6) further checks the robustness of the estimates by controlling 
for school-subject group speciﬁc linear trends to partial out trends in mobility 
and performance in these groups. This very demanding speciﬁcation makes little 
diﬀerence to the estimates of the eﬀects of entry rates. 
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3.6.2 Student exposure to teacher entry 
As noted in Section 3.5, our main measure of teacher entry captures entry into 
school departments as a whole, rather than into the year groups (10 and 11) 
speciﬁcally relevant for KS4 study. This avoids endogeneity issues posed by 
strategic selection of teachers into ‘low-risk’ year groups, but masks potentially 
informative patterns related to timing of entry. To address this issue, Column (7) 
of Table 3.2 uses, instead, a more reﬁned measure of turnover in which we deﬁne 
entry rates by the share of hours taught by incoming teachers in diﬀerent year 
groups (Year 10 or Year 11).11 
We report three diﬀerent entry eﬀects based on this hours-based entry rate 
deﬁnition: the eﬀects of entry to Year 11 teaching on the current Year 11 cohort’s 
GCSE results; the eﬀects of entry to current Year 10 teaching on the current 
Year 11 cohort’s GCSE results; and the eﬀects of entry to Year 10 teaching in the 
previous academic year when the current Year 11 cohort was in Year 10. What 
matters in these speciﬁcations is entry rates in Year 11, when students are in their 
ﬁnal examination year. The eﬀect is slightly larger (-0.064, s.e. 0.024) in magnitude 
than our baseline estimates, although statistically comparable. The sample size is 
much smaller as data on subject teaching hours is only available for the 2011-2013 
period. Note however, that our baseline speciﬁcation estimated on this smaller 
sample gives a similar coeﬃcient to that from our main sample, around -0.05. The 
implication of this result is that there is little loss from using department-wide 
entry rates, and if anything, our main results are overly conservative. 
The zero-insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on Year 10 entry rates reinforces the ‘placebo’ 
tests of Columns (2) and (3): new teachers entering in a given academic year have 
no eﬀect on GCSE results if they are not actually teaching the students taking 
these exams. The coeﬃcient on entry into Year 10 when students taking GCSEs 
11This reﬁned measure also takes account of the hours teachers who teach multiple subjects 
spend teaching each subject so also acts as a test of robustness to misallocation of teachers to 
subjects. 
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were actually in Year 10 is negative, but also small and insigniﬁcant. This has two 
possible interpretations: either turnover in Year 10 doesn’t impact on students, 
because it comes at the beginning of teaching on their GCSE course programmes, 
so it involves no disruption to continuity in teaching; or it has an impact on 
student performance, but there is little or no persistence in the eﬀects of teacher 
turnover across years. With no recorded information on Year 10 achievement we 
are unable to distinguish between these hypotheses. 
3.6.3 Event study estimates 
Expanding and reﬁning the placebo tests of Column (2) in Table 3.2, we develop an 
‘event study’ style of analysis. In particular, we want to assess whether entry rate in 
years before of after the year under scrutiny, have an eﬀect on student achievement. 
While future turnover acts as placebo check, lags of turnover can provide evidence 
of the persistence of the eﬀect of turnover over time. We implement this analysis 
by estimating the following equation: 
Qisqt = β1Entrysqt + β2Entrys,q,t−j + xiδ + zsqtγ + aqt + bst + cqs + εisqt (3.3) 
Where β2 represents the eﬀect of past or future turnover on the grade in year 
t with j that goes from -2 to +2. Positive values for j correspond to entry in 
previous years while negative values correspond to values for future entry. To 
minimize the loss of observations, we estimate the equation for each lead and 
lag separately. Figure 3.1 reports the estimates β1 (circles) and β2 (triangles) 
together with their 95% conﬁdence interval. The horizontal axis indicates the 
lag order. As a consequence, the estimates corresponding to the lead 2 (j=-2) 
replicate estimates reported in Column (2) of Table 3.2. In line with the results 
tabulated above, the eﬀect of turnover in the current year is always negative with 
a magnitude close to -0.05. Evidently, the eﬀects of the lags and leads are never 
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large or signiﬁcant. 
The small size and statistical insigniﬁcance of the leads’ coeﬃcients show, as we 
would expect, that teachers entering after a students’ KS4 exams have no impact 
on their exam performance, thus providing a useful placebo test. As discussed in 
Section 3.3, this ﬁnding rules out the possibility that entry rates are explained by 
a shock to a school department performance in year t-1 causing exits in year t-1, 
entry in year t and low performance in year t. This would imply that entry in year 
t would also be correlated with performance in year t-1, whereas the estimated 
coeﬃcient is only 0.01 and statistically insigniﬁcant. 
Looking at coeﬃcients of lags, the past entry rates – corresponding to entry rates 
in the school-subject group when the student was in grades Year 10, Year 9, and 
so on - also have no eﬀect on KS4 performance. This shows that the eﬀect of 
entry has a minimal persistence: already in the year following entry, there is no 
residual eﬀect of the disruption caused by the arrival of new teachers. 
These results justify our focus on entry rates in the year of the KS4 qualiﬁcations 
and suggest there is no need to consider cumulative entry over the whole of a 
student’s preceding years of secondary education. 
Results in Figure 3.1 also suggest that changes in teachers’ quality are not driving 
our results. If a new teacher was, say, of lower quality, we would expect a persistent 
negative eﬀect of turnover. However, this is not the case as the ﬁgure shows. 
3.7 Heterogeneity and mechanism 
So far, the analysis focused on the identiﬁcation of the average eﬀect of turnover 
on test scores and we have demonstrated that, conditional on our ﬁxed eﬀects, 
entry rates are exogenous, in the sense that they are uncorrelated with incumbent 
teacher, school and student characteristics, and school-subject speciﬁc shocks. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible that the eﬀects of entry we have estimated arise 
because incoming teachers are diﬀerent from the incumbent teachers, causing 
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changes in the average quality of the workforce at the school-subject level. It 
is also possible that the magnitude of the disruptive eﬀects of new teachers is 
heterogeneous along a number of dimensions. Firstly, the amount of disruption 
may depend directly on incoming teachers’ skills and experience, irrespective 
of whether they diﬀer from the incumbent workforce, or the skills of incomers 
may interact with those in the incumbent workforce. Allen [2017], for example, 
highlights the potential costs imposed on students in schools that take on large 
numbers of newly qualiﬁed teachers. Secondly, the magnitudes may depend on 
school organisation and how incoming teachers are allocated to diﬀerent year 
groups. As noted in the Introduction, our ‘intent to treat’ estimates, based on 
teacher entry rates into the school-subject as a whole, might underestimate the 
causal eﬀects of a new teacher on a student if new teachers are allocated to 
grades other than the one for which we measure KS4 outcomes. In this section 
we investigate these heterogeneous eﬀects of turnover, and the role of teacher 
allocation and school organisation in mitigating the eﬀects of turnover. 
3.7.1 The role of entrant teacher characteristics 
In order to explore the eﬀect of entry of teachers with diﬀerent characteristics, 
we repeat our preferred ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation from Table 3.1, Column (6), 
but split the entry rate into diﬀerent components according to incoming teacher 
characteristics. Table 3.3 presents the results of this regression. The coeﬃcients for 
the diﬀerent groups of teachers are all of a similar order of magnitude, indicating 
that all groups cause disruption. However, the patterns point towards senior 
teachers causing more disruption: the coeﬃcients increase with age, salary and 
experience (up to the 3rd category), and the negative eﬀect from being taught 
by incoming teachers from outside the profession is lower than the eﬀect from 
those moving between schools. Gender diﬀerences also play a role, with entry 
of male teachers having a much more detrimental eﬀect than female teachers. 
We also examined whether teachers coming from better/worse schools, based on 
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school-subject speciﬁc scores in the KS4 exam in the previous year, had less/more 
disruptive impacts,12 but found no diﬀerence. Additional regressions in which we 
interact entry rates with the characteristics of incumbent teachers also revealed 
no strongly signiﬁcant interactions or systematic patterns, so we do not report 
them here.13 
The ﬁnding that less experienced entrants cause less disruption than older and more 
experienced ones, requires some investigation, as it runs counter to expectations 
and some previous literature. There are potential behavioural explanations, such 
as younger teachers being more adaptable, but the results of Table 3.4 point to 
another explanation. This table reports an analysis based on teacher-level data 
from the School Workforce Census between 2011-2013, in which we regress an 
indicator that the teacher teaches Year 11 students on teacher characteristics, 
a new entrant indicator, and an interaction of the entrant indicator with some 
speciﬁc teacher characteristics. The Table, thus, shows the probability that a 
new entrant of a speciﬁc type teaches Year 11, compared to a baseline incumbent 
teacher.14 The Table is organised in a similar fashion to Table 3.3. 
The ﬁrst thing to note from Column 1 is that new entrants are less likely to teach 
Year 11, than incumbent teachers. This ﬁnding explains why, in Table 3.2, the 
coeﬃcient on Year 11 entry rates was slightly larger than our baseline estimates 
that use entry in all grades: new teachers are allocated to ‘lower risk’ grades or 
do not teach, so our ‘intent to treat’ estimate underestimates the eﬀect of the 
treatment on the treated students to whom a teacher is assigned. Note however 
that a high proportion of new entrants do teach in Year 11: the probability of 
12A teacher deﬁned as coming from a better school if the average grades in the origin school-
subject cell in (t-1) were higher than grades attained in the destination school-subject in 
(t).
13We also looked at the eﬀects of exit rates in these groups. KS4 attainment generally has no 
association with exit rates, unconditional on entry, though we ﬁnd positive associations with 
exit of the lowest paid teachers (bottom quartile) and those with the most experience (10 years 
+). If we control for both entry and exit, the eﬀects of entry become around 50% bigger and the 
diﬀerences across incoming teacher types less marked. The coeﬃcients on exit, conditional on 
entry are generally positive, but show no systematic patterns across incoming teacher types. As 
noted in the text, we do not trust these exit rates results because of their inherent endogeneity.
14For this analysis, we use as a baseline a teacher in his/her second year at the school. 
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teaching Year 11 amongst all teachers is 72%, and incoming teachers are around 
6.7 percentage points15 less likely to teach Year 11 than incumbent teachers.16 
When we look at diﬀerences in assignment to Year 11 across diﬀerent types of 
incoming teacher, we see patterns that can also, at least partly, explain the 
diﬀerences seen in Table 3.3. While all entrant groups are less likely to teach Year 
11 than incumbents, the least experienced and lower salaried entrants are much 
less likely to teach Year 11 than more experienced and higher salaried entrants. 
Male entrants are more likely than incumbents and female entrants to teach 
Year 11, which may explain why their entry appeared more disruptive to KS4 
performance. Similarly, entrants coming from origins other than other schools 
(which will mean teachers new to the profession, predominantly), are much less 
likely to teach Year 11 and less likely to aﬀect KS4 scores. 
Overall, the results of Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 suggest that schools can and do take 
steps to mitigate the eﬀects of new teachers on the high-stakes KS4 qualiﬁcations 
by not assigning them to the high-risk grade in which students take these exams. 
3.7.2 School quality 
The observation that new teachers tend to be re-assigned out of the high-risk 
grade, Year 11, raises questions about the role of school organisational quality in 
mitigating the adverse eﬀects of entrants on students. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 
examine this issue, in a similar way to Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, ﬁrstly looking at 
heterogeneity in the eﬀect of entry by indicators of school quality, and secondly 
investigating how entrant teachers are assigned across grades. Indicators of 
school quality are based on external inspections by the schools’ regulator in 
England, Ofsted. Ratings are based on a combination of self-evaluation reports 
by the school and site visits by inspectors, involving meetings with staﬀ, students, 
15It should be noted that even when new teachers teach, they tend to teach less hours (about 
0.5 less on a baseline of 3.8). Results are available upon request.
16New entrants are also less likely to teach altogether by 2.2% out of a baseline probability of 
86%. 
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governors and parents. The inspection results in rating of a school’s overall 
performance and organisation as either Outstanding, Good, Requires Improvement, 
or Inadequate. A school receives the Outstanding rating if it is judged Outstanding 
on all dimensions that are inspected, including eﬀectiveness of leadership and 
management. 
Looking across Table 3.5, it is evident that students in schools judged as Out­
standing are markedly less aﬀected by entrant teachers – the point estimate is half 
than that for other schools, and statistically insigniﬁcant. The point estimate for 
Good schools is also smaller than those for schools that Require Improvement or 
are Inadequate, although the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. While a 
number of factors could explain this pattern, Table 3.6 suggests that assignment of 
entrant teachers to grades other than Year 11 is a contributory factor. Outstanding 
and Good schools are, somewhat, more likely than schools rated Inadequate or 
Requires Improvement to assign new teachers to other grades. Other factors are 
evidently at work though, since Good schools are as more likely to assign new 
teachers outside Year 11 as are Outstanding schools, and yet their students are 
much more aﬀected by teacher entry. 
3.7.3 Students 
Table 3.7 investigates the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of turnover for diﬀerent 
groups of students. The regression results are based on our usual preferred ﬁxed 
eﬀects speciﬁcation, separately estimated for diﬀerent groups, with Column (1) 
repeating the results from Table 3.1, for comparison. As results show, in most of 
the cases, standard errors are too large to draw deﬁnitive conclusions. However, 
we can see qualitative pattern: students most aﬀected by teacher turnover appear 
to be the ones from more disadvantaged backgrounds17 (Columns 2 and 3), male 
students (Columns 4 and 5), students from ethnic minorities (Columns 6 and 7), 
and those in the lower quartile of the primary school (KS2) grade distribution18 
17Proxied by free school meal eligibility.
 
18Primary school exam.
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(Columns 8 and 9). The diﬀerence in the eﬀect between boys and girls is in line 
with a recurrent theme in the educational literature, where boys generally seem to 
come oﬀ worse (see Gibbons et al., 2017, for example). Disruption from teacher 
turnover appears to be one contributory factor (albeit a small one) to the gender 
gap between boys and girls in England’s schools. The largest diﬀerence is between 
students in the top quartile (Column 7) and in the bottom quartile (Column 8) of 
the KS2 grade distribution. More vulnerable students seem to be more aﬀected 
by disruption induced by teacher turnover as they might be less able to make up 
for program disruption with additional family resources and independent eﬀort. 
These ﬁndings suggest that teacher turnover might, at least in part, contribute 
to the diﬀerence in achievement between disadvantaged and not disadvantaged 
students. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Our study investigates the impact of teacher entry rates at school-subject-year 
level on student achievement in England using ﬁxed eﬀects regression designs 
which control carefully for unobserved school-by-year, subject-by-year shocks and 
school-by-subject or individual unobservables. The key ﬁnding is that students 
in the ﬁnal year of compulsory secondary school score less well in their ﬁnal 
assessments if they are exposed to higher rates of teacher entry in the subjects 
they are studying. Entry in the ﬁnal year in which students take their ﬁnal 
GCSE assessments seems crucially important, implying that disruption to ﬁnal 
qualiﬁcations from new teachers could be minimised by assigning them to year 
groups with less high-stakes assessment. The magnitudes are, however, quite 
small, with a 10 percentage point increase in entry rates reducing scores in ﬁnal 
qualiﬁcations by just under 0.5 percent of a standard deviation. This ﬁgure is 
almost exactly the same as that found for entry of teachers in schools in the US 
(e.g. Ronfeldt et al., 2013, Hanushek et al., 2016). This suggests that the eﬀects 
are potentially quite general and not dependent on context. In addition, the 
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magnitude of the impact is economically meaningful compared to many other 
educational interventions. For instance, the literature on teacher quality suggests 
that a one standard deviation increase in overall teacher quality – where ‘quality’ 
means everything about teachers that is correlated with persistently higher value-
added scores – only raises individual student achievement by around 0.11 standard 
deviations (see for example Hanushek, 2009). Our standardised eﬀect is about 
0.8 percent of one standard deviation from a one standard deviation increase in 
entry rates, so clearly considerably smaller than this, though not negligible, and 
comparable or larger to the estimates of other forms of educational externality in 
student groups. 
In contrast to Hanushek et al. [2016], we ﬁnd that the adverse eﬀects of entry do 
not appear to be related to changes in workforce composition and entry of less 
experienced teachers. The eﬀects are quite general across entrant teachers with 
diﬀerent levels of seniority, in age, experience and salary, and insensitive to controls 
for workforce composition. The observation that less experienced entrant teachers 
have no bigger impact than more experienced teachers is partly, but not completely, 
explained by the fact that schools tend to allocate new teachers outside the high 
risk grade Year 11 when students take their ﬁnal exams, and are more likely 
to do so for younger less senior teachers with less experience and lower salaries. 
Evidently, schools are able to partly mitigate the impact of turnover by the way 
they organise teaching, implying that our estimates potentially underestimate (in 
absolute value) the causal impact in a situation where new teachers were randomly 
assigned to students. Even so, turnover of teachers matters regardless of teacher 
seniority and these organisational responses. This implies that the results are 
likely driven by unavoidable general disruption and lack of continuity in teaching 
due to new teacher entry. 
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Figures 
Figure 3.1: Eﬀect of teacher turnover on student outcome with leads and lags 
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Note: Figure plots coeﬃcient of the eﬀect of teacher entry rate on students’ standardized KS4 
grade with our preferred speciﬁcation. The graph reports coeﬃcients for Equation 3.3 for 
values of j between -2 and 2. Each couple of dots and triangles represent an estimation of 
the equation. Circles report the eﬀect of entry in year t while triangles represent the eﬀect 
of leads (negative lag order) and lags (positive lag order) of entry. Entry rate is deﬁned as 
the share of teachers in year t who were not present in the school in year t-1. All equations 
include controls for teacher, student and school characteristics. Teacher characteristics include: 
average age of teacher in the department; average experience; share of female and average log 
salary. Student characteristics include: normalized prior test scores; Free School Meal (FSM) 
eligibility; gender; ethnicity (white/others). School characteristics include: pupil teacher ratio 
at department-school-year level; proportion of female students in the department; proportion 
of FSM eligible in the department; proportion of white students in the department; number of 
teacher in current and past academic year in the department. Sample includes years from 2009 
to 2013. Standard Errors clustered at school level. Equation estimated separately for each lead 
and lag to minimize sample loss of sample size. Conﬁdence interval at 95% reported. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Baseline results for eﬀect of teacher entry rates on KS4 point scores 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Entry rate -0.100*** -0.243*** -0.050*** -0.075*** -0.031*** -0.049*** -0.029*** -0.041*** 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Observations 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 
Year FE Y Y N N N N N N 
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
SchoolXYear FE N N Y Y Y Y N N 
SubjectXYear FE N N Y Y Y Y N N 
SchoolXSubject FE N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Student FE N N N N N N Y Y 
Note: OLS Regression at student level. The dependent variable is the average standardized test score in the KS4 exam by student, 
subject and year. Entry rate is deﬁned as the share of teachers in year t who were not present in the school in year t-1. Controls 
include teacher, student and school characteristics. Teacher characteristics include: average age of teacher in the department; average 
experience; share of female and average log salary. Student characteristics include: normalized prior test scores; Free School Meal 
(FSM) eligibility; gender; ethnicity (white/others). School characteristics include: pupil teacher ratio at department-school-year level; 
proportion of female students in the department; proportion of FSM eligible in the department; proportion of white students in 
the department; number of teacher in current and past academic year in the department. Sample includes years from 2009 to 2013. 
Standard Errors clustered at school level. Level of signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ***. 
Table 3.2: Robustness and placebo tests 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline Leads Other Subjects Exit Lag Grade Subject Trends Year Group Entry 
Entry rate -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.043*** -0.047*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Lead 2 Entry Rate -0.000 
(0.010) 
Entry other Subjects -0.006 
(0.010) 
Exit Rate -0.013 
(0.009) 
Lag Avg KS4 Grade 0.216*** 
(0.008) 
Entry Rate YG11 -0.064*** 
(0.025) 
Entry Rate YG10 0.001 
(0.022) 
Lag Entry Rate YG10 -0.008 
(0.016) 
Observations 12,654,691 9,846,958 12,653,579 12,654,691 12,241,679 12,654,691 4,041,094 
R-squared 0.465 0.488 0.465 0.464 0.467 0.465 0.467 
Year FE N N N N N N N 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXYear FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXYear FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXSubject FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXTrends N N N N N Y N 
Note: OLS Regression at student level. The dependent variable is the average standardized test score in the KS4 exam by student, 
subject and year. Entry rate is deﬁned as the share of teachers in year t who were not present in the school in year t-1. Controls 
include teacher, student and school characteristics. Teacher characteristics include: average age of teacher in the department; average 
experience; share of female and average log salary. Student characteristics include: normalized prior test scores; Free School Meal 
(FSM) eligibility; gender; ethnicity (white/others). School characteristics include: pupil teacher ratio at department-school-year 
level; proportion of female students in the department; proportion of FSM eligible in the department; proportion of white students 
in the department; number of teacher in current and past academic year in the department. Column (3) adds entry in subjects not 
seated by the student. Column (4) adds the exit rate deﬁned as the share of teachers in year t who will not be present in the school 
in the following year. Column (5) includes the lagged KS4 average score in the previous year in the schoolXsubject. Column (6) 
adds schoolXsubject linear trends. Column (7) measures turnover in as the share of hours by year group in KS4 taught by teachers 
not present in the school in year t-1. Sample in Column (7) is limited to years from 2011 to 2013 due to data limitations. Standard 
Errors clustered at school level. Level of signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ***. 
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Table 3.3: Heterogenity: eﬀect of entry by composition of entrants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 
Age Salary Experience Gender Origin
 
20-29 -0.040** Quartile 1 -0.038*** < 2 years -0.040*** Female -0.039*** Other schools -0.056*** 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
30-39 -0.044*** Quartile 2 -0.060*** 2-5 years -0.041** Male -0.067*** Elsewhere -0.036** 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) 
40-49 -0.061*** Quartile 3 -0.063*** 5-10 years -0.057*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
50+ -0.077*** Quartile 4 -0.057** > 10 years -0.063*** 
(0.025) (0.027) (0.016) 
Observations 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 
Year FE N N N N N 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXYear FE Y Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXYear FE Y Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXSubj FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Note: OLS Regression at student level. The dependent variable is the average standardized test score in the KS4 exam by student, 
subject and year. Entry rate is deﬁned as the share of teachers in year t who were not present in the school in year t-1. Controls include 
teacher, student and school characteristics. Teacher characteristics include: average age of teacher in the department; average experience; 
share of female and average log salary. Student characteristics include: normalized prior test scores; Free School Meal (FSM) eligibility; 
gender; ethnicity (white/others). School characteristics include: pupil teacher ratio at department-school-year level; proportion of female 
students in the department; proportion of FSM eligible in the department; proportion of white students in the department; number of 
teacher in current and past academic year in the department. Entry by category computed as the number of entrants in that category 
divided by the number of teachers in the department in t-1. Standard Errors clustered at school level. Level of signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ***. 
Table 3.4: Heterogenity: probability of teaching year 11 by incoming teacher 
characteristics compared to incumbent teachers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Entrant Age Salary Experience Gender Origin
 
Entrant -0.066*** 20-29 -0.080*** Quartile 1 -0.153*** < 2 years -0.189*** Female -0.060*** Other schools -0.063*** 
(0.006)	 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
30-39 -0.043*** Quartile 2 -0.043*** 2-5 years -0.072*** Male 0.079*** Elsewhere -0.187*** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
40-49 -0.062*** Quartile 3 -0.031*** 5-10 years -0.026*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
50+ -0.106*** Quartile 4 -0.062*** > 10 years -0.069*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Observations 412585 412585 412585 412585 412585 412585 
Mean Dependent 0.717 0.717 0.717 0.717 0.717 0.717 
Year FE N N N N N 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXYear FE Y Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXYear FE Y Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXSubj FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Note: Linear probability model at teacher level. The dependent variable equal to one if the teacher teaches positive hours in the school in the academic 
year in year group 11 (grade of the ﬁnal exam in secondary school). Controls at teacher and school level. Controls at teacher level include: age, sex, 
experience, tenure and salary of the teacher. Controls at school or department level include: last OFSTED report grade, ranking in quartile for 5+ 
A*-C in GCSE in the Performance Tables, dummies for core subjects, average normalized grade in KS2 for students in the department and pupil 
teacher ratio at department level. Core subjects are: English; Math; Science; History. Sample includes years between 2011 and 2013. Standard Errors 
clustered at school level. Level of signiﬁcance: 0.1 *; 0.05 **; 0.01 ***. 
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Table 3.5: Heterogenity: eﬀect of entry by school quality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outstanding Good Requires Improvement Inadequate 
Entry Overall -0.0294 -0.0543*** -0.0610*** -0.0630 
(0.0185) (0.0165) (0.0211) (0.0402) 
Observations 2942967 5390165 3114523 986797 
Year FE N N N N 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXYear FE Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXYear FE Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXSubject FE Y Y Y Y 
Note: OLS Regression at student level. The dependent variable is the average standard­
ized test score in the KS4 exam by student, subject and year. Entry rate is deﬁned as the 
share of teachers in year t who were not present in the school in year t-1. Controls include 
teacher, student and school characteristics. Teacher characteristics include: average age 
of teacher in the department; average experience; share of female and average log salary. 
Student characteristics include: normalized prior test scores; Free School Meal (FSM) 
eligibility; gender; ethnicity (white/others). School characteristics include: pupil teacher 
ratio at department-school-year level; proportion of female students in the department; 
proportion of FSM eligible in the department; proportion of white students in the depart­
ment; number of teacher in current and past academic year in the department. Entry by 
category computed as the number of entrants in that category divided by the number 
of teachers in the department in t-1. Standard Errors clustered at school level. Level of 
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ***. 
Table 3.6: Heterogeneity by school quality for probability of teaching: OFSTED 
report 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outstanding Good Requires Improvement Inadequate 
Entrant -0.066*** -0.080*** -0.045*** -0.045** 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019) 
Observations 106385 176558 95225 34417 
Mean 0.724 0.723 0.715 0.722 
Year FE N N N N 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXYear FE Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXYear FE Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXSubject FE Y Y Y Y 
Note: Linear probability model at teacher level. The dependent variable equal to one if the 
teacher teaches positive hours in the school in the academic year in year group 11 (grade of 
the ﬁnal exam in secondary school). Controls at teacher and school level. Controls at teacher 
level include: age, sex, experience, tenure and salary of the teacher. Controls at school or 
department level include: last OFSTED report grade, ranking in quartile for 5+ A*-C in 
GCSE in the Performance Tables, dummies for core subjects, average normalized grade in 
KS2 for students in the department and pupil teacher ratio at department level. Core subjects 
are: English; Math; Science; History. Sample includes years between 2011 and 2013. Standard 
Errors clustered at school level. Level of signiﬁcance: 0.1 *; 0.05 **; 0.01 ***. 
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneity by student characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Baseline FSM eligible Non-FSM eligible Female Male Not White White Top Quality Bottom Quality 
Entry Rate -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.049*** -0.040*** -0.058*** -0.069*** -0.046*** -0.038*** -0.064*** 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
Observations 12659601 1376235 11283366 6409915 6249686 2141080 10518521 3543423 2812789 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXYear FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXYear FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXSchool FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Student FE N N N N N N N N N 
Note: OLS Regression at student, department and year level. The dependent variable is the average standardized test score in the KS4 exam by student, subject 
and year. Entry rate is deﬁned as the share of teachers in year t who were not present in the school in year t-1. Controls include teacher, student and school 
characteristics. Teacher characteristics include: average age of teacher in the department; average experience; share of female and average log salary. Student 
characteristics include: normalized prior test scores; Free School Meal (FSM) eligibility; gender; ethnicity (white/others). School characteristics include: pupil 
teacher ratio at department-school-year level; proportion of female students in the department; proportion of FSM eligible in the department; proportion of white 
students in the department; number of teacher in current and past academic year in the department. Sample includes years from 2009 to 2013. Standard Errors 
clustered at school level. Level of signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ***. 
C
H
A
PT
ER
 3.
 
T
EA
C
H
ER
 T
U
R
N
O
V
ER
 
Appendices 
3.A Tables 
Table 3.A.1: Teachers assigned to subjects by year 
Subject 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Math 17,592 18,651 22,010 22,485 23,041 
English 20,065 21,362 24,366 24,843 25,514 
History 12,997 13,578 14,926 15,246 15,659 
Science 24,757 26,119 28,934 29,321 29,663 
Other Foreign Languages 11,599 12,001 13,427 13,582 13,770 
Sports 13,593 14,379 15,985 15,917 16,058 
Biology 1,341 1,419 1,535 1,639 1,887 
Chemistry 1,062 1,132 1,342 1,464 1,611 
Physics 1,134 1,202 1,382 1,516 1,585 
Art 17,273 18,073 20,253 20,113 20,114 
IT 6,645 7,167 8,765 8,544 8,171 
Social Science 1,564 1,461 1,404 1,279 1,164 
Design 5,690 5,981 6,937 6,749 6,591 
Economics 7,242 7,638 8,615 8,437 8,430 
Home Economics 3,095 3,254 4,567 4,518 4,390 
Media 1,004 1,071 1,443 1,445 1,403 
Humanities 2,438 2,623 3,726 3,591 3,439 
Engineering 852 895 1,117 1,162 1,132 
Total 149,943 158,006 180,734 181,851 183,622 
Source: DTR up to 2010 and School Workforce Census from 2011 onwards. 
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Table 3.A.2: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Turnover measures at school-subject-year level 
Entry Overall 0.140 0.165 0 1 
Exit Overall 0.105 0.151 0 1 
Entry School 0.084 0.132 0 1 
Exit School 0.077 0.132 0 1 
Entry Profession 0.056 0.103 0 1 
Exit Profession 0.028 0.078 0 1 
Teacher characteristics 
Female 0.622 0.262 0 1 
Age 39.904 5.698 20.75 72 
Tenure School 6.923 2.848 1 20 
Student characteristics 
KS4 Standardized Score 0.009 0.988 -1.694 10.124 
KS2 Standardized Score 0.001 0.999 -4.331 2.204 
School/school-subject group variables 
# Teachers 70.565 24.171 2 170 
% FSM students 0.130 0.109 0 0.757 
% Female students 0.500 0.175 0 1 
% White students 0.815 0.230 0 1 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 16.905 4.204 0.744 316 
% Teachers between 20-29 0.197 0.194 0 1 
% Teachers between 30-39 0.332 0.229 0 1 
% Teachers between 40-49 0.242 0.214 0 1 
% Teachers over 50 0.229 0.221 0 1 
Note: Summary statistics at student level. Number of observations: 12,654,691. 
Table 3.A.3: Teacher turnover and student characteristics 
No Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects 
Variable Beta S.E. T-Stat Beta S.E. T-Stat 
Contemporaneous variables 
Standardized score in KS2 
Proportion White 
Proportion Female 
Proportion FSM 
-0.102 0.013 -8.097 
-0.086 0.008 -10.828 
0.005 0.006 0.888 
0.026 0.004 7.461 
-0.002 0.003 -0.548 
-0.001 0.001 -1.693 
-0.001 0.001 -1.105 
0.000 0.001 0.775 
Lagged variables 
Lag mean KS2 Standardized Score 
Lag Proportion of White Student 
Lag Proportion of Female Students 
Lag Proportion of FSM Students 
-0.183 0.021 -8.86 
-0.160 0.011 -14.681 
0.002 0.006 0.330 
0.025 0.004 7.024 
-0.022 0.012 -1.75 
0.000 0.001 0.110 
-0.002 0.001 -1.284 
0.000 0.001 0.026 
Note: Regressions of listed variables on entry rate in Columns (1) to (3) and on entry rate and 
ﬁxed eﬀects at school-year, department-year and school-department in Columns (4) to (6). Fixed 
eﬀects include school by year, subject by school and subject by year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors 
clustered at school level. Number of observations: 12,654,691. 
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Table 3.A.4: Teacher turnover and experience 
(1) (2) (3) (5) 
Linear Cubic Groups Tenure 
Entry rate -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.051*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Observations 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 12,654,691 
Year FE N N N N 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXYear FE Y Y Y Y 
SubjectXYear FE Y Y Y Y 
SchoolXSubj FE Y Y Y Y 
Student FE N N N N 
Note: OLS Regression at student level. The dependent variable is the average 
standardized test score in the KS4 exam by student, subject and year. Entry 
rate is deﬁned as the share of teachers in year t who were not present in the 
school in year t-1. Controls include teacher, student and school characterist­
ics. Teacher characteristics include: average age of teacher in the department; 
average experience; share of female and average log salary. Student character­
istics include: normalized prior test scores; Free School Meal (FSM) eligibility; 
gender; ethnicity (white/others). School characteristics include: pupil teacher 
ratio at department-school-year level; proportion of female students in the 
department; proportion of FSM eligible in the department; proportion of 
white students in the department; number of teacher in current and past 
academic year in the department. Column (1) controls linearly for average 
experience in the department; Column (2) controls for a cubic polynomial; 
Column (3) controls for the share of teachers in diﬀerent experience groups 
(2 years; between 2 and 5 years; between 5 and 10 years; more than 10 years); 
Column (4) controls linearly for school tenure. Sample includes years from 
2009 to 2013. Standard Errors clustered at school level. Level of signiﬁcance: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ***. 
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